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ABSTRACT
This study aims to understand the security policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and investigate NATO’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) approach in Afghanistan
between 2003 and 2014. The primary research question in this study asked the following:
In terms of NATO’s SSR approach in Afghanistan, what worked, what did not work, and
why did certain aspects of SSR fail? The analysis sheds light on the policy-relevant,
logistic and doctrinal intricacies associated with NATO’s now almost twenty-year record
of involvement in Afghanistan, as well as liberal institutionalism’s policy relevance. This
research benefits the security policy community by asking whether NATO's SSR agenda
in Afghanistan was progressive, and whether its weaknesses call for the reform of its
approach and execution – or its abandonment. The research findings indicate there were
faults with the SSR project in Afghanistan, and modes of execution and stages of policy
development were incoherent and inconsistent, but liberal institutionalism helps explain
how to establish vital institutions and ensure more democratic transitions of power so that
the international community and multilateral institutions like NATO remain engaged.

KEYWORDS:
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SUMMARY
This research demonstrates that the NATO’s attempts to reform the security sector in
Afghanistan have been marred by both progress and faults. The majority of the problems
were with the way in which stages of security policy development were crafted. This
research found that they were inconsistent and incoherent, but liberal institutionalist
theory helps explain how to establish vital institutions and ensure more democratic
transitions of power so that the international community and multilateral institutions like
NATO remain engaged.
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CHAPTER 1
Security Sector Reform: NATO’s intent and processes in Afghanistan:
Introduction
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was toppled by the United States (US) in
2001 with relative ease in military terms yet the US-led invasion appears to have failed
to produce strong social cohesion, effective institution-building mechanisms and
sufficient implementation of the constitutional rule of law. Since the US invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) involvement
in 2003, considerable emphasis has been directed toward building and rebuilding the
nation’s security apparatus – its military, police and intelligence sectors – for the
purposes of tackling a resilient Taliban insurgency. Since 2003, NATO’s overall intent
and processes in Afghanistan have come to be known as Security Sector Reform (SSR)
but there is considerable debate among academics and other experts as to whether
SSR has been wholly successful, moderately successful, somewhat successful or
entirely unsuccessful. Questions about NATO’s success or failure in Afghanistan remain
important – despite the US and Canada’s intended withdrawal from the country over
time – because the lessons learned from Afghanistan could be applied to other Out-ofArea conflicts in the decades to come. They are also useful for understanding NATO’s
record of success, mixed success or failure – in Afghanistan and have important
implications for NATO itself, particularly given the billions of dollars of aid and funding
that were spent– and could be promised in future years.
The rapid fall of the Taliban regime following the US-led invasion in October 2001
temporarily ended more than two decades of ethnic conflict which had virtually
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destroyed all structures of a functioning state in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to preserve the communist sphere of influence in the
region, millions of Afghans were displaced and forced into neighbouring countries and
beyond while another million civilians were killed by relentless shelling between Soviets
and mujahideen fighters. Following years of ethnic conflict among the Hazara,
Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, subsequent Taliban rule in Afghanistan destroyed most
major cities in Afghanistan.
The collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001 following the US-led intervention
brought about an era of uncertainty, instability, and security-related issues which
continue today. With the establishment and international recognition of the Afghan
Interim Administration during the Bonn conference in 2001, which declared Hamed
Karzai the transitional leader of Afghanistan, there was much speculation as to how the
new administration would curb the influence of warlords and contemporaneously
maintain order and security in both major cities and rural parts of the country. Without
hesitation, US-allied groups such as the Northern Alliance and the National Islamic
movement of Afghanistan came to dominate key security ministries in the new
administration and merged their militias into the police, intelligence, and the military
apparatuses. These unforeseen developments, which came about with the integration
of mujahideen fighters into Afghan security institutions in 2001, came to be a major
impediment to the NATO-led SSR process which began in 2003 and continues today.
In the realm of post-conflict settings, SSR, as a policy initiative, has emerged in
the past two decades as a progressive policy prescription to improve state security in
keeping with the liberal democratic objectives of accountability, good governance, and
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transparency. In attempting to institute liberal democratic objectives, SSR aims to
systematically differentiate and professionalize the functions of the intelligence, military,
and police apparatuses in post-conflict situations. Afghanistan, as an experimental case
study for SSR, provides essential insight into the practicality and feasibility of such an
approach. This section aims to highlight and discuss the prominent theoretical literature
relevant to the SSR process in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. In addition to the
prominent policy aspects of SSR discussed earlier, this section aims to acquaint the
readers with the foundational and theoretical basis of the SSR literature about
Afghanistan and to underscore the gap in security studies literature which this research
study aims to bridge.
This research does not grapple with the advantages and disadvantages of
NATO’s decision to insert itself directly in to the conflict, but is rather intended to
investigate whether liberal institutionalism’s policy relevance for understanding the
merits and demerits of the NATO security framework’s attempt to institute the rule of law
in Afghanistan. Although Taliban power has greatly diminished since the invasion and
many opportunities were granted to some Afghans as a result, NATO intervention
struggled to secure Afghanistan from some remaining forms of insurgency that were
primarily driven by extremist ideologies rooted in ethnic relations and politics.
Additionally, the lack of formal military discipline and morale in Afghanistan’s
nascent security apparatuses galvanized both the US and NATO to professionally
organize the security sector of Afghanistan in accordance with Western standards and
with full international support. Yet, SSR requires certain prerequisites in order to be fully
implemented. In post-conflict situations, these requirements include minimum levels of
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stability, security and institutional capacity; upholding the sanctity of core liberal
principles which SSR emanates from; professional training of armed forces in
accountability; responsibility to civilians; and a clear understanding of legal procedures
according to democratic values. Therefore, the main purpose of this dissertation is to
gain a comprehensive insight into the following overarching research questions:
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In terms of NATO’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan between
2003 and 2014, what worked, and what did not work? The secondary question
pertaining to this research study asks: Why did certain aspects of SSR fail?
This study aims to understand the operational issues of NATO’s security policy to
investigate the SSR approach’s record of SSR in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014.
It will demonstrate that this record was not uniform, but rather mixed. Careful analysis of
this set of outcomes may shed light on the doctrinal- and policy-relevant intricacies
associated with NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan. The single most important
contribution of this research will directly benefit members of the security policy
community by providing them with policy-relevant assessments regarding whether
NATO’s SSR agenda in Afghanistan has been successful, and whether its weaknesses
call for the reform of its approach and execution – or its abandonment.
To reiterate, this research study asks what worked and what did not work in
terms of NATO’s SSR approach in Afghanistan. This thesis does not test whether the
NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan was a success or not. In order to maintain
objectivity in conducting this research study, it is important not to judge the entire
NATO-led SSR mission in Afghanistan as a clear case of success or a failure given that
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NATO’s SSR mission lacked clear indicators of progress and deficiencies from 20032014. As such, the focal point of this research study is to investigate and reveal what
worked and what did not work, not whether it was a complete success, abject failure or
in between.
This research could concomitantly inform the research community with respect to
the merits and deficiencies of NATO’s SSR agenda in other out-of-area developing
countries. And it may indicate how NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan could have been
improved, maintained or better aligned in accordance with local, national, regional and
structural conditions.

Research Methodology and Data Collection
Participants in the study were primarily asked to reflect upon a set of issues,
including but not limited to the following four themes:
Theme 1: the extent of bureaucratic and institutional reform at the Afghan Ministry of
Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS);
Theme 2: the field operations aspect and capabilities of MoD, MoI, and NDS units;
Theme 3: the aspects of NATO’s SSR approach that worked, did not work, and why?
Theme 4: how NATO’s SSR agenda could have been done better in hindsight? And
what could be done better now?
In short, participants were asked what they thought about how NATO’s SSR
agenda provided institutional assistance to the rebuilding of the security sector in
Afghanistan. In order to better understand what is revealed by the research process
itself – as well as the interviews of participants who engaged in SSR – the study makes
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use of qualitative interviews. It needs to be emphasized that the interviews focused
mainly on what interviewees – having participated in devising security policy in
Afghanistan – thought about crafting and institutionalizing security policy. Interviewees
for this research were mainly comprised of mid-to-high-level elites and policymakers in
NATO and Afghanistan who were extensively involved in SSR. Approximately the same
set of questions was asked of each person.
This methodological approach was selected from the beginning of the research
study because it was assumed that the interviewer would encounter a varied group of
interviewees, each with their own sets of occupation-and training-related language or
jargon, understandings, and specializations. In short, many of the questions were
designed to be universally relevant and the final questions at the end of the interview
were designed to be specifically relevant, depending on the interviewee’s position, past
experiences and occupation.
This research made use of non-invasive observation techniques including elite
interviewing (Lancaster, 2016, 7), as well as other techniques such as examining
training and education manuals and relevant pieces of legislation including various and
significant documents and articles related to SSR itself. In total, 30 people were
interviewed by the author, Sakhi Naimpoor, at various institutions including NATO
headquarters in Brussels, Belgium; Hamburg, Germany; Kabul, Afghanistan; and
Ottawa, Canada between February 2017 and October 2018. The interviews were
conducted at different institutions and locations listed in the chart, ‘Interviews
Conducted’ included as an Appendix in this thesis.
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The interviews were conducted in public spaces including boardrooms,
cafeterias, hotel lobbies and offices. All interviews were conducted in the English
language as each interviewee chose to speak English (rather than Farsi). Each face-toface interview lasted approximately 30 minutes to one hour. The only identifiable
information that was collected included the interviewee’s full name, work address
including work email address; and information about where the interview will be and
was conducted. The interviewer’s handwritten notes identified the research participant
by a number, not their name, address or any personal information. All this information
was not shared with others and this information was collected in order to contact the
participant by email and to arrange the location and time of one study visit interview.
This research study does not attribute any quotes or information in this thesis with any
of the research participants interviewed. All research participants in this study declined
to be directly quoted or have any identifiable information attributed to them directly.
Instead, the research participants only consented to be referenced in the bibliography
as an interviewee and not within the body of the dissertation which could potentially
jeopardize their sensitive positions within their respective organizations.
A general outline of relevant questions had been developed and was approved as part
of the September 2017 application to the University of Western Ontario Research Ethics
Board. Some of the approved questions were intentionally devised as open-ended to
allow for a diversity of responses. Approximately the same set of questions was asked
of each person. See Appendix 1 for further details regarding the research methodology.
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CHAPTER 2
Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan and Literature Review
This chapter jointly analyzes the paradigmatic explanations of SSR, and the
more detailed operational issues associated with it to demonstrate both merits and
demerits of SSR. First, the academic literature regarding theoretical arguments which
frame the SSR process in Afghanistan within the more extensive and often competing
theories of international relations is discussed. Then, the relevant academic literature
published by security-oriented researchers about the implementation of SSR in
Afghanistan is discussed. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief analysis of the
competing perspectives on SSR and examines which approach is compatible with a
further theoretical and operational inquiry.
This chapter now proceeds to discuss the overarching grand theoretical debates
concerning the SSR’s liberal democratic principles. The aim here is to build the
theoretical basis on which SSR is founded and shed light on the critiques of liberal
institutionalist theory.

Theoretical Debates
The evolving definition of security since the end of World War II (WWII) opened a
multitude of analytical fronts for the academic development of security studies.
Traditionally, security was a state-centric concept primarily attributed to the
strengthening and enhancement of national security. Over time, security studies
literature came to embody multifaceted definitions of security, such as human security,
food and water security and environmental security, which transcended state-specific
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responsibilities of providing security (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). These transmutations
in the analytical concept and definition of security now commonly affect various stages
of policy development in order to develop sound policy options.
Despite the conceptual maturation of the school of security studies, academic
discourse in the field has been overwhelmingly focused on enhancing state security
since the events of 9/11 (Hama, 2017, 2). State security includes power relations,
determining intentions of state and non-state actors, and the development and
advancement of intelligence, military, and police capabilities to counter existential
threats to securitize the sanctity of the state (Hama, 2017, 2-5; William, 2010, 623-625).
Over the past decade, academics have published extensive policy
recommendations that prescribe improving NATO’s security outcomes to improve the
legitimacy of the constitution in Afghanistan through the ‘boots on the ground’ approach.
They have put forward policy propositions based on singular conceptions of the conflict
and assertions about the roots of the conflict in Afghanistan regarding liberal
institutionalist accounts. By aligning their propositions in favour of the legitimacy of
widely recognized institutions such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU),
NATO and the World Bank (WB), they have argued that these international institutions
possess both the material capabilities and technical expertise to foster an environment
of progress and cooperation and facilitate the establishment of the constitutional rule of
law in Afghanistan (Nuruzzaman, 2008, 195).
Upholders of such claims have been more concerned with the effectiveness of
the fragile Afghan government. They have pointed to the absence of institutional
infrastructures, non-existent or nascent democratic principles, weak electoral
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contestation, absentee parliamentary arrangements, a nascent constitutional framework
and weak incremental progress as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
indices. They have belaboured the poor access of Afghans to education and decreases
in quality of life as other indicators of how democracy has failed to take root (Mac Ginty,
2010, 584-586).
Within the scope of liberal institutionalism, security for states is understood as the
ability to endure unprecedented shocks to the established institutions and form of
authority and the measure of the relative ease with which a state can retain levels of
normalcy. In the case of Afghanistan, the degrees to which the Afghan government can
withstand and fail to withstand insurgencies while still being able or unable to uphold the
legitimacy of the constitutional rule of law are also taken as measurements of state
fragility or state stability.
Liberal institutionalism argues that for there to be stability and peace in
international affairs, states must cooperate together in an environment of anarchy and in
effect yield some of their sovereignty to create ‘integrated communities’ to promote
economic growth and respond to regional and international security issues (Jupille and
Caporaso, 1999, 430). In short, liberal institutionalists tend to assert that the Afghan
administration should focus upon strengthening the legitimacy of international norms
and values in state-building initiatives, accepting democratic principles and fostering
NATO’s security apparatuses in terms of establishing the constitutional rule of law
(Rubin, 2006, 179-183).
Like academics in the liberal institutionalist school, security experts have built
upon liberal institutionalist principles to craft policy options with a certain bent toward
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Western beliefs. In the West, SSR has traditionally been articulated as a vital element of
liberal state-building and peace-building processes in Afghanistan. Central to the
operational mandate of SSR is the focus on liberal principles of the SSR model,
accentuating responsibility and accountability in governance, an institutionally
embedded respect for human rights, sustainability of fragile and emerging democratic
states, and democratic civilian control of the political realm (Stàlvant, 2016, 33;
Stapleton and Keating, 2015, 3-6). In short, they lobby for democratic reform to root out
the inefficiencies within the government’s bureaucratic apparatuses but at the same
time, emphasize that the Afghan populace and government are incapable of continuing
in the spirit of state-building without the strong help of powerful international actors
(Barany and Rauchhaus, 2011, 289-292).
Analysts in the discipline of conflict management have asserted that
Afghanistan’s fragile democracy and ineffective institutions can still be considered a
success because the current trend of patrimonialism in a state bureaucracy will
smoothly shift into ‘proto-bureaucracy’ with increased oversight and will eventually
arrive at a modern state bureaucracy which will be imitative of features that can be
observed today in Western democracies (Berman, 2010, 5). Therefore, the core claims
of academics and security experts seem to be entrenched in temporal considerations
for progress and embedded in fundamental processes that assume democratic
institution-building is necessary to buttress the successful formation of the Afghan state.
The focus on international organizations (NATO, UN, World Bank, etc.) and
international regimes that are based on rules, norms and principles that help govern the
interaction of state and non-state actors on issues such as human rights are what make
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the argument in favour of liberal institutionalism so compelling. This is because it allows
for non-state actors and those that would be marginalized by the modernist project such
as civil society activists and grassroots movements to be brought back into world affairs.
The relevance of liberal institutionalist theory to the developmental and legal
discourse in Afghanistan is quite evident with the presence and involvement of
numerous international organizations. Some academics that have adopted a liberal
institutionalist framework for understanding democratic transitions include R. Alcaro
(2018), R. Duvall and M. Barnett (2018), Michael Schechter (2018), Erik Voeten (2019),
and Rorden Wilkinson and Thomas Weiss (2018).
However, others have questioned and critiqued whether liberal institutionalism
serves as a genuine alternative to the realist approach to international conflict. This
thesis does not conduct research into whether the realist approach can adequately
explains the course and character of international conflict and security, and in particular
the issue of SSR in Afghanistan; rather, the focus instead is on understanding and
evaluating the explanatory power of liberal institutionalism. However, the concluding
chapter of this dissertation considers some aspects of the realist approach to
international conflict in light of the research findings.
Like neo-realists, liberal institutionalists tend to assume that the international
system is fundamentally anarchic, and they continue to emphasize national sovereignty
as sacrosanct (Alcaro, 2018, 4-6; Keohane and Martin, 1995, 43-47; Navari, 2019, 5357). Drawing upon historical evidence from previous conflicts, they tend to argue that
international organizations such as NATO and the UN during the Cold War were
paralyzed by US-Soviet vetoes, and the emphasis on the financial needs of leading
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liberal states for dealing with security issues left only meagre resources for the
development of weaker states (Keohane and Martin 1995; Moravscik 2001;
Nuruzzaman 2008; Richmond 2009).
Since the end of the Cold War, liberal institutionalists have been criticized for
failing to recognize the impact that domestic forces and ethics have in promoting more
cooperative strategies to deal with moral and ethical issues (Bell and Evans, 2010,
377). Although SSR experts favour liberal institutionalist accounts, many poststructuralists or critical theory proponents have framed the ongoing conflict in
Afghanistan in a distinct manner (Åhäll, 2018, 87-91; Larsson, 2015, 181-185). Poststructuralists (or what some point to as the Scandinavian post-modern, post-critical
school) point to the poverty of absurd policy options emerging from liberal
internationalist accounts. They posit that post-structuralism should be more concerned
with the epistemological concerns of knowledge building and as such, post-structuralists
are unable to offer helpful insight into the practical context of war and conflict resolution
(Zalewski and Smith, 1996, 331-337). Nevertheless, there has been a significant push
in recent years to reframe the conflict in Afghanistan through the lens of poststructuralism (Stritzel and Chang, 2015, 551-555).
Post-structuralist approaches tend to argue that liberal institutionalism in the
name of democracy is colonizing the indigenous fabric of far distant lands, and in so
doing, essentially commits a serious disservice to the agency of the constructed other.
(Campbell, 2007, 211; Heath-Kelly, 2016, 78-81). Thus, they argue, the majority of
available security-related literature about the conflict in Afghanistan is at best grounded
in liberal institutionalist assumptions, while critical explanations have more recently
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surfaced to proffer viable alternative interpretations (Crilley and Chatterje-Doody, 2018,
1-5; Hansen, 2012, 95; Hauer, 2017, 191-194; Roberts, 2012, 41-43; Sandu, 2011, 114117; and Walshaw, 2014, 107-109).
The academic debate regarding SSR in Afghanistan has been continuously
evolving between liberal institutionalists and post-structuralists (sometimes referred to
as critical theorists or as critical security studies) since 2001. Post-structuralist critics of
SSR tend to vehemently argue that the internationally supported security stabilization
and state-building efforts in Afghanistan have not been a success (Coletta and Rynning,
2012, 28-31; Dodge, 2013, 1193). They do accept that the US-led military intervention
that toppled the Taliban regime was largely welcomed by the Afghan public (Dennys
and Hamilton-Baillie, 2012, 4-7). However, consistent failure to ensure security, stability,
and rule of law across Afghanistan, despite billions of dollars in foreign aid, has
undermined the Afghan public’s trust in the Afghan government and more importantly,
has cast doubt on the genuine intention of its international partners (Abrahamsen, 2016,
287; Ayub et al., 2009, 11; Perito, 2009, 63-67). These are the more potent criticisms
made by critics in the critical security studies school of thought, which might be better
understood as a lens, rather than a school of thought based on precise theoretical and
empirical precepts.
Critics of SSR have some more detailed ideas, but these are difficult to glean
from this rather general and at times ambiguous literature. For example, some of them
further argue that the actual development of SSR, including reform of the Afghan
National Police (ANP) including the Afghan Border Police (ABP); the Afghan National
Army (ANA); and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) was compromised during
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the 2001 Bonn Conference in Germany. The key claims are that the externally
generated reforms could not help but be superficial in application. In Ayub and Kuovo’s
(2009) words,
[...] the continuing security challenges and the lack of international- and
national-led security rushed the pace of the re-establishment of a national
police force in particular. As a consequence, the focus of the reforms were
not as much on a comprehensive census and verification process or on
building credible institutions, but more on ensuring a minimal security
presence in provinces and districts. The pressure on establishing a security
sector (not necessarily reforming it) also undermined rule of law
considerations: checks and balances and internal accountability
mechanisms have not received adequate attention (Ayub and Kuovo, 2009,
11).
Furthermore, context-specific criticisms of the SSR project in Afghanistan have
been brought to the fore by some thinkers using the post-structuralist lens in that they
detail the shortcomings and inherent flaws that have beset the core liberal mandate of
SSR as it has evolved over time. These criticisms are directed at the critical pillars of
SSR in Afghanistan, including the reformative approach employed by NATO to
rehabilitate the military, police, judiciary, counter-narcotics, and the demobilization,
disintegration and reintegration of peace-seeking insurgents (Stritzel and Chang, 2015,
551-557).
First-generation and second-generation SSR
In light of the continuously evolving academic debate between the liberal
institutionalist and post-structuralist schools of inquiry regarding the merits and demerits
of SSR, it is important to distinguish and explain the two main and often competing
conceptions of SSR. Paul Jackson, Research Fellow at the Center for African Studies,
differentiates between first and second-generation SSR, although conceding that the
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discourse in security studies has been dominated by the former (Jackson, 2018, 2-3).
Jackson describes first-generation SSR as a set of principles emanating from liberal
democratic doctrines linking good governance to abstract definitions of the rule of law,
civilian control over security institutions, and the enshrinement and protection of human
rights (Jackson, 2018, 2).
Jackson underscores the decades-old dominance of academic discourse aligned
with first-generation SSR as a policy configuration aimed at comprehensive statebuilding in conflict-affected states. However, Jackson maintains that first-generation
SSR can be better understood and scrutinized as a set of vacuous and hollow
undertakings by donor countries, international organizations, and non-state actors
aiming to implement a basic set of contrived principles to a complex set of
circumstances (Jackson, 2018, 3). Even more, Jackson contends that first-generation
SSR has been traditionally implemented for security institutions on an ad hoc basis and
mostly lacks both comprehensiveness and coordination (Jackson, 2018, 4).
Aphoristically, this means that SSR means different things to different intervening
states in conflict-affected states. To comparatively illustrate Jackson’s point with an
example from Afghanistan’s SSR journey, while the US focused on the rapid training
and build-up of security apparatuses, Germany concerned itself with gradually training
the Afghan National Police (ANP) based on community-based civilian policing, France
led a developmental approach to security, and Norway fixated on building a capable
and responsive counter-terrorism force.
Another area of concern for Jackson apropos the implementation of firstgeneration SSR in conflict-affected states is the ownership of the process itself. Above
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all, Jackson argues that SSR must be understood as a political process that undergirds
the fabric of social relations between the state and locals in order to build reliable and
accountable security institutions (Jackson, 2018, 4-5). Technocratic approaches to
security stabilization schemes systematically repress and ostracize local expertise in
favour of the esoteric institutional knowledge which external actors purport to possess in
building both human and institutional capacity. As a direct consequence, the power
relations between the state and society are relegated to the realm of ‘internal and social
affairs’ removed from the political processes which concern SSR (Jackson, 2018, 4-6).
On the other hand, Jackson draws attention to the nascent doctrine emerging
within security studies, increasingly known as ‘second-generation SSR.’ Jackson begins
by acknowledging the ambivalence and the propensity towards path dependence in
contemporary security studies. On the one hand, there is the temptation to relapse into
first-generation SSR, and on the other hand, there is the post-liberal initiative to
somehow incorporate concepts such as societal relations, inclusive ownership,
development, and sustainability into a hybrid model (Jackson, 2018, 6).
Considering that there is a lack of concrete definition of second-generation SSR
due to its contemporary roots, it is conceptually described as embodying a parallel
arrangement that considers the weight of ‘hidden politics’ towards comprehensive state
building endeavours (Jackson, 2018, 6). In other words, second-generation SSR
attentively accentuates the importance of institutional politics, not just institutions;
procedures and processes within organizations, not just structures; and the relationship
between institutions and society, not just bureaucratic procedures (Jackson, 2018, 7).
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In like manner, Stephen Baranyi, professor of international development and
global studies at the University of Ottawa, explains that the concept of secondgeneration SSR emerged in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. Baranyi argues that
vague policy suggestions crafted to facilitate democratization and the “technical
reinforcement of state security agencies based on a Western model of the state”
pursued by the first-generation model galvanized critical security academics to explore
alternative approaches to improve security outcomes in conflict-affected states (Baranyi,
2019, 2).
Baranyi proclaims that the first-generation model has largely been atheoretical in
the sense that context-specific alternatives were either unexplored or largely escaped
academic scrutiny owing to the dominance of the unquestioned body of knowledge
which placed the state at the centre of security preservation (Baranyi, 2019, 2). For
Baranyi, second-generation SSR maintains flexible traits ranging from appropriateness
of security policy to specific contexts governed by local conditions to long-term
commitment to the rule of law in attempting to reform the culture of governance
pertaining to security institutions in conflict-affected states (Baranyi, 2019, 2-3).

Liberal Institutional Proponents of Security Sector Reform further examined:
So far, this chapter has briefly outlined the positions of the main proponents and
critics of the fundamental principles of SSR. Further analysis and examination of critical
literature will establish that their criticisms are neither conclusive nor complete and do
not necessarily indicate a total failure of the SSR project. The literature review, thus far,
merely serves to provide readers with a synopsis of the largely theoretical literature by
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academics who are keen to point out the merits and demerits of the SSR process. To
encourage further research and fieldwork to alleviate some of these context-specific and
nuanced problems, this research now endeavours to add to the existing paradigm of
knowledge of SSR by providing a more detailed literature review of the evolving
approach to SSR since 2001.
Liberal institutionalists have generally emphasized the process of state-building
in Afghanistan through SSR in favour of building a capable security force through
gradual institutional reforms with the support of NATO member countries. Liberal
institutionalists tend to propose, for example, that a functioning security and justice
sector is a crucial indicator of stability (Glickstein, 2014, 93-95; Maley, 2013, 262).
Furthermore, SSR is seen to involve a more ‘holistic’ approach in that it focuses not only
on integrating defense, police, intelligence, and judicial reform but also on a normative
commitment to the consolidation of democracy and the promotion of human rights and
of principles of good governance – including accountability and transparency in
Afghanistan (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandermoortele, 2012, 147-152; Gross, 2009, 18).
Key SSR activities, from the perspective of liberal institutionalists, thus include
reforming security institutions, strengthening control mechanisms, and restructuring the
security sector. Given the broad range of political and economic instruments at NATO’s
disposal, NATO was in an advantageous position to implement SSR activities through
policy instruments in Afghanistan. Not only did NATO possess the political and
economic instruments, it further multilaterally possessed the institutional and security
sector expertise to help Afghanistan in its slow progress towards democracy, stability,
and reconciliation (Koehler and Gosztonyi, 2014, 238-240).
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Gross (2009) concisely sums up the challenges of SSR implementation in her
words:
The specific context of Afghanistan, however, highlights the challenges in
implementing SSR in a setting where state legitimacy is violently
challenged, and organized crime and corruption thrive. Unlike other areas
where NATO has engaged in SSR activities, Afghanistan presents a case
where large-scale military operations take place alongside state and
institution-building efforts on the part of the international community – and
where the inherent contradiction between military operations in the context
of the war against terror and institution-building efforts has tended to
somewhat undermine the effectiveness of SSR (Gross, 2009, 11).
As Gross points out, there are challenges such as corruption, violent crime and a
prevailing culture of informalism in state institutions, however, these evident challenges
do not necessarily lend credence to the positions of critics in the critical security studies
school but rather serve to highlight the evolving nature of global conflicts and how
NATO’s SSR efforts have evolved from short-term security stabilization to long-term
institutional commitment in conflict situations.
In order to chart Afghanistan’s SSR process, from a liberal internationalist
perspective, therefore, it is imperative to begin with an appraisal of the published
literature on SSR as it has been pursued by advocates of NATO in Afghanistan along
with the alliance’s other international partners.
Barnett Rubin draws attention to an essential aspect of the SSR process in
Afghanistan – the rivalry and incoherence associated with the attempt to adopt a
unilateral and uniform approach in post-conflict situations to institute democratic
accountability, transparency and responsibility. Rubin argued in 2006 that the pursuit of
sustainable development, peace, and security while also following democratic principles
in Afghanistan would progressively require the coordination and decentralization of
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authority from unilateral actors to multilateral actors (Rubin, 2006, 177-181). In other
words, Rubin suggested early on that the SSR process in Afghanistan pursued by
NATO since 2003 should have been delegated to a multilateral entity such as the UN,
which could effectively pursue the core mandate of liberal democratic objectives. By
doing so, it would have prevented the fragmentation of the SSR mandate due to the
propensity of unilateral actors to act upon their own set of values, opinions, and
motivations (Rubin, 2006, 181-184). Thus, the focal point of Rubin’s argument is that
divergent operational doctrines and agendas would require a systemic overhaul to
streamline the SSR approach in order to avert the prevalence of anarchy and the
culture of informalism in Afghanistan.
In line with Rubin’s position, Emma Sky argues that the SSR process in
Afghanistan was vulnerable to the preferences and priorities of a donor-driven agenda
pursued by NATO countries whereby the responsibilities of intelligence, military and
police sector reform were divided multilaterally. In her report written for the Royal United
Services Institute, she postulates that the ‘lead nation’ – the nation charged with
overseeing reforms in a specific sector of the SSR process – dictates the direction of
the specific security sector’s policy and reform in Afghanistan (Sky, 2006, 23-24).
Therefore, she attributes the flaws in the SSR process in Afghanistan to a lack of
coordination, both between NATO countries and Afghan authorities, and the omission of
domestic factors in constructing policy directives to allow for local ownership of reform in
the security sector (Sky, 2006, 22). Lastly, Sky argues that disallowing domestic
ownership of reform in the security sector would effectively inhibit the critical task of
local capacity building to strengthen the role of institutions in Afghanistan (Sky, 2006,
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22-26). Therefore, Sky harbours a distrustful position about NATO’s SSR strategy in
Afghanistan and proceeds to foretell that security-related efforts will fail due to a lack of
strong security institutions with Afghans as significant stakeholders (Sky, 2006, 26).
In the same vein, Professor Mark Sedra’s research at the Center for Security
Governance in Waterloo on SSR echoes Jackson and Donais’ apprehensions regarding
the feasibility of donor-driven SSR agendas as a cornerstone for development and
stability. In 2006, 2007 and 2013, Sedra’s systematic review of quantitative data from
NATO initiatives in Afghanistan led him to draw several crucial inferences. First, Sedra
deduces that measures of accountability, responsibility, and transparency, in harmony
with the SSR principles of ‘good governance’, were grossly overlooked and ignored in
favour of the internal political expediency of donor states (Sedra, 2013, 375-387).
Sedra explains that the liberal peace project in Afghanistan, from which SSR
emanates, has been practically disconnected from principles of liberalism due to
domestic political pressure and regional geopolitics (Sedra, 2013, 384-386). Rising
casualties among NATO combat troops, the resiliency of the Taliban from the brink of
military defeat, and the growing frustration of donor states with the inadequate
capabilities of Afghan security apparatuses contributed to the figurative changes in the
implementation of SSR (Sedra, 2006; 2007; 2013) See Figure 2.0 for more analysis by
of the number of US and coalition troops fatalities in Afghanistan in 2001-2013
(Brookings Institute 2014).
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Figure 2.0: Number of US and Coalition Troop Fatalities in Afghanistan, 2001 – 2013

Open access source: Brookings Institution, 2014
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Secondly, NATO’s SSR priorities in Afghanistan came to be dispensable and
replaceable by donor-states’ priorities and directives. As time passed, the human
security aspect of SSR in Afghanistan was intentionally suppressed by NATO and
delegated to weak and incapable Afghan security forces (Sedra, 2006, 97-104). At the
same time, the focus of NATO’s SSR agenda transitioned from building strong security
institutions embodying legal and bureaucratic procedures to counterinsurgency and
rapid recruitment and integration of Afghan personnel in security apparatuses of the
state. Consequently, the shift from state building to counterterrorism in tandem with the
multilateral disengagement of NATO from Afghanistan leading up to 2014 brought to the
fore the intricacies of pursuing the first-generation model of SSR (Sedra, 2013, 378381).
Finally, Sedra challenges SSR’s rigid prescription of statebuilding in terms of
building Western-style security institutions in conflict-affected states, such as
Afghanistan, and the omission of regional politics as a factor in the development of
security policy. As a vocal proponent of second-generation SSR, Sedra postulates that
donor-driven security governance in Afghanistan has not benefitted from regional
cooperation to offset the geopolitical effects of insecurity (Sedra, 2018, 53-54). He
includes a critique of NATO’s parochial view of achieving security cooperation from the
state itself rather than from the involvement of regional stakeholders and power brokers
in improving security outcomes in Afghanistan (Sedra, 2018, 54). Sedra proposes a
parallel form of security engagement with neighbouring states to attain regional
cooperation, and more political support to coordinate SSR activities in conflict-affected
states (Sedra, 2018, 54).
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Having considered all the crucial factors above, Sedra suggests that the systemic
conceptualization and reimagination of the contemporary SSR model are long overdue.
For Sedra, systemic change to the current mainstream model of SSR is multi-faceted
and complex in character. For one thing, SSR must transition from a first-generation
concept arrested by the apprehensions of liberal democratic objectives to a holistic and
flexible approach (Sedra, 2018, 60-61). This would involve the methodical alignment of
SSR initiatives to local conditions by taking into consideration the informal governance
structures that may exist in fragile states, political and economic aspects of the conflict
and enabling local ownership of processes (Sedra, 2018, 61).
Another segment of SSR reconfiguration involves coming to terms with the
limitations of the mainstream model and the normative principles of democratic reform
guiding institutional change in the security sector (Sedra, 2018, 60-61). To envision
SSR as a platform for progressive change toward development and security requires an
evolution in implementation, whereby security policy transmutes from one that is donordriven to a joint effort comprising both internal and external stakeholders and a
decentralized model of leadership (Sedra, 2018, 61).
Nicole Ball, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington,
finds fault with such assertions. Ball asserts that effective SSR policy is a nexus of
democratic governance, sustainable security sector coordination, and development
(Ball, 2005, 27). She puts forth the normative argument that the state’s legitimacy
should only be guaranteed and sustained once the democratic governance of the
security sector decentralizes to a civilian model of control (Ball, 2005, 27).
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Specifically, Ball references Miller and Pereito (2004), and Sedra (2003), to
discuss the case of Afghanistan where the main emphasis is placed upon the
establishment of security institutions, and command structures, with little or no civilian
control over the development of the intelligence, military, and police apparatuses (Ball,
2005, 27-28; Miller and Pereito 2004; Sedra, 2003). Ball further explores the democratic
governance of the security sector in post-conflict settings and questions whether
institutional development in the security sector is synchronous with human capacity in
terms of pace and scope (Ball, 2005, 27-28). Is it possible to build strong institutions
and human capacity concurrently? What explains the weaknesses of security
institutions in fragile states? Does an adequate level of human capacity in weak states
improve political and security governance?
After carefully considering the merits of democratic governance in the security
sector, Ball proceeds to outline three fundamental elements to strengthen democratic
oversight in fragile states. First and foremost, there must be political will within the
national leadership to reform the security sector. Secondly, reformative processes must
be contextually specific and appropriate. This includes the incorporation of informal
legal structures, cultural norms, traditions, and values to craft a holistic security policy.
Finally, the determination to democratically reform the security sector involves the
establishment of transparent intragovernmental channels of communication to
coordinate activities, set in motion consultative processes between the civil-sector and
government bodies, as well as security-sector and public engagement (Ball, 2006, 28).
To reiterate, Ball’s suggestions towards democratic control of security
governance via local ownership was in keeping with the prevalent conjectures
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presented by the proponents of second-generation SSR. At the same time, Ball
assumes that political will in fragile states emerges from an ambiguous constellation of
political interests to democratically orient the security sector as per the principles of
good governance (Ball, 2006).
On the contrary, Colonel Duncan Barley of the UK’s Land Warfare Department,
who spent a significant amount of time with the Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan,
accentuates the importance of a national security strategy alongside SSR processes.
Barley concedes that Afghanistan’s SSR journey is unique and unparalleled in that it
has not had a functioning government with a set of institutions since the fall of Dr.
Najibullah’s Communist regime in 1992. Hence, SSR in Afghanistan is not merely an
undertaking to reform weak security institutions, but it also encompasses the statebuilding enterprise from the bottoms-up (Barley, 2008, 52).
By its very nature, the monumental task of reforming and instituting the Afghan
security sector is fraught with challenges, tensions, and complications requiring political
will and an integrated approach to devise a capable national security strategy (Barley,
2008, 52-53). Barley proposes that SSR’s progress in Afghanistan is dependent on the
integration of SSR into the national security strategy, which takes into consideration the
root causes of internal conflict, implementation of confidence-building measures, and
the gradual transition of command to Afghan security forces (Barley, 2008, 52).
The prevalent theme in SSR’s shortcomings in Afghanistan has been the dearth
of expertise in coordinating reformative processes in areas of responsibility between
international actors and Afghans. Barley explains that the incorporation of SSR in the
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national security strategy is fundamentally capable of synchronizing the focus of both
donor countries and the host nation (Barley, 2008, 53).
For Barley, this would include the establishment of a joint command, inclusive of
international and local security policymakers, capable of prioritizing SSR activities. In
Afghanistan, Barley notes that SSR’s activities were focused on the development of a
counter-terrorism strategy as a problem-solving approach (Barley, 2008, 54). In order to
establish a joint operational command, there must be acknowledgement among
interlocutors that SSR, as a practical and prescriptive policy mandate, is a long-term
approach requiring continued support for and from the host nation. Second, in Barley’s
view, academics and security experts must acknowledge that ‘owning the process’ is
not borne out by evidence, in the face of a resilient counter-insurgency campaign,
against a state equipped with incapable weak security institutions (Barley, 2008, 53-55).
In summation, Barley concluded early on that as part of a comprehensive SSR
strategy, peacebuilding in Afghanistan by way of a SSR framework would need to be
dependent upon higher levels of coordination between the host nation’s national
security strategy and the incorporation of reform measures in collaboration with
international actors (Barley, 2008, 55-57). Thus, Barley’s assertions are prescient in that
they are primarily aimed at strengthening the ‘unity of effort’ between the host and donor
countries to revise the fragmented and individualistic way SSR was traditionally taking
place.
Timothy Donais, a professor of Global Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University in
Canada addressed early on the importance of integrating the positive features of local
ownership in state-building efforts. Donais stresses that traditional SSR structures have
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been primarily driven by the objectives of donor states to reform the security institutions
in emerging and fragile states (Donais, 2009, 119). Even though SSR traditionally was
meant to foster the empowerment of local security institutions in conformity with the
doctrine of good governance, there are considerable gaps in both policy and practice
concerning the ownership of the process (Donais, 2009, 118). Donais explains that the
objective to transfer reformative efforts to locals is often overshadowed by the
reservations of donor states regarding the capabilities of locals in weak states (Donais,
2009, 120-121). Much of this contention rightfully rests with the inability of the locals due
to the lack of professional expertise and capacity to understand and uphold the
democratic values of good governance in building robust security institutions (Donais,
2009, 121).
Consequently, according to Donais writing in 2009, SSR as a policy tool for
responsible and systematic state-building in conflict-ridden countries such as
Afghanistan, is faced with fundamental questions: Should SSR’s democratic and
normative commitments to build strong institutions be rigidly upheld in weak states?
Should the major commitment to local ownership supersede the mandate of donordriven SSR policy agenda? (Donais, 2009, 121).
Donais refers to this dilemma as a debate in contemporary SSR faced by
international donors in weak states, especially in contexts such as Afghanistan. He
notes that often, these debates are more pronounced and amplified in weak states with
notable differences in the subjective understandings of the normative assumptions of
SSR between the donor states and locals (Donais, 2009, 121).
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While Donais concedes that a full-fledged implementation of SSR in weak states
fraught with endemic corruption, favouritism, and informalism is difficult to
conceptualize, he proposes an alternative framework for security governance
coordinated by common democratic objectives. Donais suggests that the empowerment
of civil society through consultations and involvement in policy decisions, as a method
of deliberative democracy, can assist in the transition of the SSR agenda from the
international to local actors (Donais, 2009, 127). Donais explains that capacity-building
should not be a private enterprise to build security institutions, but it must more broadly
build the capacity of civil society groups to expand the discourse surrounding securityrelated issues (Donais, 2009, 127). By doing so, the SSR process in weak states can
transition from a state-centric initiative to a people-centric endeavour that considers the
power, capabilities, and in-depth knowledge of locals regarding security matters at the
community level (Donais, 2009, 127-128).
Tonita Murray, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Interior in Afghanistan,
reveals some of the intertwined web of intricacies related to SSR implementation in
Afghanistan. Murray predominantly focuses on the evolution of SSR in Afghanistan after
the rapid collapse of the Taliban regime. She divides the evolution of SSR in
Afghanistan into three phases, following the Taliban’s defeat and immediate
disbandment. She describes the period between 2002-2007 as the first phase of SSR in
Afghanistan, which saw the emergence of the ANP and the ANA under the direct
advisory and training command of the US and Germany (Murray, 2011,48).
She argues that during and towards the end of the first phase of the SSR
process in Afghanistan, the US hailed its success in being able to establish the
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institutional pillars and the rapid recruitment and deployment of the ANA troops across
the country (Murray, 2011,48). By the same token, the German-led training program
stressed the development of ‘high-ranking members of the professional police force with
a clear and distinguishable command structure’ (Murray, 2011, 48). Murray argues that
the exclusive training program crafted for the ANP by German police trainers
undermined the professionalization of the larger batch of patrol-level officers tasked with
law enforcement in major cities and districts (Murray, 2011,48).
According to Murray, the second phase of the SSR in Afghanistan was a period
of policy assessment, reflection, and realization in order to systematically disengage
from the previously flawed security policy devised to professionalize the military and
police apparatuses (Murray, 2011, 49). She explains that although the US and ISAF
trainers acknowledged the shortcomings of the training programs in the first phase, they
did not introduce any sort of comprehensive reform which would ameliorate the
problems faced in the first phase. Instead, the US sidelined the German training
program for the ANP and took on the additional responsibility to train them alongside
the ANA (Murray, 2011, 49).
By 2007, the European Union Police Training Mission (EUPOL) was established
as a parallel police sector training program primarily led by Germany and other
European partners to professionalize the force. The two distinct training programs for
the ANP – one led by the US and the other by the EUPOL – set in motion varying
performance issues within the police apparatus (Murray, 2011, 49). While the US
trainers streamlined the police training program with an emphasis on military and
counter-insurgency tactics, the EUPOL training focused exclusively on the importance
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of civilian community policing techniques in relation to the constitutional rule of law
(Murray, 2011, 49-50). As a result, the police reform project in Afghanistan during the
second phase came to be divided along ideological lines between the US and EUPOL
with two divergent training models.
Finally, Murray argues that the third phase of the SSR is characterized by the
intensification of training and counter-insurgency efforts as ordered by the Obama
Administration in 2008. During the third phase, the new US-led directive signalled a
period of substantial increase in the number of US troops to defeat the Taliban
insurgency using overwhelming military force (Murray, 2011, 50). More importantly, the
third phase of the SSR in Afghanistan leading up to 2014 was explicitly based on a
withdrawal timetable to facilitate the gradual disengagement of NATO troops from
primary combat duties and to allow for the eventual handing over of those
responsibilities to Afghan security forces (Murray, 2011, 50-51). To conclude, Murray
argues that the three-phased SSR process in Afghanistan was marred by procedural
inconsistencies, a lack of operational coordination between international and Afghan
partners, and an inclination towards the attainment of short-term results at the cost of
neglecting the long-term sustenance of Afghan security forces (Murray, 2011, 59-61).
Peter Thruelsen’s thought-provoking conjectures relevant to SSR discuss its
fundamental basis with a reflective emphasis on the subtle concept which he terms as
‘Security Sector Stabilization” (SSS). First, Thruelsen explains that SSR is a
mainstream concept that has elusively escaped the lens of academic scrutiny in the
past two decades by security experts. He argues that SSR is inherently tied to idealism
and liberal democratic objectives in the face of the infinite challenges present in
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Afghanistan (Thruelsen, 2011, 624). Thruelsen does not discount the concept of SSR
but instead proposes a precondition that must be fulfilled in order to achieve credible
and sustainable reforms in the security sector in Afghanistan.
Thruelsen proclaims that in a counter-insurgency setting, such as Afghanistan,
the focus of NATO must be directed towards stabilizing the security sector rather than
comprehensively embarking on the perilous and self-defeating journey to reform it
(Thruelsen, 2011, 624-625). Thus, Thruelsen emphasizes two critical contexts within
which SSR and SSS should take place; permissive and non-permissive environments.
He explains that countries plagued by a protracted campaign of counterinsurgency,
such as Afghanistan, must be classified as non-permissive environments. The lack of
institutional strength of security apparatuses, inconsistency in the delivery of security
services, and regression from the liberal democratic mandate of effective governance
including accountability and transparency in day-to-day operations of security
apparatuses are all crucial indicators of a non-permissive environment in Afghanistan
(Thruelsen, 2011, 623).
In the case of Afghanistan, Thruelsen proposes an SSS approach that aims to
stabilize not only the security apparatuses but the geographical boundaries within which
they operate to ease the gradual transition into mainstream SSR. Essentially, SSS lays
the groundwork to achieve the full potential of SSR once the campaign of
counterinsurgency subsides and strong security institutions begin to emerge
characterized by local ownership of the process and domestic legitimacy. (Thruelsen,
2011, 624). In terms of security policy, Thruelsen posits that SSS should not be
attached to a strict criterion of good governance and accountability – on which SSR is
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premised – but rather that SSS efforts should be directed towards the rapid building up
of the capability of the security forces with a mandate to defeat the insurgency
contesting the central government’s legitimacy (Thruelsen, 2011, 625-166). To
demonstrate his point, Thruelsen uses a model based on NATO’s Land Operations
Division along with his insight to chart the trajectory of both SSS and SSR in conflictaffected states (See Figure 2.1: The Spectrum of Security Sector Engagement).
On the other hand, Thruelsen argues that SSR is a responsible and
comprehensive approach in conflict-ridden parts of the world such as Afghanistan. In
the same spirit, he argues that the actual implementation of the SSR agenda can be
achieved only once the legitimacy of the central government is strengthened and strong
security institutions emerge with the defeat of insurgency (Thruelsen, 2011, 622-623).
Thruelsen further argues that SSR has potential key indicators that maintain semblance
to the core objectives of the liberal democratic model of reform in security institutions.
First, there is a political aspect embedded within the core doctrine of SSR that can be
gauged by the strength and authority of civilian oversight over security institutions,
which categorically promote the virtues of good governance. Hence, the appraisal of the
political aspects is useful in determining the level of transparency and accountability in
any given security institution (Thruelsen, 2011, 623-625). Next, Thruelsen considers the
institutional importance of SSR roles and responsibilities in Afghanistan to improve and
sustain security outcomes. He theorizes that the institutional aspect of SSR is relevant
to the implementation of the rule of law and transparent hierarchical structures of
authority, and is characterized by the clear division of responsibilities and duties of
various security apparatuses (Thruelsen, 2011, 624-625).
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Figure 2.1: The Spectrum of Security Sector Engagement
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Thirdly, Thruelsen proceeds to explore the economic aspect of SSR concerning
the duties and responsibilities assigned to various security apparatuses. This includes
the responsible allocation and spending of resources with embedded mechanisms that
ensure accountability and transparency of processes. Beyond international aid, the
economic strength of emerging democracies, such as Afghanistan, should be used to
construct security and defense budgets to guarantee the sustainability of the security
apparatuses in the context of post-intervention (Thruelsen, 2011, 625).
Finally, Thruelsen identifies the social dimension of SSR as a foundational pillar
of stability and security in Afghanistan. The social dimension is effectively defined by the
relationship between the central government and the populace it governs. The level of
security provided by the government to the populace is correlated to the social
legitimacy and the nationwide acceptance of the central government’s authority
(Thruelsen, 2011, 625-627). The social dimension also encompasses a vital factor – the
public accessibility of established security institutions. Fundamentally, security
institutions dictated by the doctrine of good governance are in a perpetual psychological
and social relationship with the populace they aim to serve. Put simply, security
institutions are strengthened by the public legitimacy afforded to them by providing
access to security institutions, which, in return, reinforces the central government’s
legitimacy and authority (Thruelsen, 2011, 635-640).
Thruelsen’s edifying research into the establishment of a useful criterion to
distinguish between SSR and SSS questions the foundational basis of SSR literature.
By challenging the conventional wisdom of the SSR mandate, Thruelsen manages to
extract a set of values and notions from within. The important distinction between both
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SSR and SSS is proposed to be the context in which they are pursued – individually or
in tandem. Thus, the focal point of Thruelsen’s article is centered around the
establishment of a security model beginning with a strategy of insurgency containment
to reduce violent challenges to the central government’s authority and eventually ending
in full-fledged SSR implementation dictated by the liberal democratic notion of good
governance.
Writing later in 2012, Willem Oostervald and Renaud Galand jointly put forth a
normative argument regarding the merits, purpose and suitability of SSR in post-conflict
situations. Oostervald and Galand argue that SSR, as an operational policy framework
and theoretical extension of liberal democratic theory, requires a systemic overhaul to
improve its compatibility with statebuilding endeavours and the implementation of legal
procedures in security institutions (Oosterveld and Galand, 2012, 194). In addition to
their reservations regarding the implementation of SSR, Oostervald and Galand
proclaim that local ownership of the SSR process is apt for assessment, monitoring and
evaluation of reform in security apparatuses in fragile and emerging states (Oosterveld
and Galand, 2012, 195-196).
Foundationally, SSR is meant to reform the intelligence, military and police in
weak states in accordance with the liberal objective of good governance to improve
‘local security conditions’ and to enable development in other public sectors to
progressively take place. Considering that SSR is geared towards the systematic
empowerment of security institutions in weak states, Oostervald and Galand contend
that local ownership must be a core component of the SSR process to ensure it
becomes both sustainable and capable in order to support active participation from
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locals (Oosterveld and Galand, 2012, 196-197). In short, Oostervald and Galand
underscore the vital importance of a people-centred approach to strengthen the
domestic security apparatuses in international SSR undertakings aimed at statebuilding
in weak states (Oosterveld and Galand, 2012, 198). And due to the vast differences in
social values, norms and culture between societies, the significance of local input,
involvement, and ownership in devising security policy cannot be overstated. Oostervald
and Galand emphasize that a rigid definition of the rule of law, which they describe as
‘thick conception’, can be contentious and at odds with local norms and values
(Oosterveld and Galand, 2012, 198). As such, not all liberal democratic objectives, such
as human rights, gender equality and religious rights, are compatible with the norms
and values of host nations which are driven primarily by customary laws (Oostervald
and Galand, 2012, 198-199).
In order to assuage some of these concerns, which may lead to friction between
the host nation and international partners, Oostervald and Galand encourage the
development of a ‘thin conception’ of SSR (Oosterveld and Galand, 2012, 198-199).
That is, a basic skeleton of SSR objectives and goals must be developed in partnership
with the host nations, which empowers and promotes local ownership to account for
their culturally specific norms, and values as they deem fit within the broader concept of
democratic goals. Altogether, they deem the level of cooperation and partnership
between local interlocutors and international advisors to formulate SSR policy as the
critical determinant of success in achieving sustainable democratic reform in weak
states (Oosterveld and Galand, 2012, 199).
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Karsten Friis, a senior advisor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs,
offers an analysis of societal-level factors that underpin international military intervention
and state-building prerogatives in Afghanistan that stands in alignment with Oostervald
and Galand’s arguments. Friis begins by acknowledging the countless security issues
plaguing Afghanistan’s developmental and the larger statebuilding enterprise jointly led
by the international forces and Afghan government. Friis advocates for an analytical
framework based on key assumptions to diagnose the primary reasons for military
shortcomings in Afghanistan through discourse analysis (Friis, 2012, 269).
Friis attributes the inadequacy of state-building efforts in Afghanistan – weak
security institutions, a lack of development, and contested legitimacy of the central
government – to certain fundamental theoretical axioms of the liberal democratic order
(Friis, 2012, 269). First, Friis argues that the intrinsic power dynamics at play during
interventions in weak states work to prioritize the national interests of intervening
parties, which are rooted in identity (Friis, 2012, 169).
In the broader context of identity construction, Friis explains that the
development of ‘superior military identity’ for the intervening parties depends upon
military power and authority over the Afghan populace (Friis, 2012, 275). Friis concedes
that the ostracization of the local populace might not always be the intention of the
intervening parties, but the intersubjective power of mainstream discourse is such that it
supersedes and passively subjugates the importance of local development, ideas,
values and norms (Friis, 2012, 275-276).
More importantly, Friis expounds that political discourse is an instrument of
naturalization inherently tied to constructing epistemic objectivity in shaping ideas,
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values and norms (Friis, 2012, 275). Simply put, conventional discourse in politics is an
essential factor in agenda setting, policy construction and implementation of security
frameworks in fragile states, as it embodies the unquestioned body of knowledge (Friis,
2012, 274). As a result, NATO’s SSR and military efforts to reinvent Afghanistan in
accordance with the principles of a democratic society omit two vital elements of statebuilding. First, the attempts to impose a Western democratic order in Afghanistan based
on the virtues of SSR does not consider the weight of power dominance over Afghans
as a crucial underlying feature of the political order. As Friis quotes in the words of Iver
B. Neumann:
Discourse analysis is eminently useful for such analysis because it says
something about why state Y was considered an enemy in state X, how war
emerged as a political option, and how other options were shunted aside.
Because a discourse maintains a degree of regularity in social relations, it
produces preconditions for action. It constrains how the stuff that the world
consists of is ordered, and so how people categorize and think about the
world. It constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible,
and what is thought of as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a given situation. But
discourse cannot determine action completely. There will always be more
than one possible outcome. Discourse analysis aims at specifying the
bandwidth of possible outcomes (Neumann, 2008, 62).
That is, the SSR narrative willfully turns a blind eye to the viability of an
unconventional order aside from the liberal democratic prerogative to improve security
outcomes based on Afghan customs, norms, traditions and values (Friis, 2012, 291).
Secondly, NATO’s SSR mission in Afghanistan functioned under the guise of
humanitarianism to reinvent Afghan society by the principles of Western democracy
(Friis, 2012, 292-293). Friis propounds that those disingenuous representations of
NATO’s SSR mission in common parlance based on the narrative to improve overall
human security for Afghans only protracted the conflict in Afghanistan. Because the
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narrative of the SSR mission in Afghanistan has commonly been portrayed as a
prerequisite for human security, it serves to legitimize the NATO military intervention as
an ethical method of promoting humanitarianism (Friis, 2012, 293-294).
In like manner, Eleanor Gordon, a professor of international security and conflict
studies at Monash University in Australia, points out the often-overlooked nuances of
SSR in state-building efforts. Gordon begins by acknowledging the merits of SSR in
peacebuilding and state-building efforts in conflict zones as a prerequisite for
sustainable development (Gordon, 2014,127). She concedes that building security
institutions in conflict zones, especially in countries with the prolonged absence of a
central government, is a colossal undertaking requiring the harmonization of
international efforts with local conditions (Gordon, 2014, 127-128). However, Gordon
proceeds to enunciate that SSR efforts in conflict zones, such as Afghanistan, must be
reconsidered to attain the highest level of cooperation from the local populace, the
central government, and civil society activists (Gordon, 2014, 129-131).
Gordon proposes an inclusive and bottom-up approach to SSR characterized by
the following traits: inclusion of the state in developing policy frameworks, consultations
with the locals regarding their security needs and concerns, and the inclusion of civil
society groups in implementing SSR for sustainable development (Gordon, 2014, 131133). In particular, the inclusive approach is described as a parallel mandate to the
state-centric dominated structure of SSR. Gordon suggests that SSR, as a multipronged security policy directive, must be understood and implemented beyond the
context of temporality and field operations efficiency (Gordon, 2014, 132-133).
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Given the context-specific challenges of implementing a singular conception of
SSR in different operational theatres, the common factor that can improve security
outcomes is the inclusion of the populace – both at the community and state levels
(Gordon, 2014, 133). She adamantly maintains that if community-level engagements
are aligned and well-coordinated with the state’s security policy during SSR
implementation, it can help in the following three ways: 1) strengthen security
institutions, 2) provide much-needed impetus to own the state-building efforts, and 3)
afford the central government public legitimacy to pursue the elusive goal of selfreliance aside from the allocation of international aid (Gordon, 2014, 142-143).
Professor Philip Darby, a senior fellow at the School of Social and Political
Science in Melbourne, Australia, reiterates Gordon’s conjectures in Rolling Back the
Frontiers of Empire: Practising the Postcolonial:
The need now is to challenge conceptualizations of both violence and
under-development as a problem embedded in the difference of the nonEuropean world. Or to put it another way, to carry out a spatial reorientation,
focusing for a bit on here and not there and showing how ‘we’ are heavily
implicated in ‘their’ predicament. The question then becomes: what can be
done at home about fixing the processes of international exchange to
provide the conditions for self-reliance to flourish? (Darby, 2009, 713).
Additionally, Rita Abrahamsen, Director for the Centre of International Policy
Studies at the University of Ottawa, has contributed to the SSR debate by exploring the
tensions surrounding the network of actors tasked with implementing the SSR agenda
in fragile states. Abrahamsen describes the attempts to revamp the security sector in
fragile states as a joint venture between a multitude of actors comprising both the state
and non-state entities (Abrahamsen, 2016, 282). Although she admits that there has
been a gradual transition from state-centric perspectives to a hybrid model involving
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both the state and non-state actors in the field of security governance, she argues that
the focal point of SSR initiatives in fragile states remain predominantly state-centric
(Abrahamsen, 2016, 285-286).
Abrahamsen advances the argument that despite the involvement of the nonstate organizations in SSR policy development and implementation, albeit as a result of
the formidable critique of the orthodox model, the second-generation approach to SSR
only cements and strengthens the position of the state as the sole provider of security
(Abrahamsen, 2016, 288). By involving a vast network of non-state actors to
supplement and expand the scope of SSR policy, including but not limited to civil
society activists, community leaders, and international organizations, the state comes to
be the sole beneficiary of the second-generation model bearing in mind that the entire
initiative is aimed at strengthening the public sector (Abrahamsen, 2016, 288).
More importantly, Abrahamsen highlights that second-generation SSR and the
proposed initiative to decentralize security governance in fragile states are faced with
issues of incapability, insecurity, and legitimacy (Abrahamsen, 2016, 291). She clarifies
that the issues of global terrorism, international terrorism, and SSS draws the multilayered approach back to reliance merely on the state’s sphere of influence to deliver
security. Though it may seem that second-generation SSR is aimed at comprehensively
reforming security governance in fragile states, it is never practically meant to be a
novel structure for a decentralized multi-level governance model (Abrahamsen, 2016,
291). So long as the state remains fragile, weak, and embroiled in a campaign of
counterinsurgency, the second-generation model for security governance will be
subjugated and demoralized to restrain and deter more significant measures for
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accountability, responsibility, and transparency in security institutions (Abrahamen,
2016, 291).
Contrarily, Donais addresses the contemporary challenges to the implementation
of SSR initiatives in conflict-ridden countries and why local perspectives matter in
improving security outcomes. Donais discusses the importance of vertical integration –
“which speaks to the need for greater coherence and coordination up and down the
chain of relationships that link international, national, and local actors in the context of
postwar interventions” – which has been either overlooked or understated in SSR policy
considerations (Donais, 2018, 41). The prevalent theme in the discussion surrounding
vertical integration is that there is a veritable lack of understanding in the SSR policy
community about the vital role that political figures, civil society, locals, and communitylevel social networks can fulfill to improve the security sector.
Donais further expounds that instead of merely discussing the merits and
potential of SSR, it is beneficial to envision the evolution that takes place in terms of
security in fragile states. This evolution involves a series of steps the state takes to
safeguard stability and order in direct response to the feedback it receives from the
society itself (Donais, 2018, 41). Despite the overwhelming clout of international actors
in devising policy platforms that control the trajectory of SSR processes, the need for a
dynamic relationship between the citizens and the state largely remains outside the
purview of mainstream approaches to security reform. Often, in post-conflict settings,
the implementation of SSR is plagued by a lack of insight into the strength of the social
contract between the state and society, and how it can be strengthened and brought
into policy considerations (Donais, 2018, 40-41).
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Donais claims that normative assumptions, driven mainly by liberal democratic
objectives of good governance undergirding the SSR agenda in fragile states neglect
the power of state-society cooperation and relations (Donais, 2018, 42). Donais
advocates for a renewed emphasis on the merits of atypical security arrangements,
which can consider the driving forces that build consensus and set in motion the political
will to progress towards inclusive ownership of SSR processes. Given the profound
focus on the importance of state-society relations in reforming the security sector,
Donais argues that international actors must diligently work to identify their roles and
responsibilities in their capacity as advisors and enablers – not primary agents of
change in reforming the security sector (Donais, 2018, 43).
For Donais, the prospect and likelihood for peace, stability, and order in fragile
states emerging from the carnage of war and instability are dependent upon the ‘vertical
integration’ of endogenous actors as agents of change in the security sector (Donais,
2018, 43-44). Rethinking the fundamental purpose of SSR as a hybrid enterprise
between the state and society reinforces the legitimacy of the state, ensures that the
SSR project is locally owned, and decentralizes and transitions the decision-making at
the institutional level in the security sector – from one that is donor-driven to a joint
endeavour between the state and society (Donais, 2018, 44). Therefore, the requisite
shift from donor-driven SSR agenda to a locally crafted one is understood to be a
paradigmatic change – which Donais concedes to be challenging, sophisticated, and
unconventional for international actors inured to administering and supervising the
reformative facets of security institutions themselves (Donais, 2018, 44).
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In the same light, Jackson (2018) examines the perils of appropriating resources
and policy solutions to the security-specific needs of fragile states. Jackson argues that
although the central premise and purpose of SSR is internationally recognized and
accepted in building robust security institutions in conflict-prone regions of the world, it
is a formidable narrative lacking factual substance (Jackson, 2018, 2). To clarify, the
first-generation SSR emphasized by Jackson is fundamentally and descriptively the
same as ‘mainstream SSR’ discussed earlier in this chapter.
Jackson quotes Mark Sedra, professor of political science at the University of
Waterloo, in classifying the SSR approach in Afghanistan as an abysmal failure where
societal affairs between the state and those being governed were suppressed in favour
of a somewhat integrated approach pursued by NATO (Jackson, 2018, 8; Sedra, 2018,
57-59). Although gauging the level of integration and coordination of core SSR
principles in Afghanistan is a subject of academic scrutiny, Jackson concurs with Sedra
that first-generation SSR is bound to fail in future theatres of operations without a
systemic overhaul of the SSR concept itself (Jackson, 2018 8; Sedra, 2018, 60). Hence,
the literature concerning second generation SSR has an intrinsic proclivity towards
adopting and implementing a deliberative, balanced, and inclusive approach to statebuilding that accords equal weight to the opinions and concerns of both urban elites and
rural citizens (Jackson, 2018, 9).
Despite SSR’s decades-old reformative principles, the body of literature
concerning Afghanistan’s SSR journey is circumscribed predominantly to the realm of
critical security studies. As discussed above, there is an ongoing debate among
academics regarding the feasibility of mainstream SSR and the adoption of second
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generation SSR keen on localizing the scope of the process in keeping with domestic
affairs and politics. While both the first generation and second generation SSR are
normative by their very nature, the academic debate regarding the feasibility of either
approach in conflict-affected countries remains robust and persistent.
Although critical security theorists such as Ball, Jackson, and Sedra make a
strong case to demonstrate the failures of the first-generation SSR in Afghanistan, they
also fail to acknowledge the unique case Afghanistan presented to policymakers where
the merger of the state-building enterprise with SSR activities hindered full-fledged
democratic reform. For instance, Sedra’s two-track formalism in reforming the
mainstream SSR is novel and thought-provoking, yet it is nonetheless hindered by the
dearth of policy-relevant mechanisms through which these proposed changes can be
implemented and tested.
More specifically, what is not clear from Sedra’s analysis is how parallel
engagement of both local and regional actors would play out given the divergent and
conflicting interests of regional states as part of the more massive zero-sum game and
balance of power configurations in contemporary international affairs. Put differently, the
conceptualization of two-track formalism is an appealing policy alternative to the
readership of critical security studies, but it is correspondingly deficient in being able to
impart any empirical evidence to substantiate the merits of his larger assertions.
Critical theorists including Ball and Jackson present the argument that local
ownership of the SSR process is a crucial determinant for the sustainability of the
process, though it is unclear from their analyses how normative assumptions to
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integrate public opinion and concerns in policy considerations will overcome the
resistance of local elites at the institutional and political level.
Correspondingly, devising precise and contextually specific SSR policy may be a
factitious endeavour in societies where rampant informalism trumps institutional
procedures; where the pervasiveness of cultural sensitivities in local affairs constrain
and hinder the essence of democratic reform; and where delivering security in the
absence of a central government has tended to be an independent undertaking of
warlords divided along ethnic fault lines.

Competing perspectives: Which approach is most well suited for further testing and
exploration?
Having analyzed the theoretical propositions of competing theories pertaining to
the varying aspects of conflict and security in contemporary international relations, this
research study examines the weaknesses and strengths of SSR as an extension of
liberal institutionalism in Afghanistan. Why? The evolving nature of SSR in tandem with
the prescriptive framework of liberal institutionalism allows for an examination of
NATO’s SSR approach using Afghanistan as a case study between 2003-2014. In turn,
the research findings will aim to provide readers with an accurate and in-depth appraisal
of NATO’s SSR approach in Afghanistan, thus contributing to a contemporary
assessment of whether liberal institutionalism’s theoretical postulations have evolved
into a sufficiently policy-relevant and theoretically useful lens.
This chapter provides an overview of the competing theoretical frameworks in IR
and the merits and demerits of the current liberal institutionalist approach to SSR. The
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intertwined web of various factors that continued to protract the armed conflict in
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014 will be brought to the fore in the following chapters
by continuing to explore further the crucial security-centered dimensions of SSR with
knowledge gained from in-depth interviews with NATO and Afghan policymakers.
While this introductory chapter aims to provide readers with a brief understanding
of the complicated security situation in Afghanistan, for a detailed, year-by-year
overview that may be useful for the introductory reader, see Figure 2.2: Chronology of
Significant Events and NATO’s Involvement in Afghanistan. For a list of NATO’s ISAF
commanders, see Figure 2.3 List of ISAF Commanders in Afghanistan from 2001 –
2014. And see Figure 2.4 for information on the Number of American Troops Deployed
to Afghanistan and the Rise and Decline of US Troop Deployment.

History and Background of the Afghan SSR Case (1993-2014).
The Northern Alliance formed the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1993 after
reaching the gates of Kabul following the surrender of Dr. Najibullah’s forces to the
militias loyal to Burhanuddin Rabbani. After seizing power in Kabul, Rabbani declared
himself president and was endorsed by the United Nations which formally recognized
him as the legitimate representative of the people of Afghanistan (Bearden, 2001, 25).
Rabbani’s Northern Alliance militia attempted to consolidate power in Afghanistan and
embarked on a series of informal negotiations with powerful Islamist warlord Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar (Rais, 1993, 917).
Although Hekmatyar accepted the post of Prime Minister to cease hostilities
against the Northern Alliance, the agreement with the Rabbani government was short-
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lived and fell apart less than three months later over disagreements regarding the
disproportionate allocation of important ministries to factions loyal to the Northern
Alliance (Bearden, 2001, 27).
Hekmatyar’s willingness to negotiate with the Northern Alliance was interpreted
by his key backers in Saudi Arabia and within Pakistan’s military institutions as a threat
to their Islamist ambitions in Afghanistan (Bruno, 2008). In 1994, the Saudis and
Pakistanis decided to retract their support from Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami group and
subsequently funded the creation of a new hardline Islamist faction called the Taliban
(Bruno, 2008; Ahady, 1998, 121-124). The Taliban followed the strict and literal
interpretations of the Deobandi school of thought widely practiced in Saudi Arabia and
northwestern Pakistan, while Hekmatyar was closely aligned with the Muslim
Brotherhood Islamist movement in Tunisia, Qatar, and Egypt (Ahady, 1998, 122-124).
The Taliban attracted poor immigrants living in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s
border areas who faced systematic discrimination from the Northern Alliance’s newly
formed government in Kabul (Ghuffran, 2001, 473). The steady flow of funds from
Saudis combined with the efforts of hard-line religious scholars in Pakistan duplicated
the magnitude of resistance seen previously against the Soviets (Bruno, 2008). The
Taliban began a gradual takeover of southern provinces propagating their agenda to
establish an Islamic emirate based on Islamic law throughout Afghanistan and to
eliminate the corruption of the Northern Alliance government (Gannon, 2004, 38-41).
The Taliban successively took one province after another emboldened by both local and
foreign support (Ghuffran, 2001, 471).
By mid-1996, the Taliban had taken over Kabul and had pushed the Northern

50

Alliance along with militias allied to them to their mountain hideouts in northern
Afghanistan. Much of the period between 1996-2001 came to be defined by the brutality
of the Taliban regime against the Afghan population and the destruction of all formal
institutions which effectively spelled the end of the Afghan state. On September 11,
2001, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks took place in the US subsequently
claimed by Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden. The targets included the World Trade
Center, the Pentagon, and presumably the Capitol Hill, claiming the lives of almost
3,000 civilians and injuring another 6,000 in the attacks. In order to accurately portray
the sequence of events, the chart below provides a snapshot of the critical events
leading up to the beginning and the subsequent end of NATO’s SSR mission in
Afghanistan. Below, figure 2.2 lists the name of rotating ISAF commanders in charge of
NATO’s SSR agenda in Afghanistan while figure 2.3 charts the course of the US troop
deployment in Afghanistan and displays how it rose and gradually decreased as Afghan
security institutions effectively took over security responsibilities leading up to 2014.
September -12-

NATO allies invoked Article 5 in support of the United States,

2001

pending the outcome of investigations. NATO Secretary-General
General George Robertson informed UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan of the alliance’s decision.

October -7-2001

The US launched Operation Enduring Freedom. As part of this
operation, the US, Britain, and Northern Alliance militias jointly
launched military strikes against Taliban targets in Kabul,
Kandahar, and Heart.
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November -12-2001 Taliban fighters abandoned Kabul and headed towards northern
Afghanistan. Northern Alliance militias entered Kabul with air
support from the US and claimed strategic victory.
December -5-2001

The Bonn Agreement is passed under the auspices of the UN to
recreate the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The agreement called
for the creation of a judicial and constitutional committee in
consultation with the Loya Jirga (Grand Council) to draft the
provisions for an Islamic and democratic constitution.

December -6-2001

The last remaining Taliban stronghold of Kandahar fell to the US
forces heralding the Battle of Tora Bora against the Taliban and AlQaeda figures.

December -2-2001

UN Security Council Resolution 1386 adopted and mandated the
creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to
protect Kabul and surrounding areas.

December -21-2001 The transitional government of Afghanistan was sworn in, and
Hamed Karzai agreed upon as the interim President of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan.
February -11-2002

The first contingent of foreign troops from 20 countries arrived in
Kabul as part of ISAF to provide security to the Interim Afghan
Government. The ISAF leadership was based on a six-month
rotational model between participating countries.

August -11-2003

NATO officially took over the responsibility of the ISAF command.
NATO’s multinational headquarters established in Kabul’s
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diplomatic zone with an on-ground commander to coordinate the
mandate, policy and planning of ISAF.
October -13-2003

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510 expanded the role
of ISAF to all of Afghanistan to provide security in support of the
Interim Afghan Government.

December 2003

NATO-led ISAF command undertook Stage 1 expansion to
northern Afghanistan to establish control over the critical provinces
of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

October -1-2004

Stage 1 expansion to northern Afghanistan completed under
NATO’s command. All nine northern provinces in Afghanistan are
under the direct security influence of ISAF.

October to

As a test for democracy, Presidential elections took place in

November 2004

Afghanistan, and Interim President Hamed Karzai is declared the
winner.

February -10-2005

NATO announced Stage 2 of ISAF command expansion towards
western Afghanistan to take control of Badghis, Ghor, and Heart.
With the completion of Stage 2, ISAF effectively controlled 50% of
Afghan territory.

December -8-2005

Stage 3 expansion of ISAF command agreed upon in Brussels,
Belgium, by Allied Foreign Ministers to expand the ISAF mission to
southern Afghanistan.

April 2006

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTCA) formed in coordination with NATO and the government of
Afghanistan. The primary imperative of CSTC-A was to train and
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equip the Afghan military and police with professional training
provided by NATO forces
July -31-2006

Stage 3 expansion of ISAF’s command to southern Afghanistan
completed. ISAF took over the security responsibility of southern
Afghanistan from the US. Six additional provinces are now under
ISAF’s leadership: Daykundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, and
Zabul. ISAF now controls over 75% of Afghan territory.

October -5-2006

NATO directed ISAF to take command of eastern Afghanistan from
the US and coalition forces. ISAF’s expansion to the east marked
the end of NATO’s command expansion in Afghanistan as it now
effectively covers all the Afghan territories. The Taliban launched a
deadly campaign of suicide bombings and insurgent attacks
against NATO and Afghan forces to counter ISAF’s national
expansion strategy.

November 28-29-

NATO allies at the Riga Summit in Latvia reinforced their
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commitment to the mission in Afghanistan. NATO allies committed
another 2,500 troops in addition to the military resources, including
aircraft, advanced communication equipment and helicopter
gunships. Allied forces agreed in principle to operate outside their
area of operations to provide support in insurgencies, particularly in
southern Afghanistan.

June -12-2008

At the Paris Donor Conference, 68 countries and 15 international
organizations pledged almost 20 billion dollars towards
Afghanistan’s reconstruction.
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February -22-2009

At the NATO Ministerial meeting in Krakow, Poland, the US
announced a surge of 17,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in
addition to the 20,000 soldiers previously deployed. NATO allies
agree in principle to increase their military commitments towards
Afghanistan.

March 2009

President Barack Obama announced an additional 4,500 troops to
help bolster the morale of the Afghan National Security Forces. The
newly assigned soldiers were exclusively assigned to the military
and police apparatuses to provide expertise in areas of law
enforcement and military strategy.

April 2009

At the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, NATO allies agreed to form NTMA under the operational umbrella of CSTC-A to spearhead and
administer the training program for the Afghan military and police.
CSTC-A/NTM-A merged into a single training program comprised
of almost 8,000 military mentors and advisors deployed in security
ministries and training bases.

August – October

Presidential elections held in Afghanistan for the second time and

2009

Hamed Karzai retains the presidency in a vote marred with
allegations of electoral fraud and widespread violence perpetrated
by the Taliban.

December 2009

President Obama announced another troop surge and commits an
additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan until 2011 to repel a
resilient Taliban insurgency across the country.
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November 2010

At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal, NATO allies agreed to gradually
hand over security responsibility to Afghan National Security
Forces by the end of 2014.

November 2011

The Loya Jirga (Grand Council) convened in Kabul, and tribal
elders endorse President Karzai’s plans to negotiate a 10-year
Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States to allow US
troops to remain on Afghan soil post-2014.

May -21-2012

At the NATO Summit in Chicago, allies endorsed the plan to
withdraw all combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. At
the same time, NATO allies emphasized their long-term support for
the government of Afghanistan post-2014. The Train, Advise,
Assist Mission was agreed upon post-2014 to build the capacity of
Afghan National Security Forces.

July 2012

At the Tokyo Donor Conference for Afghanistan, international
donors agreed to provide conditional aid for 16 billion dollars in the
form of civilian assistance. The government of Afghanistan is
encouraged to counter corruption, improve governance, and
assume greater responsibility for security.

June 2013

At a handover ceremony in Kabul, the Afghan National Army took
responsibility for overall security and military duties for Afghanistan
from NATO.

December 2014

NATO formally ended its combat mission in Afghanistan with the
handover of all security responsibilities completed. It marked the
conclusion of the ISAF’s 13-year mission in Afghanistan.
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January 2015

NATO’s revised non-combat Resolute Support Mission began to
train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Approximately
12,000 NATO troops are involved.

Open Source: NATO [unclassified], online, 2019.

57

Figure 2.2: List of ISAF Commanders in Afghanistan from 2001-2014

DATE
December 2001 –

NAME

RANK

NATIONALITY

John McColl

Major General

United Kingdom

Hilmi Akin Zorlu

Major General

Turkey

Van Heyst

Lieutenant General

Germany

Goetz Gilemeroth

Lieutenant General

Germany

Rick Hillier

Lieutenant General

Canada

Jean-Louis Py

General

France

Ethem Erdagi

General

Turkey

Mauro del Vecchio

General

Italy

David Richards

General

United Kingdom

June 2002
June 2002 –
February 2003
February 2003 –
August 2003
August 2003 –
February 2004
February 2004 –
August 2004
August 2004 –
February 2005
February 2005 –
August 2005
August 2005 – May
2006
May 2006 –
February 2007
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February 2007 –

Dan McNeill

General

June 2008
June 2008 – June

America
David McKiernan

General

2009
June 2009 – June

United States of
America

Stanley McChrystal

General

2010
June 2010 – July

United States of

United States of
America

Sir Nick Parker

Lieutenant General

United Kingdom

David Petraeus

General

United States of

2010
July 2010 – July
2011
July 2011 –

America
John Allen

General

February 2013
February 2013 –

America
Joseph Dunford

General

August 2014
August 2014 –

United States of

United States of
America

John Campbell

General

January 2015

United States of
America

Open Source: NATO [unclassified], online 2019)
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Figure 2.3: Number of American Troops Deployed to Afghanistan and the Rise and
Decline of US Troop Deployment

Open Source: Brookings Institution, 2014
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CHAPTER 3
The Institutional Breadth of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan
Introduction
On a return trip from Kabul in November 2013, former US National Security
Advisor Susan Rice vociferously expressed her frustration with former President Hamed
Karzai’s reluctance to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that had come to
shape the current involvement of US forces in Afghanistan after the official withdrawal of
the NATO-led combat troops which was to be completed in 2014. Suddenly, the terms
of the revamped U.S. foreign policy extended toward Afghanistan no longer matched
the requirements for development and governance which had previously been proposed
and subsequently implemented in a “trial and error” framework between 2001 and 2013.
Although former President Hamed Karzai’s reservations regarding the BSA were
widely thought to be a precautionary attempt against the fading interest of the US
government in Afghanistan post-2014, and the US attempt to transfer the responsibility
of future decision-making to the incoming president Ashraf Ghani in August 2014, it also
pointed to the poverty of foreign policy options which have been pursued in the past
nineteen years in Afghanistan (Shahrani, 2015, 277-279).
At its core, the BSA provides for a military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.
It has a very limited scope and cannot then fully account for other key variables such as
ethnicity, culture and, more importantly, SSR. The BSA allows for a prolonged presence
for the US Army personnel numbering around 10,000 Special Forces troops which
would maintain a handful of strategic bases including among others Bagram, Spin
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Boldak and Kandahar Airfield to plan and execute “counterterrorism” operations
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2013). Adding to
these troop numbers, the Trump administration has also authorized an additional 3,900
army personnel to turn the tide against the perpetual insurgency and to bolster the
morale of the beleaguered Afghan security forces (US Department of State, 2017).
Furthermore, the security protocol allows for continued support for the development of
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) under the supervision of US forces until 2022
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2013). Overall,
Bilateral Security Assistance can only provide temporary relief to an Afghan populace
by ensuring status-quo conditions for a few short years while largely ignoring the
importance of indigenous-led efforts in reaching a lasting solution to the conflict in the
heart of Asia.
In addition, the BSA includes no provision for promoting inter-relations among
ethnic groups; it does not support any systematic reconciliation among tribes and
denies any legitimacy to a peace process which might lead to a transformation of
relations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. That is not to say that efforts
have not been made in the past (2008-2011) to bridge the differences between
insurgents and the Afghan government, but rather that previous attempts at
reconciliation had lacked genuine commitment in US foreign policy such that the fragile
peace initiative was often rapidly led down a steep decline (Berdal et al., 2009, 56). To
add to the urgency of an indigenous-led peace process, Karzai clearly iterated in a
January 2014 press conference that the BSA could only be signed if the US “honestly”
began a peace process inclusive of the Afghan government, and he went further to
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assert that “If the U.S. is not willing to accept our conditions, then they can leave us any
time they want and Afghans will continue their lives without foreigners” (Cutler, 2017,
63).
According to Mats Berdal (2009), Professor of Security and Development at
King’s College and former Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, during the early years of the intervention and since 2004, Afghan President
Hamed Karzai had secretly been advocating engagement with the Taliban group
through dialogue in an attempt to include them in the country’s political bureaucracy but
these efforts fell on deaf ears among policymakers in Washington (Berdal et al., 2009,
58). The hawkish policymakers under the Bush Administration (2001-2008) rejected the
extension of an olive branch to the Taliban and rather repeated the rhetoric that the “US
government does not negotiate with terrorists” (Felbab-Brown, 2010, 2-4). Therefore, as
it became clear that the military approach toward Afghanistan was failing to uproot the
Taliban and that only limited advances on the ground could be made, the US
government secretly, if fruitlessly, held talks with the group’s representatives without the
Afghan government’s representatives at the table (Felbab-Brown, 2010, 5).
Nonetheless, since 2003 the NATO coalition in Afghanistan has cleared major
swathes of territory from radical fighters and brought about major changes to the
economy, employment, as well as the social and cultural atmosphere leading to the
further development of human rights provisions which had been mostly suppressed or
absent during the period of Taliban control. According to Professor Claire Sjolander at
the University of Ottawa, the global push for gender empowerment found its way into
Afghanistan’s modern-day constitution, which explicitly outlined basic human rights for
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both genders. The introduction of formal and institutionalized education systems and
registration of twelve million Afghan students raised hope that coming generations could
reverse extremism, disenfranchisement, and hopelessness. See Figure 3.0 “Education
Metrics for Boys and Girls and Annual Enrollment of Boys and Girls in Elementary and
Secondary Education in Afghanistan.” This chart shows the rise in school enrollment for
both boys and girls in Afghanistan as the NATO intervention expanded in both scope
and size in all 34 provinces.
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Figure 3.0: Education Metrics for Boys and Girls and Annual Enrollment of Boys and
Girls in Elementary and Secondary Education in Afghanistan, 2002-2013

Open Source: Brookings Institution, 2014
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Figure 3.1 Real GDP Growth in Afghanistan, 2002-2015

Open Source: Brookings Institution, 2014
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Professor Sjolander further points out that the enormous positive changes
observed in Afghanistan – ranging from economic development to relative security to
governance to institutional accessibility – have made it a daunting task to mount any
sort of criticism against the NATO intervention (Sjolander, 2010, 44-45). See also Figure
3.1 “Real GDP Growth in Afghanistan, 2002-2015.” This graph lends credence to
Professor Sjolander’s claim regarding the mass economic development measured by
annual GDP growth that took place across Afghanistan facilitated by the influx of
significant aid money contributed by both the US-led NATO coalition and international
partners.
The institutional aspect of the SSR process in Afghanistan was the focal point of
the NATO-led coalition’s attempt at reinvigorating key security institutions to establish
the rule of law. In a personal interview with NATO Official 1 who served as a special
envoy for the security sector in Afghanistan, he noted that the institutional dimensions of
SSR were closely linked to the functioning and coordination among the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the National Directorate of Security. He further
elaborated that the institutional aspect encompasses capacity building initiatives, the
establishment of independent bureaucratic structures, and creating and implementing
safeguards within key security institutions against corruption, clientelism, and nepotism.
Afghan Official 1, based on his extensive advisory experience at the MoI from
2011-2015 corroborated this account. He asserted that the institutional facets of SSR
continued to be concerned with the rationalization of a proto-bureaucratic identity to
ensure an independent and responsible bureaucracy across all key security institutions
and the following core fundamental initiatives: providing basic security to all citizens and
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access to legal institutions, maintenance of an independent and impartial judiciary,
building capacity and expertise within the framework of international standards and
procedures in security and judicial institutions, ensuring due process, legal
representation, and equal treatment under the law for all individuals. The overarching
theme of the NATO-led SSR project linking all crucial security institutions noted above
rests with security coordination between the law enforcement organs of Afghanistan.
With crucial insight from interviewees, this chapter explores and explains the key
achievements and shortcomings of the institutional dimensions of SSR over 11 years at
the MoD, MoI, and the NDS.
After the Taliban regime was toppled in 2001 by the US-led coalition, the main
and perhaps the most challenging task for the international community was to bring
about security, stability and order in a country where it was virtually non-existent in the
decade leading up to 2001. During the reign of the Mujahideen and Taliban from the
early 1990s to 2001, the populace in Afghanistan had become accustomed to informal
security and legal channels such as tribal councils, cultural norms, and judgements by
village elders in accessing some form of acceptable justice. Of course, these practices
were often arbitrary, corrupt, and had many vested traits which are common in ethnic
nepotism.
To break this cycle of informalism and to establish an accountable, responsible,
and transparent security apparatus along with an impartial judiciary, the NATO-led
coalition in Afghanistan endeavoured to build key security institutions to grant legitimacy
to the Afghan government led by Hamed Karzai. The Bonn conference in 2001 and the
Geneva conference of international donors in 2002 was the pivotal period for SSR in
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Afghanistan given that key NATO allies operating under the UN-mandated International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took on crucial responsibilities in the security sector in
2003. In sum, the security-related responsibilities and policies were formulated in
tandem with institution-building initiatives to provide an aggregate solution to the
problem of capacity building.
Prior to discussing the institutional aspects of SSR, it is crucial to accentuate that
this research primarily deals with the issues surrounding three key security institutions
and their respective forces in Afghanistan: the ANA under the MoD command; the ANP
under the MoI command, and the NDS Forces under the NDS command. Although all
NATO coalition members agreed to the urgent need for effective and efficient security
apparatuses for Afghanistan at both the Bonn and Geneva Conferences, the primary
issue remained with the execution of the project. This chapter is divided into three parts.
First, it explains and describes the findings of this research in relation to the institutional
aspect of the Afghan MoD. Secondly, it examines the institutional capacity and issues
pertinent to administrative aspects of the Afghan MoI. Finally, it concludes with an
analysis of the institutional proficiencies and deficiencies of the NDS.
Institutional Dimensions of the Ministry of Defense
NATO Official 2, a high-ranking official at NATO who was heavily involved with
the post-Bonn Conference initiative in Afghanistan, explained the significant
disagreements which persisted despite the unequivocal and overwhelming support from
coalition members for building a sustainable army, police force, and an intelligence
apparatus. The first disagreement among NATO members emerged in early 2003. It
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predominantly concerned the apprehensiveness of coalition members regarding the
heavy-handed approach of the US military in building up the army institution in
Afghanistan. Given that the Afghan MoD was in its early stages of development at the
time of the NATO intervention, most coalition members, including Canada, sought to be
consulted regarding the institutional capacity-building process in the MoD led by the US.
Despite the reluctance of NATO coalition members, the US embarked on
constructing the main edifice and several other branches of the MoD in Afghanistan. In
an interview with a former high-ranking Afghan policy advisor to the MoD in
Afghanistan, Afghan Official 2 expounded on institutional issues at length. He
emphatically asserted that the institutional building in Afghanistan was never an
‘Afghan-led process’. First, the $60 million contract to rebuild the MoD buildings beside
the presidential palace in Kabul was awarded to US military contractors including the
former Blackwater military organization, DynCorp, and several other small-scale
contractors. In his opinion, the money originated from the US in the form of financial aid
and ended up back in the US in the form of official salaries in spite of the abysmal state
of the Afghan economy and high levels of unemployment across Afghanistan. He
presented me with an audit report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR), which assessed the productivity of foreign contractors tasked
with constructing the Afghan MoD along with the Security and Support Brigades
Division.
The report revealed that the timeline to build the crucial Defense infrastructure
was pushed back by two years and significantly exceeded the allocated $60 million
budget. In comparison, the classified report by SIGAR reported that the same quality of
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work could have been performed by Afghan contractors at a fraction of the price with
minimal logistical issues and within the two-year timeframe as originally intended. The
infrastructure project alone would have employed approximately 600 local Afghans and
another 400 general staff across the country accounting for logistics, transportation, and
supply chain command (SIGAR, 2004).
Another high-ranking NATO official with extensive capacity-building experience
tasked with the general oversight of the Afghanistan mission explained some of the
other prevalent institutional issues within the Afghan Ministry of Defense between 2003
and 2014. NATO Official 3 explained that the recruitment process concerning the
support staff by civilians was inconsistent with the “Accountability, Oversight, and
Transparency” mandate of both the US military and the NATO alliance which had jointly
agreed to implement the Western-styled bureaucratic procedures within Afghan security
ministries. The headquarters of the MoD in Kabul was inaugurated in July 2003 which
set in motion the institutional capacity-building process and the larger subdivision of
human capacity-building initiative under its authority.
To clarify, this recruitment process was entirely distinctive in comparison to the
armed personnel recruitment which will be explored and examined in later chapters.
The institutional capacity-building led by the US military began by recruiting influential
warlords, their relatives, and other groups which had helped the NATO-led coalition
overthrow the Taliban regime in 2001. NATO Official 3 emphatically asserted that this
was seen by many NATO members in 2003 as a methodical reward system for those
groups which rejected the fanaticism of the Taliban regime yet remained complicit in
major war crimes in defeating the Taliban insurgency.
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In essence, the building up of the human resources section of the MoD exhibited
an endemic culture of nepotism, poor institutional planning, and a lack of respect for
Western-style bureaucratic procedures. NATO Official 3 further acknowledged the
willingness of the US military advisors to turn a blind eye to the palpable deficiencies
and shortcomings within the Afghan MoD in order to accelerate the pace of recruitment
for military personnel. Senior civil-service positions within the Defense ministry were
occupied by incompetent, corrupt, and illiterate personnel lacking an in-depth
understanding of a professional bureaucracy.
NATO Official 4, a military General tasked with advising all three key security
ministries in Afghanistan, affirmed that the formation of the Civil Service Commission in
early 2004 was a rudimentary attempt to overcome some of the abovementioned
deficiencies in the Defense department. The commission composed of NATO
administrative policy officials with broad range of experiences endeavoured to close the
gap between the joint initiative of introducing a professional bureaucracy and the
practical incompetence of Afghan civil employees in the defense sector. NATO Official 4
further explained that the Civil Service Commission was disorganized and missed a
well-defined agenda for institutional reform beyond an advisory role.
For instance, members of the Security and Support Brigades Division civilian
staff were better trained in bureaucratic practices by the Civil Service Commission
including the implementation of an accountability and transparency framework in
administrative practices. NATO Official 4 largely attributed these positive strides in this
division to the low-level positions staffed by ordinary Afghans without any special
relationship to the high-ranking officials. On the other hand, the Office of the Chief of
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Staff and the higher administrative branch were dominated by warlords including
members of the Northern Alliance, National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, and other
NATO-allied militia groups. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission had significant
difficulties altering corrupt and unprofessional behaviour in the highest administrative
level of defense bureaucracy. NATO Official 4 further iterated that advisors were
regularly prevented from accessing crucial documents such as pay schedules, the
procedural documents for hiring and promoting personnel, and files which explicitly
specified how the defense budget was being allocated to key administrative divisions.
Not only was there a lack of coordination between administrative divisions of the
MoD, but the performance of members of the Civil Service Commission varied
considerably depending on the administrative division to which they were assigned.
Although the Joint Agreement on Defense Sector Reconstruction signed between
NATO and the Afghan government in 2005 specifically aimed to introduce transparency
and oversight, it remained nothing more than a normative policy advisory document with
a minimal enforcement mechanism.
In an exclusive interview with a special advisor to the Parliament of Afghanistan
with extensive experience in the inner workings of the Afghan MoD, Afghan Official 3
revealed that the salaries for the civil staff at the ministry remained unknown with some
high-ranking officials earning as much as $10,000 US dollars a month while others
earned as little as $US 120 per month. As such, the Civil Service Commission remained
a diminutive and a largely ineffective advisory force and it was formally replaced by
Strategic Advisory Teams (SATs) in 2006. In sum, Afghan Official 3 stressed that the
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NATO mandate in reconstructing the administrative dimensions of the MoD sacrificed
the professionalization of the civil sector in favour of training armed personnel.
Also, Afghan Official 3 maintained that the prevalence of nepotism in the Defense
sector allowed for other corrupt activities such as embezzlement of aid funds, personal
use of government resources, and informalism in bureaucratic procedures to flourish
with minimal transparency and oversight. The mass funding was provided by the
coalition, yet the pay schedule was dictated by established structures of nepotism by
Afghans themselves. Thus, the installation and support for an unprofessional
bureaucratic structure by NATO beginning in 2003 in tandem with the operational
attitude emanating from a culture of warlordism by high ranking officials at the MoD was
a crucial institutional deficiency for NATO’s SSR activities.
Another prominent institutional issue with the MoD was the manner in which
procurement of military needs was fulfilled including but not limited to logistical supplies,
heavy weaponry, fuel, combat uniforms, and assault rifles. In every conflict-ridden
country in the world, the defense procurement sector seems to be a classic example of
widespread corruption largely due to the decentralization of authority from the central
government to the defense sector and due to the sophisticated and in-depth knowledge
required for the procurement of military supplies (David et al., 2013, 121-124). Similarly,
in underdeveloped and war-torn Afghanistan, the procurement process is a critical part
of the government budget where 50 percent of the national budget is allocated for
procurement of supplies for various government ministries. According to NATO Official
5, who served as the chief of the Afghan Task Force for one of the leading NATO
coalition countries, the funding for military supplies was provided to the MoD with very
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few checks and balances. NATO Official 5 further emphasized that the corrupt
bureaucracy along with administrative officials took advantage of this lack of oversight
to engage in ‘big seed’ corruption in the MoD.
NATO Official 5, having served as a top official for a NATO troop-contributing
member country, elucidated the magnitude of corruption in the MoD by illustrating an
example which concerned the procurement of fuel for the ANA. In 2013, the US
government earmarked $1 billion for fuel supplies for the ANA to be delivered by the
MoD by holding an independent and transparent competition for the contract to be
fulfilled. During the course of the competition for the contract, four local Afghan
companies were awarded close to a billion dollars for the annual fuel and diesel
supplies for the ANA. A subsequent investigation found that executives from all four
companies had colluded ten days prior to bidding to set an exact price for both diesel
and fuel to split the contract in four equal parts. The contract was later cancelled by the
Administrative Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan after
SIGAR presented the government with ample evidence of deliberate collusion, yet no
criminal charges or disciplinary actions were taken against any individuals or entities.
NATO Official 5 authored a report to the Administrative Office of the President of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan calling for the creation of a non-partisan,
independent, and transparent body to overcome the complex challenges in the
procurement process. In response, the Afghan government embarked upon a number of
reforms to provide better public services, establish an effective and transparent
procurement system, effectively control public expenditure, and decrease corruption in
government institutions.
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In late-2014, the National Procurement Authority (NPA) was established by the
orders of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani whereby the Special Procurement
Commission (SPC) came to be under the authority of the newly created National
Procurement Commission (NPC) (NPA, 2014). Furthermore, this reconfiguration of the
procurement policy in Afghanistan led to several significant changes to make the
procurement process accountable, responsible, and transparent. First, the abolishment
of the Contract Management Office (CMO) streamlined the procurement sector’s
bureaucratic procedures in order to eliminate ‘big seed corruption’ at the CMO.
Subsequently, the Afghanistan Reconstruction & Development Services (ARDS) and
the Procurement Policy Unit (PPU) were amalgamated with the NPA to increase
efficiency and oversight of the procurement projects (NPA, 2014).
In general, the empowerment Afghan ministries has been an institutional goal of
the NATO coalition so as to present them internationally as independent, effective,
efficient, and legitimate institutions. With careful consideration of the crucial insights
gained from relevant high-ranking interviewees, it becomes clear that the institutional
capacity within the Afghan MoD was extremely deficient and ineffective. The pervasive
nature of nepotism and visible patterns of corruption embodied by high-ranking Afghan
Defense officials inhibited the growth and professionalization of the human capacitybuilding initiative at the MoD. By this logic, the institutional functions of the defense
sector were rooted in traditional informalism and clientelism whereby high-ranking
officials (including former warlords) viewed the advent of a professional Western
bureaucracy as a threat to their traditional spheres of influence.
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NATO Official 6, a coalition military General with extensive capacity-building
experience in Afghanistan, highlighted that human capacity can only be built
successfully when the foundations of the MoD institution itself are rooted in
accountability and transparency. He further proclaimed that building human capacity in
the MoD was only marginally successful in the low-ranking divisions such as the
Security and Support Brigades Division, Supplies Maintenance Division, and
Communications Division due fundamentally to a clear chain of command, limited
access to direct foreign aid, and technocratic recruitment supported by the Civil Service
Commission. The creation of the NPA in 2014 was another institutional victory for the
MoD which forbade high-ranking corrupt officials from directly awarding government
contracts to bidders. While the NPA was a step in the right direction to bring about a
measure of visible transparency and accountability, a visible lack of a professional and
technocratic bureaucracy impeded the institutional progress of the MoD in Afghanistan.
NATO Official 7, a high-ranking policy officer responsible for the Afghanistan
operations division and with extensive knowledge of the hierarchical bureaucratic
structure in the military administration articulated the perils of the rewards system
propagated by the US and subsequently accepted by NATO in 2003. He pointed to the
missteps taken by the NATO coalition when it awarded allied Afghan fighters with key
security ministries, including Defense, which came to be the single leading cause of
unprofessionalism, corruption, embodiment of proto-bureaucracy, and the prevalence of
informalism in security institutions. Hence, the institutional development of the MoD in
Afghanistan from 2003 to 2014 came to be dictated by a post-war reward mechanism
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which was largely incompatible with the spirit of the original mandate agreed by the
NATO members at both the Bonn and Geneva conferences.
Despite the shortcomings, this research finds several areas of progress in the
Defense institutional capacity-building: reduction in corruption and nepotism through the
creation of the NPA; the emergence of a technocratic support division for the ANA
within the MoD; greater engagement for international partners including the SIGAR and
the UN in monitoring progress and setbacks; and improvements in institutional
infrastructure funded by the NATO-led coalition from 2003 to 2014.
Institutional Structures of the Ministry of Interior
The Geneva Conference in 2002 paved the way for the emergence of the ANP
and, more importantly, the formation of the MoI of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
With direct assistance and supervision from the German federal police force and military
police in 2002 and later by EUPOL in 2007, several key enforcement divisions for the
ministry were created. The MoI is comprised of the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan
National Police (ANP), Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), Afghan Public
Protection Force (APPF), Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and the
General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPC). While the establishment
of these divisions paved the way for the commencement of institutional capacitybuilding in the MoI from the capital Kabul to all other 33 provinces, there were
monumental challenges between 2003 and 2014.
Afghan Official 4, who served as a senior civilian advisor to the MoI in
Afghanistan from 2002 to 2012, expounded upon the precise issues in the institution-
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building process which he believed were largely extant. According to Afghan Official 4
prior to the establishment of the MoI, it had already become a part of the larger reward
system for Northern Alliance commanders for their direct assistance to the NATO
coalition in dislodging the Taliban regime.
The NATO coalition took a preventive approach and decided in 2003 to integrate
Northern Alliance fighters into the administrative ranks of the MoI bureaucracy and the
larger ANP force to avoid a security vacuum and another struggle for power from armed
groups. This decision cemented the grasp of Northern Alliance commanders on one of
the most important security institutions in Afghanistan.
Afghan Official 4 further expounded on key institutional issues which began in
early 2002. Given that the MoI was institutionally non-existent prior to early 2002, the
directive to rapidly build the institutional foundation of the ministry came from the
German government in agreement with the US. The building that housed the MoI was
built in 8 months in Kabul with the combined labour force of both locals and foreign
contractors. The longer goal was to construct the administrative offices of the MoI and
the ANP headquarters in the rest of the 33 provinces by the end of 2003 to establish the
enforcement mechanism of Afghanistan’s Criminal Code across the country and to
further buttress the legitimacy of Hamed Karzai’s nascent central government.
Significant institutional financial aid for the development of the MoI bureaucracy was
contributed by the Germans which initiated the intended professionalization and
bureaucratization process of the MoI in 2002. Afghan Official 4 further revealed that the
German advisory force was far more interested in the structural organization of the MoI
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than recruiting the type of expertise needed to perform the day-to-day operations of the
institution itself.
As such, they constructed a complex web of bureaucratic divisions within the MoI
comparable to a well-developed Western institution (See Figure 3.0). Former Northern
Alliance commander Yunus Qanuni was declared the first minister of the MoI and was
subsequently tasked with overseeing the institutional capacity-building process with
assistance from technical expertise of German advisors. Afghan Official 4 explains that
when presented with the organizational administrative chart drawn by the Germans for
the institutional development of the MoI, Qanuni was baffled and doubtful that the
proposed plan of action would materialize without requisite expertise and technocratic
personnel. While Qanuni unsuccessfully attempted to seek the backing of the
Administrative Office of the Afghan President in seeking a solution to the proposed
German plan in 2002, although he believed it was at odds with the administrative
capabilities of Afghans in the post-Taliban era, the German training mission remained
unchanged.
In spite of initial reservations from Qanuni, the focal point of the German advisory
force from 2003-2006 continued to be the maintenance of the organizational structure
within the MoI. See Figure 3.2 Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Interior Affairs.
This chart demonstrates the complex organizational structure adopted by the German
advisors to shape the institutional bureaucracy of the MoI in 2003. The organizational
structure designed by the German advisors was based on a Western model
emphasizing a clear chain of command, institutional accountability, clear separation of
duties and responsibilities and the deputization of key roles and functions within the
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MoI. As the chart demonstrates, the organizational structure of the MoI was extensively
complex and overtly ambitious given the lack of human capital and requisite technical
expertise to administer the bureaucratic functions of the MoI as revealed by research
participants in this study.
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Figure 3.2 Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Interior Affairs

Source: Ministry of Interior [unclassified], Kabul, Afghanistan, 2014.
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Afghan Official 5, who collaboratively spearheaded the German reformative
project with Afghan personnel at the MoI, drew attention to the constant disputes
between foreign advisors and Afghan staff. These disagreements generally originated
from a lack of understanding of complex policy directives devised by Germans,
language barriers, cultural sensitivities, opposition to a German-staffed accountability,
transparency, and oversight watchdog at the MoI, and the system of recruitment for
bureaucratic personnel pursued by Afghans.
Furthermore, Afghan Official 5 points to an imperative factor which aggravated the
inefficiency of the reformative process at the Ministry of Interior, namely the constant
change of command at the ministerial level. From 2002 to 2014, eight separate ministers
were appointed by Hamed Karzai to lead the MoI. The longest serving minister was
Ahmad Moqbel Zarar, who served 3 years from 2005-2008, while other appointees opted
for civilian ministerial portfolios within months or after a year. The constant change of
command at the ministerial level also exerted an impact on the permanent staff at the
MoI. The continuous change in leadership made bureaucratic staff adjust to new forms of
authority and expectations arising from different leadership models.
By the same token, given that the MoI was largely commanded by various former
Northern Alliance commanders, the unexpected result was the factionalism that
followed in the bureaucracy every time there was a change in leadership at the
ministerial level. Afghan Official 5 explains that factional loyalty by bureaucratic staff to
various commanders further fractured the fragile collective fabric of the MoI leading to
varying performance records in individual divisions. Afghan Official 5 further elucidated
the immanent difficulties in finding local expertise to staff the bureaucratic branches of
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the MoI. In light of Afghanistan’s excessive illiteracy rate which had inflated to 88
percent during the Taliban era coupled with a healthy number of previous Afghan
bureaucrats living in diaspora, locating local talent and expertise became a colossal
human capacity-building task for the German advisory force from 2002-2006.
Such monumental shortcomings resulted in bureaucratic administrative positions
being staffed by former armed fighters and Northern Alliance loyalists which set in
motion various types of unprofessional behaviour including corruption, financial fraud,
inattention to administrative duties, while overall there remained poor working
relationships among different branches and divisions of the MoI.
As such, the inability of the German advisory force to standardize and
professionalize institutional behaviour and performance led to significant fragmentation
of the MoI. Afghan Official 5 postulates that the enormous size of the MoI bureaucratic
apparatus became dysfunctional, leading to severe limitations in the flow of information
and interdivisional coordination. The Strategy and Policy branch at the MoI under the
guidance of the German advisors unsuccessfully attempted to craft a comprehensive
plan of action to implement suggested reforms.
Afghan Official 5 put forward several arguments to account for this level of
dysfunction. First, the organizational structure of the MoI had six deputy ministers for
diverse administrative portfolios which often overlapped with one another. Second,
edicts emanating from the deputy minister of Strategy and Policy branch were
construed as having an improper hierarchical authority by other deputies within the MoI.
Finally, the intense competition for limited financial resources by all bureaucratic
divisions led to an imbalanced allocation of funds. While some divisions such as
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Security, Strategy and Policy, and Administration received almost 75 percent of the
funding, the remaining three branches were only given 25 percent of the total budget.
As a by-product of the ongoing unfair distribution of financial resources, cycles of
mistrust, ineffectiveness, inefficiency, bureaucratic corruption, and poor performance
continued until the NATO coalition decided to hand over policing responsibilities to the
US security forces in 2006.
NATO Official 6, a decorated military official who was responsible for the
transition of command from the German advisory force to the US security advisory team
in 2005-06, alluded to the continuation of organizational difficulties at the Ministry of
Interior. An auditory assessment by a multidisciplinary NATO team prior to the Summit
in 2005 had concluded that institutional capacity-building along with human capacitybuilding initiatives had utterly failed to materialize in professionalizing the administrative
bureaucracy at the Ministry of Interior. At the annual NATO Summit in 2006, the
decision was made by the US to assume responsibility for the MoI, effectively sidelining
and relegating the German advisory force to other civilian ministries. Operating under
the NATO mandate, the US mission in Afghanistan introduced the Combined Security
Assistance Command (CSAC) at the MoI in Kabul.
NATO Official 6 labels this new approach as radically different from the German
training program and strikingly analogous to the military sector reform at the Ministry of
Defense. In particular, the CSAC preserved the complex organizational structure of the
MoI introduced by the Germans and instead concentrated on bringing a form of
discipline within the civil sector of the institution similar in characteristics to the
uniformed police service.

85

Accordingly, the reinvigorated and spirited approach to the professionalization of
the bureaucracy at the MoI brought to the fore the diverse challenges for the CSAC that
the German advisory force had previously faced. To cope with the lack of human
capacity and to gradually build institutional capacity at the MoI, NATO Official 6 asserts
that the CSAC, under the US advisory command, decided to offer year-long rotations to
senior Afghan bureaucrats at the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) training
academy in Quantico, Virginia to professionalize the overall administrative division of
the MoI.
Additionally, the CSAC committed to modernizing the MoI with advanced
communication equipment, digital recordkeeping resources, and initiated a performance
tracking system to monitor progress and deficiencies across all six branches using
advanced computer software. The renewed policy of institutional reform and capacitybuilding programs driven by the US-led CSAC advisors achieved incremental progress
in the MoI leading up to 2014.
NATO Official 6 indicates that after completing the rigorous FBI training program,
senior Afghan bureaucrats became acquainted with the importance and facets of
institutional accountability, modern resource management, planning, and strategizing
objectives while middle-and lower-level clerical staff still lacked the administrative
knowledge to efficiently execute their responsibilities.
That is not to say that progress had not been made leading up to the summer of
2010 under the command of General David Petraeus, but rather that bureaucratic
progress did not maintain uniformity in the MoI. The general preference to train senior
officials further ostracized and marginalized lower ranking officials and subjected them
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to increased administrative responsibilities without vital training to carry out the official
duties of crucial governmental security organs. In sum, the institutional and human
capacity-building initiative at the MoI in 2002 began with a complex organizational
structure lacking the requisite expertise to efficiently manage and to conduct the day-today operations of a key security institution and gradually transitioned to a slightly more
effective bureaucracy leading up to 2014.

Institutional Features of the National Directorate of Security
Prevailing wisdom among experts on SSR dictates that a strong and capable
national intelligence agency is the centrepiece of a country’s security, stability, and
order (Murray, 2009, 189-191; Wilson,2005, 89). In the Western hemisphere, developed
countries perceive intelligence as more than a mere compilation of organized classified
information, but rather view it as a mechanistic institution tasked with collecting,
analyzing, and sharing information to plan well-coordinated missions with other national
security agencies in utmost secrecy. In essence, the security of the state is
unmistakably tied to the quality and quantity of intelligence it can effectively gather from
various sources to safeguard its populace and national interests from looming threats.
In the 1980s, under the Soviet sphere of influence, Afghanistan’s national
intelligence agency was called Khadamate A’etlati-Dawlati (KhAD) roughly translating to
State Intelligence Agency. With direct advice from the Soviet KGB forces, it became a
potent force of over 50,000 intelligence personnel against the Mujahideen fighters under
the authority of late president Dr. Najibullah Ahmadzai, who was later executed by the
Taliban (Halliday and Tanin, 1998, 1361-1362). KhAD maintained a strong presence
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throughout Afghanistan with a complex organizational structure equipped with Soviet
spy technology and training to deter the advance of the Mujahideen towards major
urban centres.
Not only did it effectively ensure the survival of the Communist regime in
Afghanistan through the 1980s, it also served as a powerful repressive tool for the
government against political dissent (Halliday and Tanin, 1998, 1363-1367). Common
activities of the KhAD through 1980s included arranging forced disappearances of
dissidents, foreign espionage, and establishing political prisoner camps in collusion with
the KGB (Cogan, 1993, 77). However, with the fall of Dr. Najibullah’s regime in 1992 to
Mujahideen factions, the state’s intelligence apparatus also disintegrated, which
effectively spelled the end for this institution until the arrival of the NATO coalition in
Afghanistan in 2001.
In Afghanistan, the NDS was reinvented in early 2002 as the country’s national
intelligence agency with direct assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and the Pentagon to ensure the survivability of the fragile Karzai government and a
viable and capable intelligence apparatus. Despite its existence since 2002, there
remains a paucity of academic literature, analytical reports, and performance
assessments beyond general speculation in order to genuinely understand the inner
institutional workings of the NDS. To gain insight into the administrative and operational
aspects of this institution, and further, to close the gap between speculation and
evidence, the author conducted interviews with numerous former and current senior
NDS officials. These officials were interviewed both inside and outside Afghanistan to
study and explore the institutional and organizational structure of the NDS.
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Afghan Official 6, who served as an advisor in the executive office of the Director
of Intelligence from early 2002 until 2013, points to some of the institutional weaknesses
present in the NDS. In comparison to the MoD and MoI, the NDS embodies a modest
organizational structure and chain of command. The NDS is an independent intelligence
body whereby the director reports directly to the President of Afghanistan. Afghan
Official 6 further established that the CIA training of vetted special NDS agents takes
place outside Afghanistan in Bahrain, where the US military’s 5th Fleet is based, and in
various military intelligence bases across the US.
The strength of the extensive CIA training has ushered in the type of
professionalism and expertise unseen in the MoD and MoI. According to Afghan Official
6, the NDS recruits undergo a rigorous 18-month training program, which involves
learning methods of counter-terrorism strategies, enhanced interrogation techniques,
intelligence gathering techniques, interagency coordination, international human rights
law, interception and transcription of data, policy implementation, special operations
planning, and surveillance tactics.
Furthermore, the inclusive training provided by the CIA has also had a positive
impact on the flow of information within the institution with a clear and hierarchical chain
of command. Afghan Official 6 professes that the creation of an internal auditory
watchdog with assistance from the CIA is coupled with early training programmes that
helped to minimize corruption at the NDS and placed immense emphasis on
accountability and interagency transparency. As well, the recruitment process handled
by the human resources department comprehensively conducted background checks in
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coordination with the CIA, the FBI, Interpol and other regional intelligence agencies to
safeguard against any form of insurgent infiltration.
Afghan Official 7, a senior member of the operations planning department who
has been with the agency since 2002, pointed to the well-developed bureaucratic
procedures within the NDS. Given that the NDS was not part of the ministerial reward
system like the MoD and MoI in 2002, it was able to build capacity and nurture
relationships with all other divisions in an impartial manner. For instance, NATO Official
2 proclaimed that every single NDS operation, no matter how trivial or vast, had to be
approved by a specially trained judge to ensure that it was within the legal framework,
and more importantly, in the national security interests of Afghanistan.
Mass implementation of bureaucratic procedures with rules and guidelines
concerning grievances and promotions, planning, and structure for strategizing counterterrorism initiatives helped jointly and progressively strengthen the institutional and
human capacity building enterprise. In fact, the accountability and bureaucratic
efficiency of the NDS was found to be pervasive across all its branches including major
cities of Helmand, Heart, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Kapisa, Logar, Mazar-e-Sharif, and
Paktia. Afghan Officials 6 and 7 both agree that the CIA-funded training programs
helped foster patterns of institutional behaviour at the NDS which were consistent with
the conduct of a well-developed professional intelligence agency collaborating around
principles of accountability, rules and procedures, and efficiency.
But even though the agency succeeded and made significant strides from 2002
to 2014 on many institutional and bureaucratic fronts, the NDS also faced severe
challenges in other aspects. Afghan Official 8, a special field operations agent with more
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than a decade of experience at the NDS, expanded on some of the ingrained
inadequacies within the organization. While the institutional and bureaucratic structures
of the intelligence apparatus were formulated by the CIA and the Pentagon to emulate
those of a Western-style intelligence agency in 2002, the method in which the NDS
conducted the day-to-day affairs of the intelligence bureaucracy was deficient. He
primarily stressed the dependence on decades-old techniques of analyzing and
collecting intelligence. The CIA and Pentagon-funded NDS was promised human
capacity with hands-on training but overlooked in terms of institutional and logistical
arrangements which can be better performed with modern intelligence equipment. The
dearth of advanced analytical software, communication interceptors and systems, and
surveillance systems led to the intelligence assessments of the NDS being anecdotal,
incomplete, and inaccurate.
In light of this incapacitating shortcoming, Afghan Officials 7 and 8 argued that
oftentimes intelligence assessments presented to policymakers within the organization
have been severely deficient in including important content such as identifying new
insurgent groups, planning counter-terrorism operations, and in analyzing the severity of
terrorist threats. As such, incomplete assessments led to indecisiveness on the part of
policymakers and endangered the lives of ordinary civilians including major security
breaches. Afghan Official 8 further stated that historical performance assessments
leading back to 2002 overwhelmingly indicated that intelligence analysis and policy
formulation were major areas of concern at the NDS, while the collection of intelligence
by field agents was deemed to be satisfactory.
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Afghan Official 8 further acknowledged that the aforementioned limitations
cultivated a pervasive culture of authoritarianism within the senior ranks of the
organization. He emphasized during the interviews that the vast majority of the senior
NDS officials were inveterate impulsive decision-makers accustomed to informal
modalities of policy formulation dictated by anecdotes, impulses, and minimum
oversight. Furthermore, there was a visible pattern of path dependence within the NDS
since its advent which was largely based on human-centric models of policymaking –
far-detached from the widely-accepted modern gold standard of ‘Evidence-Based Policy
Making’ (EBPM).
Although EBPM was initially limited to the realm of medicine to promote a
rigorous scientific process in establishing evidence-based methods of medical research
and treatment, it soon expanded into other disciplines including public policy. In general,
EBPM is conceptually concerned with objectivity in the decision-making process by
scientifically collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information to further social or
institutional goals, which in turn leads to informed policy-making (Sanderson, 2002, 69). Many of the principles concerning EBPM promote a vision of institutional policymaking which inhibits selective and subjective aspects of conducting public policy in
favour of a organized and accountable decision-making process. For example, see
Figure 3.3 Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM) Policy Cycle. The EBPM model
displayed below explains the circular process of modern policy-making aimed at
identifying problems and achieving desired policy results as a result of constant
monitoring and evaluation. In the case of Afghanistan, the EBPM model was endorsed
at certain lower administrative levels yet faced resistance from senior bureaucrats.

92

Figure 3.3 Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM) Policy Cycle

Source: Young and Quinn, 2002, 12.
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In sum, there is an undeviating relationship between EBPM and path
dependence in modern designs of policy decision-making. The wide recognition of
EBPM as the gold standard for excellent scientific policy practice has resulted in mass
dependence on the EBPM model of policymaking and its pervasiveness in the majority
of governmental institutions across the developed and developing world (De Marchie et
al., 2016, 21-24).
While the cycle of path dependence was susceptible to significant events known
as ‘critical junctures’ which led to paradigmatic changes in policy direction in
government institutions, Afghan Official 8 affirms that the policy-making process within
the NDS from 2002 to 2014 lacked an operational reassessment and it was largely
incongruous with the fragile security situation across Afghanistan. As such, the main
source of authoritarian policy-making attributed to the NDS by Official 8 was rooted in a
trial-and-error framework of policy making devoid of the information-based analytical
sophistication required to guide the intelligence apparatus.

Conclusion
To recapitulate, this chapter provides an account of institutional strengths and
weaknesses of key security institutions in Afghanistan – the MoD, MoI, and the NDS. In
doing so, the aim is to bridge gaps in literature between the general understanding of
issues associated with policy implementation in security institutions with definitive
accounts from knowledgeable technocrats, policy officials, and senior executives at the
MoD, MoI, and the NDS.
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As briefly reviewed earlier, the dearth of literature pertaining to the institutional
aspects of all three key security institutions from 2002 to 2014 categorically inhibits the
necessary building of requisite academic discourse toward a reassessment of the
institutional proficiencies and deficiencies within the security apparatus.
Having academically engaged the uncharted realm of NATO’s SSR approach to
institutional reform by interviewing relevant policy officials, several inferences regarding
the above-mentioned institutions can be drawn. First, the emergence of the ANA as a
national defense entity under the direct authority of the MoD from 2002 to 2014 brought
to the fore the complex challenges in professionalizing the institutional backbone of the
national army. The dominance of senior policy and executive positions by warlords with
little formal experience in conducting the day-to-day operations of a command structure
of a professional army hindered the bureaucratic progress of the MoD as a formidable
institution. Additionally, the NATO undertaking which formed the Civil Service
Commission as an administrative advisory body embedded within the MoD resulted in
mixed outcomes.

Although the Security and Support Division staffed by rank-and-file bureaucrats
at the Ministry of Defense benefited immensely from advice and training from the Civil
Service Commission, senior policymakers largely operated based on informalism and a
lack of oversight. As a result, instances of ‘big seed’ corruption in logistics and
procurement subdivision of the MoD became evident from 2002 to 2014, which paved
the way for the establishment of the NPA. Nevertheless, both human and institutional
capacity at the MoD significantly improved over the years due to the special attention
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granted by the NATO coalition forces to build up the main battle and defense groups of
the country. The recruitment of both senior and mid-level bureaucrats gradually came to
be governed by rules and procedures which were previously non-existent.
The procurement dimension of the MoD was not only overseen by the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, but was largely monitored by the
World Bank, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and
independent contractors to prevent corrupt backdoor arrangements. Lastly,
improvements in public accessibility and infrastructure allowed for the development and
expansion of the MoD satellite branches across all 34 provinces as part of the larger
goal of maintaining national presence to improve security outcomes in volatile regions in
Afghanistan. Thus, the institutional aspects of the MoD from 2002 to 2014 were a mixed
record of progress and setbacks in introducing core liberal doctrines of accountability,
oversight, and transparency.
Secondly, this chapter accentuated the institutional dimensions of the MoI and
the ANP to explore a multitude of factors which shaped its identity as a public protection
force from 2002 to 2014. Analogous to certain divisions of the MoD, the creation of the
MoI in 2002 was also based on an incentive system meant to reward warlords and
militia groups for assisting the US-led coalition in 2001 and 2002 to oust the Taliban
regime. Not surprisingly, the MoI found itself at the crossroads, facing international
pressure for increased institutional capacity building on the one hand and catering to the
preferences of warlords keen on maintaining the informal culture of nepotism and
corruption on the other.
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Moreover, the emergence of acrimonious internal disputes among distinct
divisions of the MoI signalled an institutional flaw whereby the allocation of donor aid
was unequally and arbitrarily misappropriated leading up to 2011. Also, the constant
change in ministerial positions at the MoI led to an incoherent institutional reform
agenda due in part to the colossal problems posed by powerful pressure groups led by
former warlords intent on maintaining the informal culture of the status quo. This led to
corruption, misdirection, and obfuscation for technocrats and rank-and-file officials in
performing their duty to the best of their ability despite the lack of clear direction and
prerogatives.
Further exacerbating the institutional flaws at the MoI from 2003 to 2014 was the
change of command from an advisory perspective solely by Germany to a mixed
American-German assistance initiative. The emergence of the CSAC proved to be
much more effective in training the bureaucratic staff by ushering in to the MoI a more
military mindset, but it also concomitantly neglected the past efforts and advisory
direction of Germany in bringing about institutional accountability. Again, these inherent
institutional problems continued to hamper the administrative progress of the MoI
leading up to the conclusion of the NATO combat mission in 2014. Overall, the adoption
of a complex administrative structure at the MoI in 2002 by German advisors, which
idealistically emulated procedural features highlighting the importance of accountability
and oversight evident in well-developed Western institutions but not manifested in
Afghanistan brought about confusion, inefficiency, and a lack of direction between 2002
and 2014.
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Finally, this chapter provided an appraisal of the institutional features of the
intelligence sector in Afghanistan with vital insight from interviewees. In comparison to
the MoD and MoI, this research found that the NDS was not plagued to a similar extent
by institutional malignancies. The institution of a simple command structure in tandem
with rigorous training provided by the CIA in 2002 and other NATO members’
intelligence agencies in 2003 gave way to the professionalization of the institutional
framework at the NDS. The prerogative to create an internal watchdog coupled with an
educational program for the NDS technocrats focused on the procedural functions of the
agency set in motion the type of institutional coherence seen in many more welldeveloped Western institutions.
Though the NDS fared better in terms of institutional performance and
responsibility from 2002 to 2014, the agency found itself in a rancorous administrative
battle between traditional bureaucrats and reformists. Between 2006 and 2010,
traditionalists strongly advocated for the weight of their personal experiences,
judgements, and nationalist motivations while reformists were steadfast on familiarizing
themselves with modern forms of analytical and organizational methods in making
informed policy decisions. As Afghan Official 7 explained, the agency’s policy direction
leading up to 2014 was derived from a combination of opinions and dated forms of
analysis that would have had significant potential, should there be a gradual introduction
of modern methods of analysis and planning.
Lastly, the institutional assessment of the administrative performance of the NDS
is reflective of the larger divergent policy-making models apparent in developed and
underdeveloped countries. The transition from human-centric models to EBPM is a
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systematic process centred on the development of high levels of personnel expertise
and organizational sophistication analogous to scientific methods. Despite these
shortcomings, the NDS is widely considered to be the most administratively effective
institution in comparison to the MoD and MoI. Given these points, the gradual presence
of more well-developed chains of command staffed by professional bureaucrats that
began to embody a progressive and partially scientific 1policy-making model afforded
the NDS with considerable potential for further reform.
The link between institutional development in the MoD, MoI, and the NDS and
liberal institutionalism cannot be overstated. Although far from being efficient and
effective in every aspect, the journey from informal patrimonialism towards liberal
democratization was evident. Institutional development at the MoD, MoI, and the NDS as devised by NATO’s SSR agenda - foresaw the long and arduous process of fullfledged bureaucratization which would need to encompass rules, procedures, and a
structural hierarchy of command. This chapter discussed institutional level deficiencies
and proficiencies at the MoD, MoI, and the NDS in depth in order to shed light on
Afghanistan’s gradual march towards accountability, responsibility, and transparency in
implementing institutional reform.
The above discussion leads to the following overarching research question:
What worked and what did not work in terms of SSR’s institutional reform efforts
in key Afghan security organs between 2003-2014? First, the establishment of the
intelligence, police and military institutions in 2002 together with dedicated trainers and
funding allowed for the gradual legitimization of sectors of the developing Afghan state.
Secondly, the hierarchical command and structure which guided bureaucratic
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procedures in Afghan security organs demonstrated gradual institutional progress in
keeping with Western liberal democratic objectives. Thirdly, the introduction of legal
procedures, rules, and various mechanisms for institutional oversight signalled the
gradual professional development at the MoD, MoI, and particularly the NDS, leading up
to 2014.
On the other hand, the liberal institutionalist principles were rarely implemented
in a scientific manner between 2003 and 2014. Constant conflicts in terms of instituting
reforms between traditionalists and modern reformists saw institutional progress digress
from core liberal institutionalist objectives of accountability, responsibility, and
transparency. Also, the recruitment of illiterate and underqualified individuals to serve in
key roles within the MoD, MoI, and the NDS affected the mandate of SSR’s institutional
reform in Afghanistan. Finally, the endemic culture of tolerance for corruption,
informalism, and nepotism in Afghan security institutions – that was endured and even
tolerated by NATO-led advisors and trainers – monumentally affected institutional
progress between 2003 and 2014.
In sum, the deficiencies noted in this chapter are not necessarily an indicator of
problems and deficiencies in the SSR model for institutional reform itself but rather point
to the shortcomings in the execution of the liberal institutionalist project both by Afghan
and NATO officials. Hence, some measure of institutional progress in the MoD, MoI,
and the NDS can be appreciated within the context of a ‘trial-and-error framework’ that
was seriously affected by the inconsistent and incoherent modalities of policy formation
and implementation.
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CHAPTER 4
Operational Aspects of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police
Introduction
After considering key institutional aspects of SSR in the previous chapter, this
chapter discusses research findings pertaining to key operational dimensions of the
MoD and MoI and their respective security apparatuses mainly from 2003 to 2014. In
the previous chapter, several policy paradigms relevant to institutional policy making
were discussed – ranging from human-centric models to EBPM– which pointed to the
divergent methods through which governmental policy was crafted. For the purpose of
explaining the findings concerning the operational facets of SSR, these models will be
revisited to illustrate the links among effectiveness, field performance, and policy, in the
MoD and MoI in Afghanistan.
This chapter is structured into three sections. First, research findings related to
operational aspects of the MoD are reviewed and discussed. Secondly, an in-depth
description and analysis of the MoI sheds light on the mandate and performance of its
overall field operations. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of both the MoD
and MoI field operations to systematically assess the multifaceted realm of performance
by security apparatuses in Afghanistan. Then this chapter summarily recapitulates the
fundamental findings relevant to operational aspects of the MoD and MoI in
Afghanistan.
The relationship between the authority of a central government, its overall ability
to govern effectively, and the legitimacy it garners cannot be detached from the
effectiveness of a country’s key security institutions. Tasked with monopolizing the
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means of violence and concurrently serving as an enforcer and guarantor of the state’s
existence, the importance of a state-sanctioned security sector cannot be overstated. In
Afghanistan, it is evident that the central government has continuously struggled to
monopolize violence through its fragile and emerging security sector in the face of the
Taliban insurgency which had undermined the central government’s legitimacy since
2001. As such, the research findings discussed below shed light on whether the modern
Afghan state continues to struggle for nationwide legitimacy from an operational aspect
involving the internationally backed mandate of the two key security institutions – the
MoD and MoI.

Ministry of Defense Field Operations – The Case of the Afghan Armed Forces
The largest security institution in Afghanistan is the Ministry of Defense which is
composed of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Air Force personnel
numbering cumulatively around 181,000 active soldiers (Glickstein and Spangler, 2014,
94-96). Aside from the administrative division of the MoD discussed in the previous
chapter, the land and aerial warfare branches together form the Afghan Armed Forces
(AAF). Prior to discussing the research findings involving the operational capacity of
Afghanistan’s land and aerial forces of AAF, a brief organizational sketch presents a
complete picture of their key functions. The land warfare component of AAF is the ANA
which encompasses one division and six regional battle corps placed strategically
across Afghanistan and jointly accounts for more than 174,000 soldiers: 111th Capital
Division, 201st Silab Corps, 203rd Thunder Corps, 205th Atal Corps, 207th Zafar Corps,
209th Shaheen Corps and 215th Maiwand Corps. For more information outlining areas of
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regional responsibility from 2001 to present see Figure 4.0 Regional Responsibility of
ANA Division and ANA Corps Areas.
In comparison to the land warfare command of the ANA, the Afghan Air Force is
a diminutive branch of the Armed Forces numbering nearly 8,500 active personnel
divided into three Air Detachments and four Air Wings since its inception in 2001:
Gardez Air Detachment, Heart Air Detachment, Jalalabad Air Detachment, Kabul Air
Wing, Kandahar Air Wing, Mazar-e-Sharif Air Detachment, Shindand Air Wing, and the
Special Missions Wing. The Support Brigades division of the MoD, headquartered in
Kabul, discussed extensively in the previous chapter, dually serves as the official
logistical, procurement, and technical assistance arm of the Air Force as well as the
ANA throughout Afghanistan. To further investigate the operational capacity of the AAF
under the MoD command, this research study also employed qualitative observational
interviewing techniques to understand the core intricacies of SSR.
To reiterate, the aim of this research study is both theoretical and empirical. That
is, this research attempts to investigate the fundamental principles of liberal
institutionalism – which has come to be the theoretical backbone of SSR – with
research findings from relevant documents, institutional planning arrangements and
interviews of key NATO and Afghan officials. This will help to determine whether
NATO’s SSR approach in Afghanistan either uniformly or at least partially worked from
2003 to 2014 – and whether and to what extent it required further reform. As such, the
main objective of this research study is to bridge the gap between theory and practice
within the realm of SSR in Afghanistan.
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Figure 4.0 Regional Responsibility of ANA Division and ANA Corps Areas

Source: Global Security, 2014
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And, to substantiate this larger objective with substantive policy-relevant
evidence and crucial insights from participants in this study that transcend speculative
narrative accounts.
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, the need for a
traditional military apparatus with modern training became both apparent and
necessary. All branches of the AAF, including the ANA and the Air Force, had been
dismantled by the Mujahideen militias between 1993-1996, and the succeeding Taliban
regime overlooked the need for a military institution in Afghanistan given the presence
of its own armed factions with foreign backing from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The NATO coalition’s involvement in Afghanistan in 2003 set in motion the
process of statebuilding rooted in the liberal adoption of the SSR agenda. The main
imperative of ISAF in 2003 was to responsibly rebuild the Afghan military to allow for
civilian development and reconstruction to take place. However, the complex task of
rebuilding the military’s operational capacity from 2003 to 2014 proved too difficult – and
summary assessment of Afghan military’s operational capacity is examined below in
more detail.
On December 20th, 2001, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1386
authorized the deployment of multi-national ISAF troops to help stabilize the capital city
of Kabul. Later in 2003, UNSC Resolution 1510 mandated the expansion of the ISAF
mission to all other major urban centres including Heart, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and
Mazar-e-Sharif (UN, 2001; UN, 2003). Another facet of this resolution called for the
rapid creation and mobilization of Afghan-led National Security Forces, who would draw
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their strength from multiple apparatuses (Intelligence, Military, and Police). UNSC
Resolution 1386 paved the way for the arrival of the first contingent of multi-national
ISAF forces in January 2002 deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – Action
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression
(UN, 2001).
NATO Official 8, an interviewee who served as a senior NATO operations officer
in the Afghanistan section from 2003-2012, alluded to the creation of the MoD and the
AAF in early 2002. He explained that from its inception, the MoD was under the direct
supervision and guidance of the US military in helping to rebuild the Afghan military
force, with small-scale advisory help from France and the UK. He further indicated that
the recruitment process after the establishment of the MoD, which began in early 2002,
was aimed at rapidly boosting the number of active Afghan military personnel who could
shoulder the bulk of responsibility for security stabilization missions across Afghanistan
(See Figure 4.1 Increase in the Size of Afghan National Army, 2003-2013 and Number
of ANA Soldiers on Duty). This chart demonstrates the rise in number of ANA personnel
as the SSR project in Afghanistan took shape with assistance from NATO’s ISAF
mission. The chart further captures the rapid rise in the number of ANA recruits and the
robustness, and the swiftness of the training model adopted by ISAF to help accelerate
the deployment of ANA troops across Afghanistan.
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Figure 4.1 Increase in the Size of Afghan National Army, 2003-2013 and Number of
ANA Soldiers on Duty
Month

Ministry of Defense Forces

End 2003

6,000

End 2004

24,000

End 2005

26,000

End 2006

36,000

End 2007

50,000

April 2008

57,800

October 2008

68,000

March 2009

82,780

July 2009

91,900

November 2009

95,000

December 2009

100,131

March 2010

113,000

April/May 2010

119,388

August 2010

134,000

September 2010

138,164

October 2010

144,638

December 2010

149,533

Jan/Feb 2011

152,000

April 2011

164,003

May 2011

168,037
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August 2011

169,076

September 2011

170,781

October 2011

173,150

December 2011

179,610

January 2012

184,437

February 2012

187,874

March 2012

194,466

October 2012

178,501

January 2013

177,579

March 2013

177,725

September 2013

185,817

Source: Brookings Institution, 2014
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To facilitate the swift build-up of the ANA, the US funded the establishment of the
Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC) to be supervised by the Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) at the Kabul Military Training
Academy. NATO Official 8 pointed to several flaws which affected the operational
capacity of the ANA through this multi-tiered training program undertaken by the CSTCA. He began by drawing attention to the structure of the basic military training program
for new recruits organized hastily by the US Armed Forces in early 2002.
According to NATO Official 8, the CSTC-A adopted an assembly line model in
attempting to produce combat ready soldiers with professional training. The vast
differences in mindsets, literacy, and motivation between the NATO trainers and Afghan
trainees in 2003 colossally impacted the readiness of the AAF in tackling the resurgent
Taliban insurgency. The assembly line model undertaken by the CSTC-A, which began
in early 2002, provided intensive Western-style military training to Afghan recruits, most
of whom were illiterate, had political propensities linked to factional warlords, and had
only joined the AAF to financially benefit from the military’s pay structure and bolster
their factional ranks. NATO Official 8 further elaborated that militia fighters from the
National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan and the Northern Alliance group, had joined
the AAF numbering in thousands to cement their influence, as the Afghan military
gradually morphed into a professional fighting force leading up to 2010.
Afghan Official 2, a long-serving senior policy and planning executive at the
Ministry of Defense with extensive knowledge of the AAF, implied that the twelve-weeklong basic military training conducted by the CSTC-A affected the operational dynamics
of the AAF on the battlefield leading up to 2014. Given that the bulk of recruits were
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assigned to the ANA from 2002 to 2014 and divided into six regional corps and one
division, there were serious personnel misappropriations which emerged in early 2002.
Afghan Official 2 explained that the majority of the top-performing ANA soldiers were
assigned to the 111th Division comprised of 17,000 soldiers, which was based in Kabul
and primarily meant to protect the capital and diplomatic missions from large-scale
insurgent attacks. Though this was a deliberate decision undertaken by the MoD in
tandem with the CSTC-A, it overwhelmingly led to notable operational deficiencies in
the other six regional combat corps based in mostly violent and volatile parts of
Afghanistan.

Afghan Official 2 delineated that over 95 percent of insurgent activities were
concentrated in the eastern, western, and southern provinces of Afghanistan from 2002
to 2014, while the most capable and talented ANA soldiers were disproportionately
stationed in 111th Kabul division. Moreover, he explained that all the ANA soldiers were
trained with Soviet-era AK-47 assault rifles by the CSTC-A, yet upon graduation were
armed with US-supplied M-16 assault rifles with which they had little operational and
maintenance familiarity. Of the 425,000 M-16 assault rifles donated to the ANA by the
Pentagon, almost 60 percent either had originated from the surplus repository of the US
Army or were at the end of their service life.
NATO Official 8 corroborated Afghan Official 2’s account and described the
monumental issues linked to the choice of the M-16 assault rifle by the Pentagon as the
primary service weapon of the ANA. He explained that there were severe shortages of
available spare parts for the M-16 assault rifle from 2002 to 2014 in Afghanistan, which
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forced many of the ANA soldiers to be assigned to administrative duties for several
weeks until spare parts could be located. Another prevailing issue related to the M-16
assault rifle was that the barrel often overheated in the hot and arid climate of eastern
and southern Afghanistan after prolonged combat usage in the area where the bulk of
the Taliban insurgency was concentrated leading up to 2014. In such instances, NATO
Official 8 stated that the M-16 assault rifle was virtually useless and raised the
vulnerability of the ANA soldiers to insurgent attacks in combat situations.
In light of these challenges, NATO Official 8 expressed deep satisfaction and
emphasized the growing optimism within the NATO coalition pertaining to the
operational capabilities of the ANA. Having served as a high-ranking military intelligence
officer with first-hand experience in Afghanistan, NATO Official 8 underscored the
overall rapid establishment of the ANA with a professional command structure
beginning in 2003 with NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. While the ANA was beset
by the abovementioned deficiencies, the overall progress since 2002 was remarkable,
due in part to unwavering military assistance from the US-led coalition, at first, and then
later from NATO. NATO Official 8 stated that the heavy weaponry supplied by the US
Army had been exemplary including thousands of DSH-K heavy machine guns, heavily
armored personnel carriers, humvees, howitzers, 82 mm mortars, advanced rocket
systems, surface-to-air missiles, and modern radar systems installed in all major urban
centres and border areas.
In addition, NATO Official 7, a high-ranking policy officer responsible for the
Afghanistan operations division from 2003 to 2014 with extensive knowledge of the
hierarchical bureaucratic, and operational structure of the Afghan MoD also provided
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crucial first-hand insight. He stressed that the ANA Corps 201, 203, 205, 209, and 215
maintained an offensive posture from 2003 to 2014 whereby the CSTC-A training along
with the US-supplied military-grade weapons faced the challenge of eradicating the
Taliban-allied insurgents in the most volatile provinces across Afghanistan. The 203rd,
205th, and 215th ANA Corps, which have been responsible for defending and
safeguarding provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Paktia, Wardak, and
Zabul from 2002 were among the most seasoned and professional soldiers in
Afghanistan, stated NATO Official 7. To see the widespread location of these provinces,
see Figure 4.0 Regional Responsibility of ANA Division and ANA Corps Area.
The mountainous and trying terrains of southern and eastern Afghanistan
combined with the evolving guerilla-style warfare waged by Taliban insurgents against
the ANA Corps 203, 205, and 215 since 2002 has proved to be an important litmus test
in determining their effectiveness in field operations. NATO Official 7 accentuated the
unrelenting resolve of the ANA soldiers and how the emerging spirit of loyalty over the
years strengthened the morale of the military apparatus under the command of the
MoD. He attributed these positive developments in the ANA over the years leading up to
2014 to several key factors. First, the voluntary nature of the ANA under the newly
established MoD institution coupled with years of brutal repression under the Taliban
regime leading up to 2001 gave impetus to a younger generation of Afghans to join the
main national Defense force. The negative sentiments held by ordinary Afghans against
the Taliban regime due to their strict adherence to the Deobandi sect of Islam in 2001
prompted many to actively participate in preventing the resurgence of extremist
elements in governance. Secondly, the emergence of a new national identity under the
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leadership of former President Hamid Karzai, who brought together all ethnic factions in
Afghanistan to nationally unite the previously fragmented and opposing tribes, garnered
widespread legitimacy for the newly-formed central government. This in turn, prompted
leaders from Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, and Uzbek tribes to take part in aspects of national
governance which dramatically boosted the number of ANA recruits. According to
NATO Official 7, not only was this social movement to allow for some basic
development to take place throughout Afghanistan but further cemented the role of the
ANA as a unitary national Defense force devoid of the widespread ethnic propensities
which had previously dominated much of Afghan military’s history during the uprisings
from 1970s to 1990s. See Figure 4.2 Ethnic Composition of the Afghan National Army.
The chart below reveals the measure of solidarity and unity which emerged among
various Afghan ethnicities in the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban regime to form
the modern composition of the ANA.
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Figure 4.2 Ethnic Composition of the Afghan National Army
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Source: Brookings Institution, 2014
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Finally, NATO Official 7 cited the level of international support through military
assistance for the ANA facilitated by the enormous presence of ISAF forces numbering
over 144,000 at its peak as a contributing factor. The large-scale deployment of ISAF
across Afghanistan beginning in 2003 paved the way for the MoD to actively seek the
professionalization of the ANA with multilateral support from coalition members.
At the Prague Summit in November, 2002, international partners provided
financial, moral, and political support to the rebuilding of the ANA, which underscored
the resolute backing of the international community for Afghanistan’s emerging
democracy. Much of this multifaceted international support for Afghanistan translated
into legitimacy for the central government and the military apparatus and further
signalled NATO’s intent to go beyond Kabul in far-flung provinces in order to
operationally expand the scope of the combat mission. NATO Official 7 affirmed that the
unprecedented level of NATO military support coupled with the magnitude of the
combat mission helped bolster the morale and spirit of the ANA soldiers to safeguard
the longevity of Afghanistan’s fragile democracy.
Afghan Official 3, a long-serving special advisor to the Parliament of Afghanistan
with extensive experience in the inner workings of the Afghan MoD, also corroborated
many of NATO Official 7’s claims regarding the gradual improvements in field
performance of the ANA from 2002 to 2014. But, he expressed his ambivalence
regarding the overall field performance of the ANA across Afghanistan. Many of Afghan
Official 3’s reservations were grounded in the varying capabilities of the ANA Corps
largely dependent on its regional deployment in Afghanistan.
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He proclaimed that the ANA Corps 201, 203, 205, 215 were disproportionately
better armed from 2002 to 2014 with modern weapons and equipped with modern
communication systems. The Corps had access to around-the-clock embedded
advisory support from NATO Strategic Advisory Teams and benefited immensely from
improved logistical arrangements which significantly assisted ANA Corps 201, 203, 205,
213 in day-to-day field operations. On the other hand, he delineated that during the
same time frame the ANA Corps 207 and 209 were overlooked during strategic phases
of military planning, resource allocation, and tactical coordination with ISAF personnel.
This unintended miscalculation by the NATO coalition resulted in fractures within the
ranks of the ANA further affecting the operational efficiency of 207 and 209 Corps.
Afghan Official 3 further pointed to the gradual increase in insurgent activities in
operational areas of the ANA Corps 207 and 209 as a by-product of the
misappropriation of military resources. Having suffered serious battlefield losses against
the ANA and NATO forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan from 2003 to 2010, the
Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups focused the bulk of their attention on the
previously stable provinces such as Baghlan, Badghis, Farah, Heart, and Kunduz
leading up to 2014.
As part of this revitalized major offensive strategy led by the Taliban in 2010
leading up to 2014, insurgents began targeting major town centres rather than smaller
districts in order to militarily overwhelm the ANA Corps 207 and 209 with heavy
firepower. Not only did this strategy result in loss of territory to the Taliban, including
major urban centres such as Chaghcharan and Kunduz City, it managed to subvert the
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stable image of the ANA Corps 207 and 209 which was attempting to facilitate civil and
economic development in their area of operations.
According to Afghan Official 3, another reason for the dramatic change in Taliban
strategy to target major urban centres rather than smaller districts across Afghanistan
was to gain leverage in any future peace negotiations with the Afghan government.
Targeting and occupying large population centres was meant to deal a psychological
blow to the morale of the ANA and to demonstrate the vulnerability of the Afghan
government’s central authority to insurgent attacks. For instance, the week-long
occupation of Kunduz City by Taliban insurgents in early 2014 led to the collapse of 209
Corps military installations, Afghan Official 3 said. Multiple battalions of the 209 Corps
were driven out to Kunduz airfield, located on the outskirts of the bustling city, by
Taliban fighters until NATO-led coalition forces were able to provided close combat air
support to help the ANA soldiers recapture the city.
The fall of Kunduz City, as an example, highlighted the imminent difficulties in the
ANA field operations structure. NATO Official 7, a senior and long-serving coalition
officer with extensive experience in both the military and police sector in Afghanistan,
alluded to certain factors which categorically affected the field operations of the MoD.
First, the CSTC-A’s training program focused predominantly on building up the ANA
Corps with low-ranking incoming soldiers while neglecting the creation and
incorporation of members of the Afghan Special Force into the ANA battalions until mid2005. Many of the covert and special counter-terrorism operations were conducted by
NATO troops while the ANA Corps continued to operate in a modified combat support
capacity. NATO Official 7 adamantly argued that tactical combat responsibility should
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have been under the command of the ANA Special Forces to facilitate their capabilities,
growth, and professionalism – an initiative which had been delegated to NATO and
coalition forces before 2005.
Furthermore, the MoD field operations were severely impacted by the prolonged
and slow development of the Afghan Air Force, stated NATO Official 7. The Afghan Air
Force was previously disbanded under the Mujahideen government in early 1990s with
many fighter, support, transport and utility aircrafts either destroyed or sold for parts in
the black market throughout Central Asia. The Afghan Air Force Modernization Plan that
was initiated by the Pentagon in 2003 aimed to ameliorate some of the monumental
operational deficiencies in providing support to ground troops. See Figure 4.3 on the
Afghan Air Force Modernization Plan initiated in 2003. The chart below provides a
description of the equipment supplied to the Afghan Air Force as part of the
modernization plan endorsed by the US and NATO. It is important to note that the
modernization plan for the Afghan Air Force focused predominantly on building up the
close-combat support capabilities and not the air superiority aspect. Although helicopter
gunships and transport planes were either refurbished or supplied, advanced fighter jet
procurement initiative for the Afghan Air Force was overlooked by both the US and
NATO coalition.
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Figure 4.3 Afghan Air Force Modernization Plan

Source: Global Security, 2014.
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NATO Official 7 asserted that the Afghan Air Force Modernization Plan was
directed at systematically equipping the emerging Afghan Air Force with capable aircraft
to reduce the burden on the NATO forces and to serve as an air defense branch of the
MoD. Pentagon officials began the procurement process of equipping the Afghan Air
Force by purchasing used Soviet-era Mig-17 and Mig-19 attack helicopters and
donating used American C-130 Hercules transport aircraft in 2003. The long-term
Modernization Plan proposed by the Pentagon under the supervision of Combined
Security Transition Command - Afghanistan included the diversification of the Afghan
Air Force. The newer modernization plan introduced in 2011 included the procurement
of rotary wing aircraft and light-attack helicopters including Embraer, Sikorsky, and MD
Helicopters that were then meant to be contracted out by the Pentagon to various
defense firms.
NATO Official 7 applauded the gradual development of the Afghan Air Force as
one of the most promising, professional, and capable branches of the MoD. He pointed
to the logistical and limited air support provided to the ANA since 2003 throughout
Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain despite the paucity of jet fighter aircrafts in the
Afghan Air Force. He further explained that the Afghan Air Force’s professionalism in
field operations in comparison to other branches of the MoD was attributable to the
comprehensive and ongoing training programs afforded to them by the US Air Force
and coalition partners.
In congruence with NATO Official 7’s assertions, the SIGAR report in 2013
commended the ability of the Afghan Air Force to operate and provide support in all 34
provinces across the country despite the evident operational limitations (SIGAR, 2013).
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The main shortcoming singled out by both NATO Official 7 and the 2013 SIGAR Report
was the reliance of the AAF on NATO forces for close combat air support and highaltitude precision strikes against insurgents.
The Modernization Plan funded by the Pentagon in 2011 and supported by
NATO until 2014 proceeded to overlook the inclusion of tactical fighter aircraft in
equipping the Afghan Air Force. This led to continued reliance of the AAF on NATO’s air
superiority in conducting air strikes and defending hard-earned territory leading to
problems on multiple scales including gaps in communication, poor coordination, and
casualties. As Afghan Official 2 discussed, the role of the CSTC-A cannot be
understated in facilitating the development of many divisions and branches of the AAF
and cementing the central government’s authority. He vehemently criticized the lack of
an independent Afghan Air Force with a tactical fighter squadron under the command of
Special Missions Wing in Afghanistan leading up to 2014.
In his view, the field operations led by the MoD command were severely affected
without a capable fighter aircraft squadron which inevitably protracted the habitual policy
of reliance on NATO forces for air support. Although initially it was necessary for the
AAF to rely on NATO for air support leading up to 2005, Afghan Official 2 stressed the
paradoxical undertaking of the Pentagon to only equip the Afghan Air Force with light
attack, transport, and utility aircrafts as part of the reinvigorated Modernization Plan.
As a consequence, Afghan Official 2 considered the national Air Force as only
partially capable of performing the daily tasks of traditional air squadrons, and heavily
dependent on the NATO coalition air support for most important aspects of its purported
operations leading up to 2014. The key aspects of operational independence, fleet
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modernization and diversification, and allocation of resources to a capable and
promising branch of the MoD were said to have been omitted leading up to the
withdrawal of the NATO combat forces in 2014. Thus, the central theme prevalent in
discussion with NATO and Afghan officials regarding the Afghan Air Force was that at
best, it had been a sub-feature rather than a main characteristic of the SSR efforts in
Afghanistan.
In brief, this section of the chapter discussed intricacies associated with the MoD
field operations in Afghanistan. To recapitulate, the MoD was and continues to be the
largest apparatus of the Afghan National Security Forces numbering around 174,000
personnel, and comprised of the Afghan Air Force and the ANA as part of its
organizational and operational structure. The training of the ANA and the Afghan Air
Force led by CSTC-A has proven to form the backbone of Afghanistan’s SSR efforts
leading up to 2014.
This section also highlighted the disproportionate allocation of military resources
among the ANA Corps and the varied operational results based on the geographical
location. The CSTC-A training rapidly built the ANA into a formidable and functioning
military force but faced certain setbacks due to policy miscalculations. The integration of
newly-formed and trained Afghan Special Forces as part of the ANA in 2005 alleviated
some pressing security challenges in the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan
despite their late arrival to the battlefront. As delineated by interviewees, the ANA faced
tremendous challenges, including the persistence of low morale and a high desertion
rate among soldiers. High-profile attacks by Taliban insurgents on urban centres such
as Farah and Kunduz City in tandem with the periodic collapse of the ANA Corps
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battalions amplified the lack of operational support and coordination among different
branches of the MoD between 2003 and 2014.
Finally, the rebirth of the Afghan Air Force in 2002 along with the Modernization
Plan adopted by the Pentagon in 2011 was undeniably a positive development for the
MoD. The procurement of essential aircraft to build up the overall strength of the Afghan
Air Force from 2002 to 2014 proved to be decisive in supporting ground troops and
special operations across Afghanistan. Without doubt, the Afghan Air Force lacked a
tactical fighter squadron to sustain and improve the posture of forces under the MoD
command. Hence, the insights gathered from interviewees in this section highlighted the
NATO-led SSR efforts in developing the MoD command and support structure from its
incipient stages to the final withdrawal of coalition troops in 2014.

Ministry of Interior Field Operations – The Case of the Afghan National Police
The foundational basis of SSR is to allow for a liberal democratic society to
emerge with the establishment of order and stability premised on the accountable,
responsible and dedicated delivery of security (Gordon, 2014, 131-133). SSR has
evolved from a theoretical concept into a requisite for post-war nations, such as
Afghanistan, in establishing the legitimacy of a liberal democratic order. To elaborate,
SSR is not a prescription to prevent recidivism into a state of war but rather an
applicable liberal democratic strategy to minimize that specific risk (Wilén, 2018, 69-71).
The liberal institutionalist and reformist agenda on which SSR is predicated is not meant
to directly rectify political issues of armed opposition and internal strife. Rather, it is a
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practical and pragmatic approach to advance the development of a professional security
sector with ample legal and procedural checks and balances.
In early 2000, the UN Report on Peace Operations set out to distinguish between
the supporting role of coalition forces in reforming military and police sectors and the
responsibility of local forces in post-war situations (UN, 2000). The aim of this report
was to serve as a methodological handbook which would elucidate the standard
operating procedures which both international and local forces would work to implement
collaboratively. As such, police sector reform evolved into a key component of SSR
emphasizing the development of accountability, community civilian policing, effective
delivery of service to the public, and oversight.
Since 2002, the police sector in Afghanistan has been at the forefront of
reformative approaches – first supported by the US and later by NATO in 2003 –to build
public trust and to professionalize the force as a capable law enforcement agency. In
the previous chapter, the institutional aspect of the ANP under the MoI command was
discussed along with its organizational structure which governed and supported policing
initiatives in Afghanistan. With important data collected from interviewees, this section
explicates the findings pertaining to the field operations mandate of the ANP under the
MoI’s institutional authority.
In early 2002, the fall of the Taliban regime to the US-led forces precipitated the
internationally backed transitional government in Afghanistan led by former President
Hamed Karzai. To strengthen and cement the democratic objectives of the international
community, the proponents of SSR immediately embarked upon the path towards the
establishment of the ANP, which set in motion the momentous and monumental task of
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police reform. See Figure 4.4 Number of ANP Officers on Duty and Increase in the Size
of Afghan National Police, 2003-2013. This chart demonstrates the rise in number of
ANP personnel as the SSR project in Afghanistan took shape with assistance from
NATO’s ISAF mission. The chart further captures the rapid rise in the number of ANP
recruits and the robustness and swiftness of the training model adopted by ISAF to help
accelerate the deployment of ANP officers across Afghanistan.
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Figure 4.4 Number of ANP Officers on Duty and Increase in the Size of Afghan National
Police, 2003-2013
Month

Ministry of Interior Forces

End 2003

0

End 2004

3,000

End 2005

40,000

End 2006

49,700

End 2007

75,000

April 2008

79,910

October 2008

79,910

March 2009

79,910

July 2009

81,020

November 2009

95,000

December 2009

94,958

March 2010

102,000

April/May 2010

104,459

August 2010

109,000

September 2010

120,504

October 2010

116,367

December 2010

116,856

Jan/Feb 2011

118,800

April 2011

122,000

May 2011

128,622
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August 2011

134,865

September 2011

136,122

October 2011

139,070

December 2011

143,800

January 2012

145,577

February 2012

148,932

March 2012

149,642

October 2012

148,536

January 2013

149,775

March 2013

151,766

September 2013

152,336

Source: Brookings Institution, 2014
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As discussed in the previous chapter, police reform responsibilities were
assumed by the German police trainers operating under the banner of the EUPOL
Mission up until 2005. The Pentagon officially amalgamated the training program for the
ANP along with the ANA under the CSTC-A due to mounting frustration resulting from a
lack of progress and an increase in anti-government attacks (Asia Foundation, 2009).
In interviewing Afghan Official 1, former special advisor to the MoI and a senior
police official with substantial experience at the Ministry, several dimensions of the MoI
field operations were brought to the fore as part of the NATO-led SSR. He pointed to
the period between 2005 and 2014 in explaining the reforms to the Afghan National
Police, first under the tutelage of CSTC-A in 2005 and later with the NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) in 2009 – staffed jointly by Afghan instructors and NATO
troops. He revealed that during this period internationally staffed Police Mentor Teams
(PMT) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLT) were introduced
to implement reforms to procedures in policing.
The PMT and the POMLT were drawn from military personnel rather than civilian
police ranks, which inculcated a pro-military operational culture among the Afghan
National Police that was devoid of civilian community policing. Afghan Official 1 posited
that the separation of duties between the military and police apparatuses, which was a
key part of SSR, was rather ambiguous and overlapping. First under the leadership of
the CSTC-A and later under the NTM-A, military and police training often took place
together, which confused the recruits for the Afghan National Police in their day-to-day
interactions with the public and their civil responsibilities.
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Afghan Official 4, a decorated General who held important civilian advisory posts
in the MoI between 2001 and 2014, echoed similar concerns during his interview.
During weapons training, the ANP was equipped with internationally sourced AK-47
assault rifles, rocket launchers, and light machine guns which would eventually become
their service weapons. Afghan Official 4 castigated the NTM-A’s system of training
police officers, arguing that the ANP was armed similarly to a conventional army with
intimidating weapons, armoured vehicles, and militaristic appearance.
Subsequently, posited Afghan Official 4, over the years 134,000 personnel in the
Afghan National Police adopted a ‘militaristic posture’ and gradually regressed from
procedures, standards, and training modalities of civilian policing. Instead of primarily
fighting crime and building up positive rapport with the populace, the ANP maintained
the semblance of a Special Force unit and was sent to war alongside the ANA and
coalition troops. In concordance with Afghan Official 4’s description, NATO Official 4, a
coalition military general who directed SATs at the MoI from 2003 to 2014, was similarly
apprehensive about the overall training and development of the ANP.
In the NATO General’s view, the ANP operated as a full-fledged paramilitary
force throughout Afghanistan with little understanding of the civilian policing model,
proper criminal investigation procedures, human rights, and policing ethics. Thus, he
reported the culture of paramilitarization within the ANP was in stark contrast to the core
principles of SSR and ignored the fundamental principles relevant to civilian policing by
adopting a militaristic heavy-handed approach. To capture the NATO General’s
reflections, see Figure 4.5: Security Sector Reform (SSR) Policing Principles and
Paramilitary Objectives. In line with the reflections of the NATO General, figure 4.5
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elucidates the core principles of SSR as understood by senior military officials at NATO.
The key point in the graph below is that the NATO General’s understanding of SSR is
heavily influenced by the first-generation conception of SSR described in the second
chapter. In Jackson’s (2018) words, first-generation SSR is a set of principles
emanating from liberal democratic doctrines linking good governance to abstract
definitions of the rule of law, civilian control over security institutions, and the
enshrinement and protection of human rights (Jackson, 2018, 2). Although there is
some emphasis on civilian modes of oversight as a method to ensure accountability in
the police sector in the graph, the majority of reformative characteristics in policing and
law enforcement divulged by the NATO General are heavily focused on abstract and
non-figurative principles of ‘good governance’.
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Figure 4.5: Security Sector Reform (SSR) Policing Principles and Paramilitary
Objectives

Security Sector Reform (SSR)
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democratic objective of

contain emergencies

upholding human rights and

without being restricted by

the due process of law in

legal processes

enforcing the criminal code
● Paramilitaries seldom lose
● In post-conflict situations,

their offensive posture and

the focus is to transition

continue to operate as

demobilized factional

heavily-armed agents of the

paramilitaries to civilian

state

police with adequate
training

Source: This is the General’s basic delineation, according to the interviewer Sakhi
Naimpoor who took handwritten notes, based on an interview with NATO Official 4,
December, 2017. The interviewer’s handwritten notes are typewritten, herein, in
different font as Naimpoor’s handwritten notes are illegible in thesis format.
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The General also raised concerns regarding the duties and responsibilities of the
ANP in major urban centers across Afghanistan including but not limited to Heart,
Jalalabad, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif. In these urban centers, the ANP staffed major
checkpoints to search for heavy weapons, insurgents, and potential suicide bombers to
prevent major security breaches. These security related duties should have been
typically reserved for conventional armies which not only possess the expertise to carry
out these tasks but also have access to resources and advanced equipment that
supersede those of traditional police forces such as the ANP.
By dedicating staff and resources to checkpoints in major urban centers
throughout Afghanistan, the ANP was ill-equipped to deal with local incidences of
criminal activity nor was it able to truly grasp the central element of community-based
civilian policing, asserted NATO Official 4. In sum, the general maintained, the dearth of
Directives which separated duties and responsibilities for both the ANP and the ANA
from 2003 to 2014 placed an unnecessary burden on meager policing resources which
profoundly affected the implementation of a responsible policing model based on the
liberal democratic objectives of SSR.
NATO Official 9, a senior member of international staff at the NATO
headquarters and former advisor in the MoI working on ANP reform since 2003, also
provided invaluable insight into reformative procedures and field operations at the MoI.
He delineated that the reform policy of the MoI was to decentralize the ANP in rural
districts by establishing a semi-autonomous entity called the Afghan Local Police (ALP)
in 2010. The ISAF command led by NTM-A proposed that by decentralizing policing
duties and conducting three weeks of training for the ALP in rural districts, the
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mainstream ANP force would be allowed to focus on offensives against armed groups.
For more related information, see Figure 4.6 Recruitment Campaign for Afghan Local
Police and Local Police Growth, 2011-2014. The chart below portrays the culture of
informalism and paramiltarization endorsed by ISAF in order to achieve some level of
stability and security in rural districts where the traditional ANP force either partially
progressed or were significantly deficient in law enforcement. The gradual rise in the
number of ALP personnel indicates that SSR objectives of good governance and
accountability were shunned in favour of short-term security stabilization schemes.
What further compounded the problems concerning the prospect for an accountable
and responsible approach to SSR in rural districts was another significant issue that
research participants discussed regarding the factional loyalties of members of the ALP
and how they often selectively chose to apply the law for personal gain. Not only did the
over-hasty decentralization of the ANP to ALP in rural districts hinder transitions
towards civilian-based community policing, it also cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
Afghan state as the sole guarantor of security and stability.
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Figure 4.6 Recruitment Campaign for Afghan Local Police and Local Police Growth,
2011-2014
Month

Officers Enrolled in Program

February 2011

4,343

April 2011

5,360

June 2011

6,696

September 2011

8,137

December 2011

10,551

April 2012

13,139

August 2012

16,380

December 2012

18,496

March 2013

21,958

October 2013

24,000

July 2014

30,000
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Source: Brookings Institution, 2014
NATO Official 9 insisted that the ALP initiative leading up to 2014 caused
significant damage in attempting to reinvent the operational image of the ANP.
Numbering close to 45,000, the newly-formed ALP between 2010 and 2014 was
accused of abusing its power to silence personal opponents; ceding significant territorial
districts to Taliban and other armed groups; and not comprehensively understanding the
SSR mandate of civilian policing. That is, the inherent culture of paramilitarization in the
ANP, discussed above, permeated every aspect of the operational purpose and
mandate of the ALP resulting in increases in human rights violations and arbitrary
arrests and detention.
On the other hand, NATO Official 9 attributed certain benefits to the ANP’s
overall collective form of training as overseen by the NTM-A. The CSTC-A training
provided to the ANP and the ANA enabled certain efficiencies to emerge in field
operations including distinctions between ranks, better organization, and marginal
improvement in cross-sector coordination. Given that both the ANP and the ANA were
trained with similar defensive and offensive tactics and strategy by the CSTC-A, security
coordination gradually improved between the two distinct security apparatuses to
support one another during field operations. Also considering the exposure of the ANP
to high-risk conflict situations from 2002 to 2014, it became better prepared to fill a
supporting role during national emergencies. Nonetheless, NATO Official 9 insisted that
the instilled culture of paramilitarization within the ANP operational structure had farreaching negative consequences which were in stark opposition to the NATO’s SSR
mandate in Afghanistan.

136

NATO Official 10, a veteran of the diverse SSR international team at the NATO
headquarters who had previously been posted in the MoI in Kabul from 2003-2013,
detailed certain aspects of the field operations of the ANP. While echoing similar
concerns as NATO Official 9, he proceeded to posit that the MoI’s field operations led
by the ANP were inherently prone to paramilitarization prior to the NATO’s SSR efforts.
The same militias commanded by the Northern Alliance and the National Islamic
Movement of Afghanistan to help oust the Taliban in 2001 were integrated into a law
enforcement body – the ANP.
These militias operating as the ANP selectively enforced the law in their areas of
interest and opposition, while granting safe havens to criminal associates, warlords, and
other allied groups leading up to the NTM-A and CSTC-A’s merger in 2009. The culture
of paramilitarization was already present prior to NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan; it
only began to methodically compound and evolve with the SSR efforts from 2003 to
2014, according to NATO Official 10. And, the rapid buildup of the ANP presented
unforeseen challenges despite NATO’s SSR efforts, considering that it could not
account for the preceding decades of civil war which catalyzed a culture of impunity,
informalism and warlordism. Parallel mandates driven by the NTM-A on the ground and
NATO’s SSR policy on the international stage could not bridge the practical schism in
differentiating between community-based civilian policing on one hand and military
training on the other.
Afghan Official 10, a high-ranking police commander in the MoI responsible for
protection of foreign missions in Kabul since 2002, distinguished between the
operational goals of the NATO and the MoI from 2003 to 2014. He emphasized that the
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SSR efforts to train the ANP were multi-faceted and based on the premise of creating a
capable security apparatus rather than a responsible one. For instance, he maintained
that during the course of CSTC-A training, the vast majority of time was dedicated to
learning military tactics and handling heavy weaponry. Civilian policing, criminal code
and constitutional rights, and human rights were allocated a week as part of the ANP
curricula during the last week of formal training.
Afghan Official 10 confirmed that the majority of policemen under his command
were heavily armed, with the intention to go to war and as such, lacked the basic
policing skills to contribute to a civilian model of policing in accordance with the liberal
principles of SSR. Whereas NATO training models focused on building up the MoI and
the ANP security apparatuses with a military mindset, Afghan police recruits were
vigorously committed to preventing the return of Taliban’s ideological regime. This
resulted in a lack of interest in basic policing techniques during training and led to the
growing enthusiasm from 2002 to 2014 in defeating the Taliban insurgency by any
means necessary. NATO military and police trainers capitalized on this enthusiasm by
actively promoting the advanced military training which led the ANP to be operationally
deployed to some of the most contested and dangerous regions in Afghanistan such as
Ghazni, Helmand, and Kandahar.
Afghan Official 13, a MoI General who served as deputy minister and police chief
in major cities throughout his career, pointed to the resolve and resilience of the ANP in
leading field operations within the framework of the MoI structure throughout
Afghanistan. His points were directed at the potency of the ANP as a strong security
force and the public legitimacy the MoI has garnered as a security institution over the
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years into 2014. Although he agreed that the ANP operates to some degree as a
paramilitary force with a similar command and structure seen among the ANA soldiers,
he also extolled the gradual development of the ANP as a formidable counterinsurgency force which better positioned it to defend against infiltration into its ranks.
Afghan Official 13 further explicated that NATO’s SSR approach in Afghanistan
from 2003 to 2014 must not be analytically assessed according to liberal democratic
objectives. The volatile context in which the ANP operated in Afghanistan from 20022014 required an aggressive, powerful, and well-armed police force to be able to adapt
to a variety of conditions until the insurgency was neutralized. After all, he said, armed
groups threatening the security and stability of the central government were better
armed, employed undetectable guerrilla tactics, and relied on an asymmetrical form of
insurgency which included the utilization of suicide attacks and Improvised Explosive
Devices (IED).
He further explained that between 2009 and 2014, the ANP suffered a fatality
rate of at least 8 officers every day in carrying out ANP duties across Afghanistan due to
the multifaceted forms of insurgency it was faced with. According to him, communitybased civilian policing should have only been employed in post-war situations where the
insurgency was completely eliminated, where war had not persisted for more than a
decade, and where human capacity and literacy rates allowed for the formation of such
apparatuses.
On the other hand, NATO Official 12 – special advisor to the deputy chief of
Afghanistan and Iraq division at NATO from 2003-2014 – touched upon the Capability
Milestones Rating (CMR) used by NATO in assessing the operational effectiveness of
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the ANP commanded by the MoI. The CMR system was a complex web of performance
and operational aggregate data collected and used by the NTM-A and the CSTC-A to
inform formation of policy and to provide direction in allocating resources to both the
ANP and the ANA. See Figure 4.7 Capability Milestone Assessment Procedures. The
chart below exhibits the lack of understanding among NATO officials in their attempts to
gauge the effectiveness and progress of both the ANA and the ANP. It indicates that
NATO, as a multilateral institution, did not have a clear set of indicators which would
delineate areas of progress and deficiency. Also, the graph demonstrates that NATOled ISAF members did not know what a progressive form of SSR in Afghanistan would
look like and how it could be comprehensively assessed because it was largely driven
by a loose set of liberal-democratic conceptions of good governance and accountability.
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Figure 4.7 Capability Milestone Assessment Procedures

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s analysis of North
Atlantic Training Mission-Afghanistan and the Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A) in 2014, [Unclassified, NATO].
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Citing the CMR report by SIGAR that led up to the first quarter of 2014, NATO
Official 12 disputed Afghan Official 13’s claim that a paramilitarized security apparatus
was somehow more efficient or effective at enforcing the law and protecting police
personnel. He emphasized that the majority of the ANP units across all 34 provinces in
Afghanistan were only effective with constant advisory, mentorship, and training
provided by the NATO personnel. There were no evident links between
paramilitarization of the ANP with advanced heavy weaponry and military training and
an increase in its overall effectiveness in policing or a reduction in the number of violent
incidents from 2002 to 2014 (SIGAR, 2014). NATO Official 12 also divulged that there
were fissures between NATO members in how to train the ANP to be analogous with
the SSR mandate. While the EUPOL trainers accentuated the importance of selfdefense and rules of engagement, the US military trainers focused on the importance of
neutralizing threats offensively. Even more, war-fighting skills became a predominant
feature of the ANP training during the merger of the CSTC-A with the NTM-A in 2009
which resulted in neglecting SSR’s doctrines of crime prevention and the importance of
following legal procedures in conducting criminal investigations.
Simultaneously pursuing comprehensive police sector reform and aspects of
technical capacity building is a responsible approach. But militarizing the training model
for the ANP only contributed to the buildup of human capacity to counter insurgency and
gravely detracted from the SSR directive of attaining comprehensive police sector
reform, said NATO Official 12. He drew attention to a litany of overlooked and untapped
resources which would have had the capability and expertise to galvanize reforms in
SSR from 2003 to 2014 but were underutilized.
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This included the incorporation of academics, international oversight
organizations, local community members, and NGOs which could have informed policy
decisions during the formative phases of SSR in Afghanistan. The establishment of a
feedback and input mechanism which channeled policy-relevant recommendations to
the NTM-A by incorporating the insights of the civil sector into policy decisions was
grossly understated by NATO. Public sector engagement was overlooked as a key
determinant of accountable and responsible policing – a core feature of liberal
democratic objectives of SSR in achieving reformative milestones.
In brief, the assertions of NATO Official 12 indicated unsettling circumstances in
which the ANP training took place from 2003 to 2014, and while the alliance agreed on
the composition of the principles of SSR, he differed on the methodological aspects of
carrying out the comprehensive police sector reform in Afghanistan.

Conclusion
To summarize, this chapter explored aspects of the field operations of the ANA
and the ANP with the former operating as the defense apparatus of the MoD and the
latter functioning as the main law enforcement arm of the MoI. Since 2003, the NATOled SSR mission in Afghanistan oversaw and spearheaded the largest training mission
for security forces in the alliance’s entire history. This mission not only involved the
training and equipping of multiple security organs of Afghanistan from its inception, but
also encompassed capacity-building for the institutions as discussed in the previous
chapter. The research findings discussed in this chapter, supplemented with interviews
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conducted with elite and senior NATO and Afghan officials, reveal the trajectory of the
process of SSR from 2003 to 2014.
Despite the tempestuous relationship between the NATO trainers and Afghan
recruits, the establishment of the ANA has come to be known as a model of progress in
building up the professional capacity of national defense forces. The land warfare Corps
of the ANA has consistently demonstrated its ability to professionalize in spite of limited
resources, yet the aerial warfare branch’s progress, as conveyed by participants, has
faced significant obstacles. The Afghan Air Force only benefited in improving its
transport and utility tasks from 2002 to 2014 and continued to rely on the NATO
coalition for strategic and precision air strikes due to a lack of a tactical fighter
squadron. While NATO diplomats seemed satisfied with the professional progress of
Afghan pilots in being able to operate and support the ANA, despite limited numbers of
aircraft, the alliance’s policy until the end of the NATO combat mission in 2014 was
strategically engineered to limit funding and personnel in favour of building capacity at
the ANA. As discussed, progress in all divisions of the AAF has not been symmetrical
and has varied across many divisions and branches. Thus, the prime indicator of
progress for NATO’s SSR contribution to the MoD has been the gradual development of
the institution between 2003, when it first began, and 2014, when the combat mission
ended.
Finally, the field operations aspect of the ANP as the main law enforcement
agency of Afghanistan is dominated by the narrative of paramilitarization and parallel
distinct training programs. The explanations for the disparate performance of the field
operations of the ANP from 2003 to 2014 are manifold. For the most part, the discourse
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surrounding NATO’s SSR process in Afghanistan has been dominated by the gradual
development, performance, and assessment of the ANP. First, the training programs
prescribed to institute police sector reform by the CSTC-A and later by the NTM-A were
fraught with militaristic features. The program was a hybrid product of military and police
training which emphasized counter-insurgency yet also marginally stressed the duties of
the ANP as the primary law enforcement institution.
Secondly, the establishment of the ALP as an extension of the MoI’s field
operations in rural districts proved to be counter-productive. The defective three-week
long training program proved to be futile in improving comprehensive police sector
reform. Registered criticisms of this militia force included gross abuses of power,
arbitrary arrests and detention, high desertion rates, and drug use which only worked to
weaken and problematize NATO’s SSR efforts in reforming the police sector.
Thirdly, the impatience of the Pentagon officials in 2009 resulted in a major
shake-up for the ANP training with the merger of the CSTC-A and the NTM-A
commands until 2014. The ANP personnel were encouraged by US-based military and
police trainers to adopt an aggressive military posture in facing the resilient counterinsurgency led by the Taliban. The Police Mentor Teams and the POMLT were primarily
military and Special Forces trainers with a core focus on threat neutralization by use of
force. On the other hand, the understaffed EUPOL mission stressed policing tactics and
a somewhat softer approach to understanding the fundamental principles and
underpinnings of SSR in order to improve law enforcement, albeit with very limited
results.
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Lastly, the CMR system adopted by the CSTC-A and the NTM-A found marginal
progress in different operational aspects of the MoI and the ANP. A series of annual
reports detailing the complex web of policy appraisal pertaining to the ANP performance
leading up to 2014 by NATO Official 12 revealed interesting facts. The ANP was mostly
effective when constantly advised, mentored, and trained by coalition forces. But
providing military training to the ANP recruits did not improve policing, result in a
reduction of crime and violent incidents, nor did it improve their public image as a
legitimate law enforcement authority. Thus, the incompetence, mistrust, and violent
incidents which undergirded the operational ability of the ANP has been attributed to the
reliance on measuring police effectiveness with firepower and the omission of public
sector input.
The research findings conveyed in this chapter raise an important question
pertaining to the original research question guiding this dissertation. what worked and
what did not work in the MoD and MoI from a liberal institutionalist perspective?
First, the organizational command for field operations both within the MoD and MoI was
a direct attempt at professionalizing the ANSF by NATO-led ISAF. Secondly, the
separation in military and police mandates, despite similar training provided to the MoD
and MoI recruits, set in motion the gradual build-up of both security organs consistent
with modern law enforcement and defence apparatuses. Thirdly, the NATO initiative to
mentor various combat branches of the ANA and ANP in field operations laid the
groundwork for an eventual Afghan-led battle against armed insurgents across
Afghanistan. Finally, the extensive training programs provided to the MoD and MoI
recruits inculcated a somewhat refined understanding of the rules of law and rules of
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engagement in conducting field operations – all in accordance with core assumptions of
liberal institutionalism.
However, the constant change of ministerial command at the MoI along with the
introduction of a mainstream training program for the ANP and the ANA contradicted the
SSR principles of separation in duties and responsibilities for the military and the police.
Secondly, the introduction of the NTM-A curriculum in 2009 had adverse effects on the
previously German-led community policing model which aimed to introduce a civilian
mindset in policing the Afghan populace. Thirdly, the disproportionate allocation of
NATO-funded military and logistical resources to specific ANA Corps, especially the
Kabul Command, deprived the remaining ANA Corps from accessing similar resources
which affected their field operations capabilities in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
While the Kabul Buffer Zone became increasingly secure between 2002-2014, eastern
and southern provinces of Afghanistan increasingly became the subject of violent and
asymmetrical guerrilla warfare.
Finally, the paramilitarization of the ANA and ANP under the tutelage of PMT and
POMLT advisory command had a perverse effect on field operations between 2003 and
2014. The adoption of militaristic features by the ANP affected its image and mandate
given that it was engaging in aggressive policing methods and simultaneously
conducting anti-terrorism operations in its sphere of field operations. Not only did the
paramilitarization of the ANP deviate from core liberal democratic objectives of SSR, it
also cast doubt on whether the NTM-A was genuinely concerned with training and
capacity building initiatives for the ANA and the ANP. Thus, the execution of the training
programs for the ANA and the ANP between 2003 and 2014 significantly digressed from

147

the liberal institutionalist model of SSR which led to an overlap in conducting field
operations between the military and the police. And, it further confounded ANP recruits
in field operations due to their continuously shifting mandate which varied from
community policing to anti-terrorism operations.
The following chapter explores and imparts the research findings concerning the
field operations aspect of the NDS as Afghanistan’s main intelligence agency from 2002
to 2014. As previous chapters served to inform, combined with the MoD and MoI, the
NDS intelligence forces form the institutional foundation and help further document the
overall journey of Afghanistan’s process of attempting to achieve security, stability, and
order.
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CHAPTER 5
National Directorate of Security Field Operations
Introduction
In the previous chapter, the research findings pertaining to the two key security
institutions in Afghanistan from the period beginning in 2002 to 2014 were divulged: The
MoD and MoI. This chapter is focused on analytically examining the research findings
relevant to the intelligence sector in Afghanistan known as the National Directorate of
Security. The third chapter of this dissertation provided background information
regarding the inception of the NDS and the bureaucratic structure and organizational
details of the directorate from 2002 to 2014. This chapter examines key research
findings related to field operations characteristic of the NDS in order to assess the SSR
agenda in terms of reforming Afghanistan’s intelligence sector.
Often the most active and well-funded security apparatus in stable and
developed economies is the intelligence sector which is irrefutably the link between
national security and a state’s durability and political legitimacy. As a vital state security
institution, intelligence apparatuses’ duties and responsibilities are generally
constitutionally enshrined and are vast and sophisticated (Wilson, 2005, 93). From
count1er-intelligence to intelligence gathering, security risk assessment to covert
operations, from maintaining human intelligence assets to cyber-security initiatives, the
intelligence sector is constantly evolving. Recurrently, the operational changes in the
intelligence community are inherently tied to fluctuations in intensity of the global threats
posed by non-state actors against states.
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While the military and police apparatuses also face certain operational
challenges, which range from asymmetrical warfare to countering technological
sophistication employed in criminal activity, their roles are predominantly static and welldefined (Erhart, 2005). For the intelligence apparatus, the duties and responsibilities
associated with the sector are fluid and evolve in direct response to technological
advancements, the rise of threats from non-state actors, and consistent methodological
sophistication in collecting sensitive information (Chuter, 2006, 7-12).
The intelligence apparatus of the state is also the primary instrument for
gathering information, analyzing intelligence, assessing the potency of specific national
security threats, and coordinating a plan of action with the military and the police. In the
interests of safeguarding the state’s national security from multifaceted threats both
from state and non-state actors, the intelligence sector of the state is at the forefront of
threat deconstruction and concocting coherent and context-specific responses to
counter foreign and internal meddling attempts (Jackson, 2011, 1807). For this reason,
the relevance and the role of the intelligence apparatus cannot be detached from
foundational aspects of state legitimacy and national security.

Background
As highlighted by Jackson (2011) and Wilson (2005), the intelligence apparatus
is the most sophisticated sector of the state in gathering and analyzing sensitive
information which in turn provides the state with invaluable intelligence regarding the
intentions of state and non-state actors. Shared security concerns formed the backbone
of liberal institutionalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, fostering the
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inception of multilateral security organizations including NATO and NORAD in the
twenty-first century. Liberal institutionalism aimed to create a system of information
sharing which would facilitate responsible global governance by states while accepting
the anarchic nature of the international system (Moravscik, 2001, 27-33). But anarchy
on its own as a natural condition of the international system is not the sole and
exclusive determinant of conflict nor is it an impediment to shared security threats to
liberal institutionalists.
Through institutions such as the UN and NATO, states continuously work to
make information available to one another to prevent major shocks to international
security by rogue and non-state actors. Not only does the availability of information
facilitated through international institutions safeguard international security but it also
allows for states to enhance their individual national security (Moravscik, 1997, 527-529;
Moravscik, 2001, 35-37).
National interests include but are not limited to economic, cultural, political, and
social aspects of a given state which begs the following questions: why do states
employ intelligence gathering techniques to collect information on other states, including
allies, while international institutions are present? Is the underlying anarchic nature of
the international system responsible for this perceived distrust? Are national security
interests a disconnected feature of the national interest which disallows global
cooperation? For instance, classified global surveillance disclosures leaked by
whistleblower Edward Snowden from 2013 onwards demonstrated the wide expanse of
the US government’s espionage and intelligence gathering techniques employed by the
National Security Agency (NSA) on traditional allies.
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The diplomatic fallout from the NSA scandal shed light on the extraordinary
efforts the American government undertook by utilizing intelligence resources to obtain
additional information pertaining to the inner workings of allies and foes alike (Lucas,
2014, 34). Despite unsurpassed levels of cooperation facilitated by international
institutions and established multilateral relations in the West since the end of the
Second World War, the global quest to protect against potential state subversion has
steadily progressed. Under these circumstances, state intelligence apparatuses are
indispensable security organs which embody duties and responsibilities concerned with
security enhancement of the state.

National Directorate of Security Field Operations in Afghanistan from 2003-2014
Since 2003, the dearth of academic literature concerning the field operations
component of the NDS has hindered efforts to comprehensively analyze and assess
NATO’s holistic SSR approach in Afghanistan. This chapter aims to bridge the gap
between speculation and policy with insight from high-ranking Afghan intelligence and
NATO officials directly involved with the day-to-day field operations at the NDS. To
expand the paradigms of SSR knowledge beyond the relationship between the military
and the police, it is imperative to incorporate the operational section of the intelligence
sector for an accurate appraisal.
As referred to earlier in Chapter 2, to facilitate the institutional establishment of
the intelligence apparatus in 2002, the foundational development of the NDS was
coordinated with the Afghan government in conjunction with the Pentagon and the CIA.
In stark contrast to the ANA and ANP, the NDS was institutionally structured based on
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the CIA’s directorate-led system instead of the ministerial bureaucratic structure.
Reporting directly to the President, the NDS was institutionally spared the bureaucratic
hurdles in obtaining approval for crucial covert and special operations against
insurgents across Afghanistan.

The National Directorate of Security Force in Urban Areas
According to Afghan Official 11, an Afghan General who served in the NDS from
2002-2015 as deputy minister of special operations, the NDS field operations were
professionalized due to a range of factors. First, the institutional adoption of the NDS by
the CIA in early 2002 laid the groundwork to streamline personnel training programs in
accordance with modern intelligence techniques. Unlike the MoD and the MoI, the NDS
recruits were trained at Camp Peary in Virginia with a special emphasis on counterterrorism field operations training including the utilization of state-of-the-art tactics,
techniques and combat equipment. In turn, the comprehensive training provided by the
CIA allowed the first batch of returning recruits in late 2002 to be directly embedded in
tactical combat situations throughout Afghanistan without delay.
In addition, Afghan Official 11 alluded to another key factor which pertained to
the NDS field operations from 2002 to 2014: compartmentalization of the operations
department within the NDS under the direct guidance of the CIA. The operations section
of the NDS was divided into the following three distinct categories: the NDS Force in
urban areas, the NDS counter-terrorism special operations unit, and the external
investigative and operations command. The NDS Force in urban areas was created with
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the deployment of the first returning recruits from Virginia in late 2002 with directives
from the CIA and Pentagon officials to create a security buffer in major urban centers
across Afghanistan. The Initial beneficiaries of the NDS Force included the cities of
Heart, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif, while cities including
Baghlan, Ghazni, and Lashkargah were added later between 2003 to 2005, stated
Afghan Official 11. The primary focus of the NDS Force was to serve as a tertiary
security force in support capacity to the capabilities of the ANA and the ANP.
Operationally, it was deployed in major urban centers to mainly protect against
insurgent attacks and to prevent against the infiltration of insurgents in security
apparatuses.
Afghan Official 8, who served as the field operations manager of the NDS and in
various departments in the NDS Force from 2002 to 2012, confirmed Afghan Official
11’s assertions. He added that the NDS Force in urban areas proved to be operationally
effective and efficient leading up to 2005, at which point the Karzai administration came
to be convinced that the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan was defeated. There was
profound trust in the NDS Force and trust that it was operationally capable of preventing
Taliban insurgent attacks in urban centers and sufficiently trained by the CIA to gather
security intelligence in their area of operations.
Afghan Official 8 asserted that the sharp decline in violence in the early years of
the NATO-led campaign in Afghanistan from 2003-2005 facilitated the reallocation of
the bulk of the NDS Force from Baghlan, Ghazni, Heart, and Jalalabad to other
administrative branches of the directorate. As outlined earlier in the third chapter, the
administrative and bureaucratic branches of the NDS grew exponentially and
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professionally from 2003-2005 and this surge was largely attributable to the reallocation
of personnel from the NDS Force. According to Afghan Official 8, the strategic decision
to reallocate the NDS Force from previously mentioned urban centers was meant to
allow for the professional development of the ANA and the ANP personnel in the
operations theater who were less rigorously trained in field operations.
Afghan Official 8 proclaims that the reallocation of personnel had a monumental
impact on the urban centers from which they were withdrawn. The ANA and the ANP
forces were unable to independently provide the same level of security and field
operations service and expertise as the NDS. In effect, they began to surrender hardearned territory to Taliban insurgents in urban centers such as Baghlan, Ghazni, and
Heart, and Jalalabad. Moving toward 2014, explained Afghan Official 11, the remaining
NDS Force based in Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif continued with its
assigned duties in an increasingly perilous areas of responsibility.
The withdrawal of the NDS Force from previously mentioned urban centers had a
two-fold impact on the field operations of the intelligence apparatus. Afghan Official 11
adamantly insisted that the vacated urban centers by the NDS Force came to be heavily
dependent on under-equipped and operationally deficient ANA and ANP. This policy
miscalculation by the Pentagon and the CIA in 2005 to reallocate the NDS Force
personnel to administrative branches led to the consequential deprivation of a tertiary
security and intelligence force for Baghlan, Ghazni, Herat, and Jalalabad.
NATO Official 11, a member country representative at the NATO Headquarters
and an SSR expert with in-depth knowledge of the NDS field operations, posited his
reservations regarding the creation of the NDS Force in 2002. He analytically
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questioned the operational value of an intelligence security force which embraced the
responsibility of a traditional military and police force. Despite the NDS Force being
highly trained in counter-terrorism with special emphasis on covert operations, NATO
Official 11 asserted that the Force’s duties and responsibilities unnecessarily
overlapped with those of the ANP and the ANA.
This in turn, created a system of mass dependency by the ANP and the ANA on
the NDS Force to contain the insurgency in urban areas. While tasked with the
prevention and neutralization of suicide and guerilla-style attacks in major cities across
Afghanistan, the NDS Force concurrently monitored, trained, and assisted both the
military and the police. NATO Official 11 claimed that the NDS’s assignment as a rapid
reactionary response against Taliban attacks was largely due to the Special Forces
training provided to the NDS by the CIA. The training at Camp Peary had adequately
and comprehensively prepared them for a range of operations which included response
tactics in instances of sophisticated insurgent attacks. Henceforth, they gained a
positive reputation within ISAF and the ANSF as the most capable and advanced
counter-terrorism force.
Afghan Official 11 also authenticated NATO Official 11’s claims by articulating
the complex operational challenges the NDS Force faced while deployed alongside the
ANA and the ANP. He pointed to the fundamental and institutional purpose of the
intelligence apparatus operating within the structure of the state – to collect, gather, and
analyze intelligence both within and outside the demarcated borders of the state to
protect and enhance national security. The operational mandate of the NDS Force,
which was initially intended to operate as a support group to counter-terrorism and
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intelligence personnel in urban areas, came to be largely dependent on the progress of
the ANP. Thus, the operational sphere of the NDS Force continued to be dictated by the
deficiencies noted within the ANP law enforcement structure.
That is, where the ANP struggled to enforce the law and maintain security and
stability in major urban centers, the NDS Force operated as the primary rapid
reactionary force. NATO Official 11 also conveyed that while a considerable number of
the NDS Force personnel began to be reassigned to administrative duties in 2005, the
cycle of ultimate dependency had been entrenched in the operational core of the NDS.
Between 2005 and 2014, NDS personnel continued to operate in the same theater and
in the previously discussed major urban centers across Afghanistan as a security
stabilization force. While NATO had initially envisioned a rigid separation in roles and
responsibilities for the ANA, ANP, and the NDS, the operational capabilities and
effectiveness of the NDS Force led to a significant overlap with the mandates of the
ANA and the ANP.
This considerable overlap in duties and responsibilities between the NDS Force
and the ANP described by NATO Official 11 prompted ISAF and Afghan security
officials to re-evaluate the feasibility of this approach. The joint Afghan and ISAF reevaluation team was created to devise a plan for the gradual disengagement of the
NDS Force from assigned law enforcement duties which should have belonged to the
ANP. Afghan Official 12, an NDS special agent with experience in various departments
of the directorate, shed light on the reformative procedures implemented in late 2010 to
restructure the operational purpose of the NDS Force. He described the general
agreement reached in 2010 with ISAF and senior security officials in the Karzai

157

administration to create a rapid response force in order to allow the NDS Force to
evolve into an intelligence force.
In order to disengage, the agreement stipulated a capability milestone which had
to be reached for the operational capacity of the ANP. Afghan Official 12 proclaimed
that the capability milestone entailed an internal multi-force agreement which
accentuated that the NDS Force along with ISAF would supervise the creation of the
ANP-led rapid reaction force under the command of the MoI. With direct assistance
from the NDS Force and a secondary advisory role provided by the ISAF and
Norwegian Special Forces, this agreement led to the creation of the Crisis Response
Unit (CRU) in Kabul in 2010.
At its core, the CRU was meant to replace the NDS Force and become a potent
reactionary force armed with advanced modern weapons training and adept in rapid
tactical responses to insurgent attacks. Therefore, asserted Afghan Official 12, the
central focus of the CRU was to reduce the operational burden imposed on the NDS
and to further compartmentalize a commando-type force within the ANP. Maintaining a
tactical response unit within the police apparatus not only enables it to respond to
various emergency and life-threatening situations with the utmost professionalism, but
generally enables operational independence from the intelligence and military (Vecchi et
al., 2005, 541).
The creation of the CRU at the MoI with assistance from the NDS Force in 2010
set in motion the strenuous and monumental task of focusing on personnel recruitment
within the ranks of a partially effective ANP. Afghan Official 12 explained that the first
battalion of the CRU numbering around 300 officers was trained by the NDS Force in
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late 2010 and deployed in various strategic locations around Kabul. NDS Special Agent
Afghan Official 12 stated that advanced tactical training programs spearheaded by the
NDS Force for the CRU continued until early 2012 to expand the operational capabilities
of the unit to all 34 provinces across Afghanistan. The expansion program under the
supervision of the NDS Force and ISAF was completed in early 2013 with the
deployment of the last CRU battalion in Lashkargah, Helmand.
The NDS Force evolved into a multifaceted security force in 2010 which
embodied a training assignment with the advent of the CRU. Contemporaneously, it
continued to operate as a security stabilization force in direct support of both the ANA
and ANP in its realm of operations. The rapid development of the CRU and its
deployment in all 34 provinces in a little more than three years across Afghanistan
proved to be highly effective. In turn, the deployment of the CRU gradually reduced the
operational burden of the NDS Force as the frontline rapid reactionary force in critical
security situations. In early 2013, the ISAF advisors along with the NDS officials began
to reassess the operational role of the NDS Force and emphasized that it should
transition into an intelligence-related force.
NATO Official 14, a military intelligence policy advisor to NATO who served
extensively in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2014, identified the NDS Force’s new domain of
operations in 2013. The discontinuation of the reactionary role of the NDS Force in 2013
along with the relative success of the CRU in comparison to the ordinary ANP personnel
served to punctuate the multifaceted capabilities of the Force. In early 2013, the NDS
was requested by the Ministry of Defense to help train and advance the capabilities of
the Military Intelligence Unit (MIU) at the MoD.
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NATO Official 14 further specified that the request for assistance from the MoD
was further endorsed with the issuance of an Afghan presidential decree which directed
the NDS Force to fully support the development of the MIU at the MoD. Many of the
shortcomings at the MIU from 2002 to 2013 were documented in the 2013 quarterly
SIGAR’s report and were mainly attributed to a lack of intelligence personnel, oversight,
and professional development (SIGAR, 2013). The NTM-A led military training mission
for the ANA recruits only provided basic combat training without a particular emphasis
on the development of an internal intelligence body to catalyze information gathering
procedures for the Afghan military on the frontlines.
As explained by NATO Official 14, the developmental aspect of the MIU only
began to garner attention from ISAF’s SATs in late 2010 with the loss of significant
territory in Helmand and Kunar province. Mounting combat casualties observed by the
ISAF within the ANA ranks against Taliban insurgents as a direct result of the severe
shortage of intelligence assets within the MoD led to overhauls in the policy framework.
Although the MIU became a loosely connected arm of the MoD’s Military Police (MP)
from 2010-2012, it suffered remarkably from a lack of direction, purpose, and resources,
according to coalition military policy advisor NATO Official 14.
By mid-2012, ISAF’s SATs in tandem with bureaucrats at the MoD laid the
administrative foundation of the MIU within the ministerial structure to support the ANA
with its own dedicated and progressive intelligence branch. Having instituted the MIU as
an entity under the umbrella of the MoD in Kabul, the ISAF SATs faced monumental
challenges in attempts to enhance and shore up human capacity at the MIU. As
revealed by NATO Official 14, the performance milestone jointly agreed upon by both
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the MoD and the SATs was the deployment of an individual field operations unit within
all the ANA Corps installations.
As acknowledged by NATO Official 13, a NATO military trainer who served in
ISAF’s SATs in both the MoD and MoI between 2005-2014, the MIU failed to gain
performance-based traction as envisioned in 2012 and further leading up to 2013. At the
time, the emerging consensus among the NATO SATs was that it would be prudent to
recruit promising ANA soldiers and provide them with in-depth military intelligence
training in the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. By reference to the NTM-A’s positive
assessment of the CRU’s response and threat neutralization rate to critical situations,
the ISAF SATs in early 2013 reconsidered their decision pertaining to the establishment
of an overseas training program for the MIU.
The NTM-A report had concluded that the emergence of the CRU had not only
reduced response time in critical situations but had allowed the ANP to prevent and
repel major insurgent attacks with minimal assistance from the ISAF. Furthermore, the
rapid expansion of the CRU to all 34 provinces across Afghanistan had fundamentally
deprived armed opposition groups of the ability to gain a foothold in any major urban
centers. NATO Official 13 specified that an in-depth appraisal of the CRU’s rapid
development and operational success determined that it was principally due to the
comprehensive training provided by the NDS Force.
As such, the SATs embedded within the MoD proposed an intelligence-based
training program for the MIU to be directed by the NDS Force in early 2013. The training
program for the MIU began under the NDS Force command in the Kabul Military
Training Command (KMTC) in 2013 with basic principles of intelligence gathering
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strategies and techniques and security coordination methods with other arms of the
ANA. NATO Official 13 proceeded to specify that the six-month long NDS Force training
program exposed the MIU recruits to a variety of trying situations including closecombat, hostage negotiations, and tactical neutralization which assisted in preparing
them for field deployment.
The first batch of the MIU recruits graduated in late-2013 and the NDS Force
training program continued towards the end of 2014. NATO Official 13 concluded the
interview by noting that in October 2014 the NDS Force began a transitional training
program that not only trained the MIU recruits but high-ranking ANA commanders as
well to serve as future supervisors and instructors themselves. The scope and timeline
of this research study does not allow for an appraisal of the overall effectiveness of the
instructor training program as this dissertation is primarily concerned with NATO’s
combat and SSR mission led by ISAF from 2003 to 2014 and not with the transitional
training program that began in 2014. Nevertheless, future research focused on the
performance and reformative aspects of the post-SSR mission after 2014 in Afghanistan
can reflect on the operational effectiveness of the MIU.
To revisit earlier points made in this chapter concerning the main purpose of the
NDS Force; it was intended to operate as a support group to the counter-terrorism and
intelligence personnel operating in urban areas. Insight from interviewees revealed that
the NDS Force digressed from its main prerogative due to the underdevelopment of the
ANA and ANP capabilities. Intrinsically, the NDS Force morphed into a tertiary security
assistance and training force with distinct uniforms, insignia, and marked vehicles acting
as the predominant reactionary force.
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In consonance with the testimony of Afghan and NATO officials discussed
earlier, the creation of the CRU as an extension of the ANP significantly reduced the
operational burden on the NDS Force from 2010 to 2013 and provided the MoI with a
capable, sustainable, and professional force. Also, the NDS Force’s commitment to
training the MIU from 2013 to 2014 further diverted attention away from its intended
purpose. These measures undertaken by the NDS Force have been hailed as the
penultimate example of a successful indigenous-led training model by SATs. Yet, they
concomitantly draw attention to the identity and role of the NDS Force functioning as an
operational branch of the primary intelligence service of Afghanistan.
As discussed previously with insight from interviews in Brussels, Hamburg, and
Kabul in 2017-18, the security assistance and stabilization tasks conducted by the NDS
Force fell far beyond the traditional duties and responsibilities of the intelligence
apparatus. In fact, the training, funding, and advanced equipment provided by the
Pentagon and the CIA to institutionally develop NDS as an intelligence directorate in
2002 was predicated on collection, processing, and analysis of information pertaining to
national security. The NDS Force, which was practically created to serve as a support
combat group dedicated exclusively to the NDS, was embroiled in a circle of perpetual
dependence until 2014.
The reallocation of some personnel to administrative branches of the NDS levied
significant pressure on the field operations aspect of the NDS Force. From 2010 to
2014, intelligence, combat, and support forces were fully incorporated and dedicated to
training reactionary forces of the ANP and the intelligence arm of the ANA. This in turn,
sidetracked the original purpose of the NDS Force and its practical purpose failed to
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come to fruition due to the training model imposed upon it by both Afghan and ISAF
officials.
Thus far, this section of the chapter has uncovered the rapidly changing field
operations dynamic of the NDS Force in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2014. The evidence
disclosed herein demonstrates three main factors for consideration: 1) The extensive
overlap in security duties and responsibilities among the ANP, ANA, and the NDS. 2)
The gap between theory and practice observed in field operations during the
development and organization of the NDS Force by the Pentagon and the CIA. 3) The
fluid and less-fluid operational nature of the NDS Force in adapting to a variety of duties
and roles as a result of security situations.
The following section of this chapter considers the field operations aspect of the
NDS Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Force (CTSOF) from 2002 to 2014.
The aim of this section is to portray the multifaceted role of the NDS in Afghanistan by
stressing the field operations facet of the internal intelligence and counter-terrorism
branch of the NDS. Similar to the NDS Force personnel, the CTSOF was provided the
same length of comprehensive training at Camp Peary in Virginia but was assigned to
distinct branches of the NDS based on ranked preferences of recruits, provincial
security needs, and chosen areas of expertise. Lastly, the CTSOF was also deployed in
all 34 provinces across Afghanistan and commanded by the provincial NDS
commanders who conformed to the operational directives from the NDS headquarters in
Kabul.
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National Directorate of Security Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Force Field
Operations (CTSOF)
Vacillations in strategies and tactics employed globally by armed groups against
the central authority of states has led to significant reconfigurations in intelligence
apparatuses in the past few decades (Jackson, 2011, 1812; Wilson, 2005, 93).
Traditionally, the intelligence agencies were occupied with aspects of non-conventional
security optimization which included but were not limited to engaging in cyber warfare,
countering foreign interference, and the establishment or neutralization of statesponsored proxy groups. Paradigmatic shifts within intelligence apparatuses in their
ever-evolving and widening area of duties and responsibilities have become more
pronounced in weak states – such as Afghanistan (Berg, 2012, 11-17; Schroeder et al.,
2014, 219-221).
Considering that NATO’s mission in Afghanistan was fundamentally coordinated
to defeat the main pillars of global terrorism in 2003, the SSR agenda pursued by ISAF
in coordination with the ANSF also embodied in various methodical ways the traits of
counter-terrorism. The NDS’ CTSOF, the foremost beneficiary of the CIA and Pentagon
training from 2002 to 2014, undertook the main counter-terrorism and special operations
responsibilities with the establishment of the directorate.
This section of the chapter is informed by high-ranking NATO and NDS officials
who shed light on the ambiguous identity of the Counter-Terrorism and Special
Operations Force. For purposes of clarity and coherence, it is imperative to divide this
section into two separate parts. First, this chapter discusses the research findings
pertinent to field operations characteristic of the NDS’ CTSOF. Secondly, it elucidates
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the findings concerning the special operations branch of the CTSOF with emphasis on
the field operations commands. It is critical to specify that although the NDS’ CTSOF
was subsumed and structured under one broad field operations category by the CIA in
2002; it maintained distinct command centers within the NDS headquarters with
divergent mandates as reported by Afghan Official 12.

National Directorate of Security Counter-Terrorism Force Field Operations
The deployment of the National Directorate of Security Counter-Terrorism Force
Field Operations (CTF) in late 2002 in Helmand, Heart, Kabul, and Kandahar and in all
the other remaining 30 provinces by 2008 culminated with the withdrawal of Taliban
insurgents from all major urban centers across Afghanistan. Afghan Official 14, a highranking special agent with extensive experience in the CTF, implied that despite it being
an intelligence force first, it began field operations in support of UK, US, and Norwegianspecial forces in 2003.
The supervisory and advisory role played by the UK, the US and the Norwegian
forces exposed the CTF to ISAF’s professional standards of field operations and to the
distinct modalities of special operations execution. The CTF field operations began with
retaking pockets of territory from the Taliban in 2003 in the provinces of Helmand
(Gereshk district), Kandahar (Spin Boldak district), and Kunar (Dangam district). As per
Afghan Official 14, these joint operations at first saw little resistance from the armed
groups and the insurgency mostly subsided until June 2004. Meanwhile, the CTF had
continued special operations training with Special Forces from various contributors to
ISAF. Afghan Official 14 argues that the political fallout from Karzai administration and
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NATO’s unwillingness to negotiate with remnants of the Taliban in 2004 was
counterproductive and further contributed to the severity of the insurgency.
NATO Official 15, one of the senior military operations planners for Afghanistan
section at NATO, validated Afghan Official 14’s claim by confirming that the CTF’s
independent field operations started in the summer of 2004. He explained that during
the advisory and supervisory mission led by the UK, the US, and Norway, the CTF was
mainly operating in newly liberated urban centers. But the summer of 2004 was an
operational test for the CTF as it began to be deployed in mountainous areas bordering
Pakistan. The influx of insurgents inundating villages bordering Pakistan and using
guerilla tactics in keeping with asymmetrical aspects of warfare raised monumental
challenges for the CTF.
Some of the operational challenges faced by the CTF included the proper and
timely identification of enemy combatants; the timely deployment of advanced
communication interception equipment from central headquarters to eastern and
southern provinces; and operational compensation for shortcomings of the Afghan
Border Police that were directed by the ANP. Similar to the NDS Field Operations Force
partially fulfilling the duties and responsibilities of the ANA and ANP, as discussed
previously, NATO Official 15 stated that the CTF assumed partial border control
responsibilities of the ABP to prevent insurgent infiltration into Afghan territory.
Comparable to other branches and divisions of NDS, the CTF was allocated limited
operational funds and in undertaking the work of other ANSF organs including the ABP,
the ANA, and the ANP, it severely restricted the ability of the CTF to effectively and
efficiently carry out its own counter-terrorism mandate.
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Afghan Official 15, an NDS General who has commanded various CTF
operations since 2003, discussed the effectiveness of the force in terms of coordinating
intelligence and sharing information with the ANA and the ANP. In addition to serving an
elite counter-terrorism force, he contended that the CTF was and is the primary source
of internal intelligence gathering across Afghanistan. For instance, he explained that in
approximately 80 percent of cases when a suicide bomber entered Afghanistan via
Pakistan, they were alerted by advance credible intelligence through Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) sources. The General further noted that the CTF could not
simply be perceived as a reactive force, but rather should be understood as a proactive
force that could avail itself of many various avenues of intelligence analysis. This in turn
guided the Force’s response and actions which allowed it to comprehensively
coordinate with the ANA and ANP in improving security outcomes.
Additionally, the General credited the operational excellence of the CTF in field
performance to certain key factors including recruitment of operatives from all tribes,
ethnicities, sects, and tribes. Put simply, from 2002 to 2014 the CTF was based on
meritocracy and devoid of nepotistic appointments and favouritism thus subverting the
institutional progress of the ANA and ANP, discussed earlier. Additionally, in keeping
with the training provided to the CTF at Camp Peary in Virginia, operatives were adept
at coordinating information with not only the ANSF but also with regional and
international intelligence partners thus improving overall security outcomes. All this was
facilitated through advanced information-sharing systems provided by the CIA and the
NATO intelligence liaison office based in Kabul.
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Similar to Afghanistan’s other security apparatuses, the NDS’ CTF also had its
own set of shortcomings which affected or hindered its performance in field operations.
NATO Official 14, a military intelligence advisor at NATO, contended that in analyzing
the NDS’ CTF from 2002 to 2014, a US Department of State’s comprehensive
publication on Afghanistan’s terrorism subversion methodology concluded that the CTF
was deficient in maintaining a formal national Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
strategy. When presented with the assertions of Afghan Official 15 — which postulated
that the CTF has been a proactive force in preventing and eradicating terrorism across
Afghanistan — NATO Official 14 agreed but said as a proactive field operations force, it
was inherently deficient in addressing the root causes of terrorism due to the absence of
rehabilitation and reintegration programs for combatants.
Moreover, Afghan Official 15 posited that the CTF policy of chiefly targeting
villages and districts bordering Pakistan since 2003 and leading up to 2014 allowed the
Taliban and other smaller armed groups to set up safe havens in areas that were not
contiguous with Pakistani soil. Taking into consideration the monumental developmental
issues which were largely extant in both the ANA and ANP, the CTF could not prevent
the loss of territory to insurgents. NATO Official 14 explained that from 2003 to 2014
Taliban insurgents consistently managed to devise complex organizational and
operational structures deep inside Afghan soil including throughout Ghazni, Kunduz and
Wardak and with considerable impunity in other areas patrolled by the ANA and the
ANP.
Many of the advances made in the battlefield against the ANSF by the Taliban,
including the CTF, can be traced back to severe institutional failures in interministerial
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security coordination among the ANA, ANP, and the NDS. Despite the intelligence
provided by the CTF in tandem with the NDS to the ANA and the ANP, NATO Official 14
argued that the absence of a formidable counter-terrorism force mirroring the CTF led to
loss of territory and expansion of insurgent networks. In brief, the critical capability gap
identified by the SIGAR’s 2005 quarterly report underscored the importance of
developing intelligence and security coordination among all the ANSF organs. The
documented lack of security sector coordination continuously hindered the progress and
sustenance of the CTF and was particularly egregious given the higher burden of
responsibility placed on it to carry out the duties of other noted security organs (SIGAR,
2005).
Lastly, in assessing the field operations aspect of the CTF as a whole, NATO
Official 15 maintained that precarious policy models pursued by the CIA, ISAF, and
Afghan security officials contributed to the resilience of the Taliban insurgency moving
towards 2014. Precisely, NATO Official 15 noted that belief-based policy structures
which eschewed security coordination as a primary determinant and condoned
individualistic development of institutions in improving overall security outcomes
resulted in casualties for both the ANSF and civilians throughout Afghanistan from 2002
to 2014. For this reason, the CTF became embroiled in defeating a perpetual Taliban
insurgency due, as was noted earlier, to visible performance-based disparities between
the ANSF apparatuses in enforcing their mandate, maintaining adequate training
programs, and developing a national CVE strategy.
However, NATO Officials 14 and 15 and Afghan Officials 14 and 15 all concluded
that the resolve, morale, and professionalism of the CTF from 2002 to 2014 was
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unparalleled compared to any other active security force in Afghanistan. In the view of
Afghan Officials 14 and 15, the CTF was the ultimate pillar of security, stability, and
order in violently perturbed parts of Afghanistan. Likewise, NATO Officials 14 and 15
described the CTF as being at par with, if not superior to, to all other counter-terrorism
forces in the region, and a beacon of hope and stability for NATO’s UN-mandated ISAF
in improving national security outcomes. Thus, the overall observed sentiment with
regard to the CTF field operations was that the post-2014 burden of combat and
eventual disengagement of NATO from Afghanistan was heavily dependent on the
further professionalization of the NDS’s CTF.

National Directorate of Security Special Operations Force Field Operations (SOF)
The compartmentalization of NDS recruits by the CIA upon returning from
training at Camp Peary was to progressively organize the force and to assign specific
duties and responsibilities to each divisional entity. In this regard, another sub-unit
belonging to the CTSOF was the special operations forces of the NDS deployed in 2002
to assist the ANP in its effort to eliminate rampant elements of endemic criminality.
During an interview, Afghan Official 11 emphasized, as the academic literature has
shown, that the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the security vacuum left behind
fostered the rise of criminal gangs, drug and weapons traffickers, and kidnappers,
among others, in major cities (Wardak and Brathwaite, 2012, 201-206).
Mostly commercial and urban centres were affected by the security vacuum
which included Heart, Kabul, Kandahar, Lashkargah, and Mazar-e-Sharif. The fall of the
Taliban regime coupled with billions of dollars in unprecedented foreign aid flowing into
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Afghanistan helped institute a vibrant private sector (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013,
507-511). As a direct result of the emergence of previously non-existent business
opportunities, Afghan Official 11 noted that the rapid expansion of the private sector
concurrently provided opportunities for criminal elements within major cities. Complex
networks of associated criminal gangs began to capitalize financially through extortion,
abduction, and murder of prominent merchants throughout Afghanistan.
Again, the underdevelopment of the ANP was the prominent theme of many
interviews which highlighted the need for the creation of the SOF. Initially, the SOF
recruits were either assigned to the CTSOF or the NDS Force during training by the CIA
at Camp Peary in Virginia. The reassignment of the NDS recruits, comparable to the
case of the NDS Force, began in 2002 upon their return to Afghanistan. NATO Official
11 agreed with Afghan Official 11 and emphasized that early observations by the US
and later by ISAF in 2003 shaped the mandate of the SOF. As both Afghan and NATO
officials agreed, in early 2003, the technical and professional incapacities and deeprooted involvement of the commanders of the ANP in heinous crimes stunned the
commanders of the NATO-led ISAF engaged in the SSR project in Afghanistan.
Along with militias comprised of rogue miscreants in large urban cities, several
senior police officials were accused of being complicit in the extortion, abduction, and
murder of prominent merchants from Afghanistan’s rapidly expanding business
community from 2002 to 2003. NATO Official 11 explained that a series of unforeseen
rises in violent crime against the business community prompted the creation of the SOF
under the tutelage of the NDS. The main prerogative of the SOF was to address
mounting violent crime trends against the private sector and to disrupt the flow of arms
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and drugs which found their way into the illicit black market. Neither NATO nor Afghan
officials interviewed specified the size of the SOF and only divulged that it was active
and present in Afghanistan where provincial governors requested security assistance
between 2003-2014.
The field operations command of the SOF was headquartered in Kabul in 2002
and was initially tasked with disbanding armed criminal gangs that were sources of
illegal revenue from exploiting vulnerable businesspersons with extortion and
kidnapping. Such disbandment and neutralization were prerogatives which mundanely
fell under the provisional jurisdiction and authority of the police apparatus. However,
NATO Official 11 specified that from 2002 to 2014 the ISAF commanders along with
Afghan security officials were keen to implement an Afghan-led solution to the scourge
of endemic police corruption and major crime reduction.
The Afghan-led transient solution progressing towards the end of the NATO
combat mission in 2014 became to assign significant policing duties of the ANP to the
SOF. Working parallel to the ANP, the SOF gradually assumed full responsibility for
investigating cases of drugs and weapons trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping.
According to NATO Official 11, the operational logic behind the SOF as a parallel
security force was that it could plan, strategize, and execute high-risk operations
independently which would not jeopardize the integrity of sensitive investigations.
Instead of devising strategies of security coordination with the ANP, the SOF
independently and proactively pursued perpetrators of major crimes. Although there is a
lack of statistical evidence to assess the efficacy of the SOF, NATO Official 14 added
that the assertiveness and precise surgical operations carried out by the SOF managed
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to disband complex extortion and kidnapping gangs in Heart, Kabul, Kandahar, and
Mazar-e-Sharif.
Also, in direct coordination with the CTF, as the sister division of the CounterTerrorism and Special Operations Forces or SOF, the SOF continuously managed to
prevent major suicide attacks and intercepted large shipments of bomb-making material
destined for urban centers across Afghanistan. However, NATO Official 14 cautioned
that the patchwork approach of assigning the SOF to the duties of the ANP to carry out
its duties was not a durable and long-lasting solution. He proclaimed that since the SOF
assumed the duties of the ANP for major crimes in 2003, the ANP had failed to
transition and supplant the SOF as the preeminent public law enforcement force.
Identical to the NDS Force and the CTF, the SOF had been extensively trained to carry
out multifarious activities in the sphere of national security and special operations
although NATO Official 14 thought the ANP should have supplemented the SOF.
In general, NATO Officials 11 and 14 stated that the methodical and systematic
training programs created for the NDS by the CIA enabled operatives and entire
divisions to be deployed rapidly to train, advise, and assist the ANA and the ANP.
Among other tactics, explained NATO Officials 11 and 14, the field operations facet of
the SOF from 2003 to 2014 involved the utilization of advanced interception equipment
and tracing methods to apprehend kidnappers and criminals involved in Afghanistan’s
lucrative opium trade. Afghan Official 15 also alluded to the complex multi-provincial
network of prisons administered by the NDS with various classified locations for
detainees. He explained that these prisons were designed with maximum security
specifications and exclusively housed detainees arrested by the CTF and the SOF, and
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in doing so, ensured that high-value prisoners were not beneficiaries of corrupt
practices documented in the MoI-administered prisons.
In particular, Afghan Official 15 claimed that the NDS administered prisonhoused detainees until they were sentenced by Afghan courts, at which point they were
transferred to the Pul-e-Charkhi federal prison in Kabul or handed over to the USadministered prison in Bagram Air Base. NATO Official 14 further expounded that the
SOF field operations personnel maintained an inter-agency interrogation team skilled in
advanced methods and techniques of information analysis and collection. Frequently,
information gained from high-value prisoners led to disruption in planned terrorist
attacks against civilians, against the ANSF, and against ISAF, and provided further
classified information to the SOF and the CTF in order to track down high-profile Taliban
commanders.
For instance, NATO Official 14 credited the SOF for the information provided to
the ISAF command regarding the exact location of ruthless Taliban leader Mullah
Dadullah in Helmand. Dadullah was killed in a remote village in Helmand in 2007 in a
special operation coordinated by the SOF with the British and the American Special
Forces. The intelligence regarding his whereabouts was obtained by the SOF in
coordination with the CTF from a group of intercepted suicide bombers tasked with
carrying out attacks on the NATO installations in Kabul.
In the same way, NATO Official 15 commended the SOF for the capture in
coordination with the CTF of Anas Haqqani in 2014, son of the founder of the Talibanaffiliated Haqqani Network Jalaluddin Haqqani. Anas Haqqani was widely considered to
be the most high-profile prisoner in captivity, given his prominent role in planning and
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executing the most sophisticated attacks on both foreign and local security force
installations. Thus, according to NATO Official 15, the SOF’s area of duties and
responsibilities constantly expanded from supplanting and supplementing the ANP to
taking part in counter-terrorism operations along with the CTF.
Finally, the strength and effectiveness of the SOF in field operations from 2002 to
2014 also raised many human rights issues. The Afghan Independent Human Rights
Commission along with Open Society Foundations in a 2012 report titled Torture,
Transfers, and Denial of Due Process specifically castigated the NDS’ SOF for cruel
treatment of prisoners. Allegations levied against the SOF included violent beatings,
suspending detainees from the ceiling for extended periods of time, administering
electric shocks, and sexual abuse (Open Society Foundations, 2012).
The report further specified that despite NATO being fully apprised, acts of
torture and abuse were routinely exercised in all the NDS prisons to obtain confessions
or other information from detainees. When presented with the testimony documented in
this critical report, both NATO Officials 14 and 15 refuted such accusations against the
NDS and posited that the NATO investigative teams had routinely monitored and visited
the NDS detention centers where they had found no evidence of torture or extrajudicial
killings from 2003 to 2014.
To reiterate, research findings in this section revealed three key findings
pertaining to the SOF’s field operations. First, the SOF served an atypical role as the
NDS’ extension of a major crime task force, thus supplanting the ANP in major urban
centers, as discussed above. Second, inter-agency coordination between the CTF and
the SOF from 2002 to 2014 was continuous, fluid, and professional. Lastly, the SOF’s

176

field operations results expanded into a parallel program with a complex network of
prisons which produced invaluable intelligence for the NDS and concomitantly ensured
due process under Afghan law with relatively little interference from corrupt officials in
the ANP.

Conclusion
Over the course of interviewing the NDS and NATO officials involved with the
directorate’s field operations, the research findings demonstrated superior capabilities
for all operations forces assigned to the directorate. The difference in field operations
superiority for the NDS in comparison to the ANA and ANP was the extensive and
overseas training provided by the CIA (instead of the CSTC-A and the NTM-A). The
commitment, morale, and resolve of the NDS field operations personnel from 2002 to
2014 was exemplary and unwavering as communicated by the NATO and Afghan
Officials interviewed as part of this research study.
The NDS Force’s operational domain was marred by the underdevelopment and
inadequate capabilities of the ANP and the ANA. The NDS Force served as the primary
rapid reactionary force until it was able to gradually train, equip, and mentor the ANP’s
CRU. Among NATO policymakers, the comprehensive training provided by the NDS
Force to the CRU was hailed as a success story about an Afghan-led mentorship
program. The CRU training program overseen by the NDS Force yielded greater than
expected results in successfully instituting a capable and professional high-readiness
ANP sub-unit. Later in 2013, the transition of the NDS Force to become trainers for the
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MIU in the ANA redesigned its mandate as a rapidly deployable security stabilization
training force.
Furthermore, the success of the CTF among all other ANSF subunits was
unsurpassed in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2014. The field operations realm of the CTF
was dominated by intelligence-gathering; seizure and securing of operations against
insurgents; and proactively devising counter-terrorism strategies to strengthen the
overall offensive and defensive posture of the NDS. Analogous to the NDS Force, the
CTF continuously pursued a patchwork policy to fulfill and augment the ABP’s
performance deficiencies in volatile border regions. However, despite the CTF’s
entanglement in a multi-dimensional operations arena, it continued as an efficacious
and preventive counter-terrorism force by coordinating with the ANA and the ISAF
command from 2003 to 2014. Therefore, the highly-trained and readily deployable
operatives employed by the CTF were perceived to be the prominent counter-terrorism
operations combat force in the aftermath of the NATO’s combat mission in 2014.
Briefly, the SOF field operations realm was also predominantly shaped by
performance-based shortcomings, and endemic corruption, documented within the
ranks of the ANP from 2003 to 2014. Consequently, the SOF replaced the ANP as the
central investigative authority directed to prevent major crimes including extortion,
abduction, and infiltration of Taliban insurgents within the ANA and the ANP ranks. Also,
the high level of consistent security coordination between the CTF and the SOF
facilitated the capture and killing of high-profile Taliban insurgents. Hence, insurgents
captured in the SOF operations across Afghanistan produced valuable intelligence
which not only improved security outcomes but simultaneously demonstrated the SOF’s
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independence and professional capabilities. To conclude the field operations discussion
of the NDS, this chapter strived to present a comprehensive appraisal of the NATO’s
SSR process in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2014. To research the paradigmatic and
operational issues of SSR involves the comprehension of the intelligence, military, and
police as units which are implicitly interconnected and can only be systematically
accounted for if referenced to as a whole.
The research findings discussed in this chapter regarding the multiple facets of
the NDS field operations command warrant further analysis into answering the following
question: In terms of the liberal institutionalist model of SSR, what worked and
what did not work in reforming the NDS field operations between 2003-2014? First,
the separation of the training program for the NDS from the CSTC-A and NTM-A helped
it to grow professionally with generous funding from the Pentagon and the CIA
beginning in 2002. The unprecedented support from the CIA coupled with the
opportunities for professional development between 2003-2014 facilitated the
institutional development of the NDS with various active operational branches (CTF,
CTSOF, NDS Force etc.). In accordance with liberal democratic objectives of SSR, the
NDS implemented a series of rules and procedures in planning and conducting field
operations. For instance, the decentralization of authority to the judicial branch for
counter-terrorism operation approvals implemented numerous checks and balances on
the NDS field operations.
Additionally, the intensive overseas training program conducted by the CIA for
the NDS recruits – drawn from all ethnicities and sects in Afghanistan – at Camp Peary
in Virginia introduced them to modern intelligence gathering techniques and strategies
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which helped them adapt to various theatres of operations. Lastly, the cross-divisional
coordination between various branches of the NDS proved to be a clear indicator of
institutional progress which worked to not only prevent major security breaches in major
urban centres but also signified the gradual development of high morale and discipline
in field operations between 2003-2014.
On the other hand, SSR efforts at reforming the NDS were affected by a set of
circumstances that hindered SSR’s effectiveness and institutional capacity and growth.
Primarily, the NTM-A’s proposition in the late 2000s to the NDS to provide operational
assistance to the ANP’s underperforming branches such as the ABP strayed from the
core SSR mandate of the intelligence sector reform. While NATO-led ISAF had initially
proposed a parallel SSR approach for the MoD, MoI, and the NDS, their mandates and
training programs were at different periods of time either combined or separated
between 2003-2014. This inconsistency in NATO’s SSR approach in Afghanistan
perversely affected the operational capabilities of the NDS. From conducting criminal
investigations to deploying advanced intelligence assets to border areas, from training
and developing the CRU at the ANP to the development of the MIU at the MoD, they all
exerted pressure on the limited resources of the NDS as an intelligence apparatus.
Therefore, the constant ISAF-led change in SSR strategy as a direct response to the
underperformance of the ANA and the ANP had debilitating and far-reaching effects on
the intelligence sector reform in Afghanistan between 2003-2014.
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CHAPTER 6
The Feasibility of NATO’s Liberal Institutionalist
Security Sector Reform Approach in Afghanistan
Overview: Goals of Research and Research Questions
The fundamental goal of this dissertation was to analytically examine the
practicality of NATO’s liberal institutionalist SSR approach in Afghanistan. Specifically,
the purpose of this research study was to gain a comprehensive insight into the intricate
and previously incomplete account of the SSR process in Afghanistan. To restate the
primary and secondary research questions of this study:
In terms of NATO’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan between 2003
and 2014, what worked, and what did not work? The secondary question pertaining to
this research study asks: Why did certain aspects of SSR fail? The introductory chapter
of this dissertation aimed to provide the reader with a brief understanding of the
complicated security situation in Afghanistan and the liberal institutionalist approach to
SSR. The intertwined web of various factors that continued to protract the armed conflict
in Afghanistan were brought to the fore, along with documented criticisms of SSR.
These criticisms were noted to be neither conclusive nor complete and did not
necessarily indicate a total failure of the SSR project from 2003 to 2014. This thesis did
not test whether the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan was a success or not. In
order to maintain objectivity in conducting this research study, it is important not to
judge the entire NATO-led SSR mission in Afghanistan as a clear case of success or a
failure given that NATO’s SSR mission lacked clear indicators of progress and
deficiencies from 2003-2014. As such, the focal point of this research study was to
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investigate and reveal what worked and what did not work, not whether it was a
complete success, abject failure or in between.
Principally, the analysis in this dissertation served to provide readers with a
synopsis of the critical literature from academics who were keen to point out the
deficiencies of the SSR process and to encourage further research and fieldwork to
alleviate the intricate context-specific and deep-rooted problems. The introductory
preface endeavoured to shape the theoretical framework to systematically analyze the
SSR policy solutions operationalized by NATO in response to the conflict in
Afghanistan.
Theoretically, liberal institutionalists emphasized the process of state-building in
Afghanistan through SSR in favour of the long-term objective of building a capable
multi-faceted security force through gradual institutional and operational reforms with
support from NATO. Liberal institutionalists proposed that a functioning security sector,
inclusive of intelligence, military, and police, is a crucial measure for stability in postconflict situations (Glickstein, 2014, 96; Maley, 2013, 264-266). As outlined in previous
chapters, the SSR model remained committed to the development and
professionalization of Afghanistan’s vital security apparatuses. Although NATO member
countries provided advisory assistance to reform the judicial sector in tandem with the
reintegration of ex-combatants, such assistance largely remained the tertiary focus of
the SSR process in Afghanistan. Hence, NATO’s SSR agenda in Afghanistan focused
exclusively on reforming three key institutions – intelligence, military, and police.
In this context, SSR became a key concept for improving overall governance and
implementing key measures of accountability and oversight in Afghanistan. Further,
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SSR as a reform and process in Afghanistan was composed of an overarching
approach that not only focused on the integration of the defense, police, and intelligence
sectors, but concurrently incorporated liberal democratic undertones. This included the
consolidation of democracy, the promotion of human rights, and principles of good
governance – accountability and transparency in Afghanistan (Dursun-ozkanca and
Vandermoortele 2012; 141-143 Gross, 2009, 38). Broadly speaking, SSR in
Afghanistan included the reformation of security institutions, strengthening of control
mechanisms, and the institutional restructuring of the security sector from 2003-2014.
Theoretical proponents of the liberal institutionalist school of thought pointed to
the various advantages of NATO, as a multilateral security organization, given the broad
range of political and economic instruments at its disposal to institute reformative
procedures in Afghanistan. They argued that NATO, as the very model of liberal
institutionalist security cooperation, was traditionally well-positioned to effectively
implement SSR activities through collective policy instruments at its disposal in
Afghanistan (Abrahamsen, 2016, 285; Koehler and Gosztonyu, 2014, 237-241). The
arguments presented by liberal institutionalists in the second chapter posited that not
only does NATO possess the political and economic instruments, it further
collaboratively possesses the institutional and security sector expertise to help
Afghanistan in its slow progress towards democracy, stability, and reconciliation (Ayub
and Kuovo, 2009; Berman, 2010, 6; Wilén, 2018, 68). The specific case of Afghanistan
chosen for this research study, however, highlighted the tumultuous trajectory of
challenges and processes in implementing the SSR project wherein state legitimacy
was violently contested, and organized crime and corruption thrived from 2003 to 2014.
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Contrary to NATO’s past SSR missions, such as Bosnia and Kosovo in the
aftermath of the Balkan Wars, Afghanistan’s SSR experiment is suitably described
because it is an intersection of security reform initiatives and concurrent systemic
institutional overhaul. As indicated earlier, Eva Gross’ (2009) research findings
illustrated that systemic and wide-ranging security stabilization initiatives were being
carried out in tandem with institutional capacity-building efforts by international donors in
Afghanistan (Gross, 2009, 11-12). Because of this joint initiative by intervening states
(and NATO) to strengthen security institutions and legitimize the state, the SSR process
came to be incoherent, inconsistent, and at times less important to the state-building
enterprise (Gross, 2009, 11).
But these evident challenges did not necessarily lend credence to the positions
of critics but rather, they highlighted the documented transformations in global conflicts
and how NATO’s SSR efforts since 2003 have progressed and expanded from shortterm security stabilization to long-term institutional commitment to nurture the requisite
framework for the promotion of the liberal democratic order (Jarstad, 2013, 390;
Weigand, 2013, 71-73). Given this, the research findings discussed in the previous
chapters imparted crucial practical proficiencies and deficiencies of NATO’s liberal
institutional approach to SSR in the following realms: organizational structure of security
organs, bureaucratic and institutional reform in the ANA, ANP, and the NDS, and the
field operations aspect of all three security organs.
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Post-structural Assessment of SSR
As discussed in the first and second chapter of this dissertation, poststructuralists emphasize the dominance of undemocratic principles which have
imprisoned the consciousness of local populations in conflict-prone zones (Campbell,
2007, 209). In the instance of Afghanistan, post-structuralists maintain that the power
wielded by Western powers and their proposed prerogative of rebuilding security
institutions in reality subjugated the actual realities of the conflict (Bell, 2010, 61-63).
Further, they argue that beliefs in intervention and promotion of democracy are a result
of cognitive factors – which range from metaphysical beliefs about the world to policy
agendas – based on value-rational decisions. Moreover, interventionism fails to provide
a rationale in understanding the epistemological deficiencies or processes embedded in
the flawed notion of ‘democratization’ and ‘reform’ (Darby, 2009, 701-707).
Additionally, post-structuralists pointed out that the concept of overdetermination
is largely omitted from the mainstream textual presentations of security studies. This
epistemological term accentuates the interconnectedness of theory with practical
discourse. In substance, it holds that as humans we are historically conditioned to
detect and analyze what we have been traditionally directed to see (Ringsmose and
Børgesen, 2011, 509-512). In particular, this signifies that the concepts learned and
operationalized over time are obdurately attached to the flaws in mainstream
epistemological lenses. Over time, human perceptions become an extension of this
flawed epistemology and Westerners can often subjectively assess the need for
intervention and SSR for far-distant lands – such as Afghanistan.
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Post-structuralists admit to the powerful effect of discourse on constructing reality
both in terms of mainstream cognitive perception and the resulting understandings as to
what constitutes objectivity in modalities of democratic governance (Widmaier, 2007,
751-753). The power of discourse rests in its ability to transform thoughts about real
understandings of the social world into systematic processes of differentiation that
presume important variances in gender, race and geography. In short, poststructuralists maintain that our limited theoretical understanding aided by social
experiences and discourse lead to analysis that selectively isolates aspects of the
world.
Furthermore, some Western-based experiences are based on false
understandings of democratization and SSR which are enmeshed within the constant
flow of mainstream discourses. Falsehoods can become concomitant with theoretical
frameworks because we are not able to correct and self-regulate our interpretations as
they are grounded in discourse. Thus, as an ontological starting point, all observed
processes are continuously in a state of transformation and cannot be uniformly applied
in different geographical contexts.
For post-structuralists, in order to understand the true realities of the conflict in
Afghanistan, there is a genuine need for theoretical empowerment to study global
politics from the bottom up. They want to focus on the local, inconspicuous, undramatic,
quotidian and banal practices, and the relevant strategies through which humans
ontologize, fix or naturalize the world. Thus, this approach emphasizes the
deconstruction of reality based on what we already know with what we should know
about the conflict in Afghanistan (Williams, 2011, 71). To proprietors of the post-
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structural narrative, insistence on appreciating cultural values, understanding historical
details of power dynamics, exploring ethnic divisions and considering religious values
are better starting points. Only then can flawed concepts like ‘democratization’ and SSR
be systematically deconstructed.
Moreover, the policy-relevant implications of the post-structural theoretical
framework have profound limitations in terms of what they can offer as tangible policy
options to reach a lasting resolution in Afghanistan (Hanssen, 2014, 41). Although it is
somewhat convincing to reframe the conflict in Afghanistan by utilizing an
epistemological critique that analyzes NATO’s shortcomings in terms of SSR between
2003 and 2014, post-structuralists would maintain to do so is inherently limited in scope
and practice. Rather than answer the primary and secondary research questions of this
dissertation - which are themselves embedded in a liberal-institutionalist theoretical
framework - post-structuralists tend to myopically and solely focus upon the failures of
the NATO intervention due in part to cultural values, historical details of power
dynamics, ethnic divisions and religious values predating 2003-2014, factors that
arguably will continue to stymie SSR going forward.
Key principles of post-structuralism dictate that local development and security
should be led at the local level and preferably once patrimonial and patriarchical ideas
pertaining to conflict, ethnicity, gender, and race are further deconstructed. Therefore,
post-structuralist accounts are useful in exploring the deficiencies of the SSR policy
options between 2003 and 2014 and yet constrained by contextual specificity,
theoretical impracticality and their limited number of inferences that can be drawn for
the purposes of generalization.
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Another prevalent methodology in post-structural explanations of conflict is the
deconstruction method. Sajed (2012) refers to this as a process of intellectual and
cultural decolonization that critiques mainstream epistemologies of conflict and global
security (Sajed, 2012, 145). Deconstructionist methods attempt to deconstruct liberal
institutionalist understandings of security building, state building and reconstruction by
challenging the biases that are emitted from far-distant lands. The deconstruction
method at its core is primarily concerned with the evolution of mainstream knowledge.
Although deconstruction is largely hailed as a formidable method in the field of
international relations that deviates from mainstream positivist approaches, it does have
its own set of limitations resulting from an overreliance on critical frameworks (Wang et
al., 2012, 14).
In other words, stark operational variances in deconstruction methods in
comparison to mechanistic aspects of positivism and the scientific method are
hindrances in terms of addressing research questions. The task of critiquing problemsolving approaches in security studies essentially targets any theoretical framework and
subjects it to deconstruction where inherent deficiencies will inevitably arise (Jabri,
2012, 9-10).
Moreover, post-structuralists argue that the interventionist campaign in
Afghanistan carried with it a colonial undertone which continued to re-popularize the
flawed epistemologies of white/coloured, inferior/superior and developed/developing.
Similar to post-modern narratives, post-structuralists assert that it is falsely deemed and
understood to be the ‘white man’s burden’ to civilize the savage other and that by doing
so, the West is fulfilling the duty of benevolence bestowed upon it (Doty, 1993, 307).
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Thus, post-structuralists accounts seek to illustrate the failures of the NATO security
framework and SSR by questioning the epistemological and practical merits of liberal
institutionalist prerogatives.
Finally, post-structuralist methods of deconstruction can involve delving into
critical reappraisals of foreign policy from a historical perspective, which brings to the
fore the actual suppression and marginalization of the Afghan population. In terms of
SSR and liberal institutionalism, post-structuralists argue that the promotion of universal
promises of democratization pursued by NATO – which included economic progress,
development, and security – continued to dominate the ‘structural’ dynamics of
Afghanistan (Bell, 2010, 65). Although post-structuralists are unable to provide precise
strategic directives to shape concrete foreign policy options, they emphasize the
untapped power of internal reform that could be led by Afghans and that could set in
place real state-building that does not over rely on powerful external actors such as
NATO (Loeppky, 2005, 91). Such post-structural critiques filter through to highlight
cultures of hypocrisy, inequality and patrimony prevalent in mainstream explanatory and
normative theories of international relations. Although these can result in important
reiterations of epistemological concerns, their accounts rarely capture the attention of
practical policymakers. The inability of post-structuralist deconstruction to prescribe
policy recommendations based on empirical facts means their critical stance remains
detached from practical realities shaping policy frameworks.
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Feasibility of SSR in Afghanistan
The research findings in this dissertation indicate that NATO’s SSR journey in
Afghanistan between 2003-2014 was fraught with both progress and setbacks. While
progressive institutional and bureaucratic overhauls took place in some areas, they
relapsed in others. The field operations performance by the MoD, MoI, and the NDS
varied significantly due to a multitude of factors ranging from how personnel were
recruited to how training programs were set up and then developed. In short, NATO’s
SSR approach in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014 allowed for an inquiry into the
intricacies associated with SSR policy formulation and its subsequent implementation.
SSR, on its own, without a clear set of indicators or assessment criteria, was
primarily driven by liberal democratic objectives of accountability, responsibility, and
transparency surrounding the proper institution of reforms. However, the SSR model
rooted in the liberal institutionalist framework was overly vague, untested, and subject to
constant reform across different security organs in Afghanistan. Not only was the SSR
model deployed in uncharted territory with its own set of culture and values on proper
governance, but the chosen case study for liberal institutionalism’s SSR experiment was
also a difficult one from the very beginning.
Afghanistan, where no formal government had existed since the fall of Dr.
Najibullah’s communist regime in 1992, became the subject of NATO’s most massive
SSR experiment. NATO’s arduous and monumental project sought to rebuild institutions
in tandem with capable national security apparatuses in Afghanistan, although poverty,
illiteracy, patrimonialism and patriarchy dominated (e.g. illiteracy rates lingered around
90 percent in 2002). Surprisingly, by the end of NATO’s SSR mission in 2014, as this
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dissertation shows, Afghanistan had a functional and somewhat capable intelligence,
military, and police apparatus that attempted to uphold the legitimacy of the central
government. The SSR experiment resulted in a mixed record of success and failure, yet
in the context of the case selection itself, Afghanistan was an atypical hard case,
perhaps the most laborious experiment the international community could have
fastened upon in the world at that time.
To summarize, both the SSR model and the case of Afghanistan were
problematic. SSR was not fully developed in 2003 – there was no ideal model; it was
continually evolving. Moreover, the case upon which SSR was imposed was itself overly
challenging and inappropriate. As discussed in chapters 2, 3, and 4, the liberal
institutionalist campaign that sought full-fledged democratization in Afghanistan was
hindered by NATO’s execution methods. Despite difficulties in field operations and
insurmountable challenges in terms of implementing institutional accountability across
all security sectors, liberal institutional precepts did, however, manage to alter the
landscape of governance in Afghanistan.
Thus, the end of the SSR mission in Afghanistan in 2014 and the withdrawal of
140,000 NATO troops saw the democratic transition of power for the first time in
Afghanistan’s modern history from external powers to internal actors resulting in
significant improvements in both the bureaucratic capacity and field operations
performance of security apparatuses. The recent history of Afghanistan is not covered
in this dissertation (as it ends with events in 2014). However, it would not be far-fetched
to conclude that the story of the past few years (between 2015-2019) and the next few
years after that (e.g. 2020-2024) will also reflect the mixed record brought out in these
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pages - a narrative or story without a happy ending, but rather an evolving narrative
which this thesis has captured as a snapshot in time.
Chapter-by-chapter summary of research findings:
In order to maintain clarity and coherence, this chapter proceeds to analytically
assess the findings from the key empirical chapters of this dissertation in chronological
order before communicating the overall results of this research study.

Chapter 3: Overview of Research Findings
Guided by the accounts and narratives of interviewees, the third chapter of this
dissertation reported on the institutional strengths and weaknesses of the key security
institutions in Afghanistan – the MoD, MoI, and the NDS. Owing to the notable gap in
academic literature between theory and a general understanding of issues associated
with policy implementation in security institutions, it provided this research with the
impetus to supplement it with definitive accounts from knowledgeable technocrats,
policy officials, and senior executives at the MoD, MoI, and the NDS.
In the past, the scarcity of literature on the institutional aspects of the MoD, MoI,
and the NDS categorically inhibited the requisite discourse necessary for an accurate
assessment of institutional development within Afghanistan’s security apparatuses.
Having academically engaged the previously uncharted realm of NATO’s SSR approach
to institutional reform by interviewing relevant policy officials, there are several
inferences regarding the above-mentioned institutions which can be drawn.

192

First and foremost, the emergence of the ANA as a national defense entity under
the direct authority of the MoD brought to fore the complex challenges in
professionalizing the institutional backbone of the national army. The nepotistic
appointment of warlords with little to no formal experience to lead senior policy and
executive positions in the day-to-day operations of the command structure of the ANA
hindered the bureaucratic progress of the MoD. The proto-bureaucratic culture of
favouritism, coupled with the unprofessional appointment of individuals to valuable
posts devoid of the procedural recruitment process, was paradoxical to the SSR model
of maintaining accountability, fairness, and transparency.
Additionally, the ISAF-led undertaking which formed the Civil Service
Commission as an administrative advisory body embedded within the MoD to improve
effectiveness and efficiency resulted in mixed outcomes. The Security and Support
Division staffed by rank-and-file bureaucrats at the MoD immensely gained expertise
from advice and training from the Civil Service Commission. Interviewees consistently
conveyed satisfaction with the Security and Support Division, given the staff’s openness
to change, facilitating bureaucratic reform, and implementing better practice initiatives in
everyday routine tasks. Nevertheless, they communicated that the senior policymakers
at the MoD operated on the premises of corruption, informalism and patrimonialism and resisted any reformative efforts proposed by the ISAF to implement oversight
mechanisms. Resistance to the ISAF-led better practice initiatives gave way to ‘big
seed’ corruption in the logistics and procurement subdivision of the MoD. Nevertheless,
both Afghan and NATO officials proclaimed that human and institutional capacity at the

193

MoD significantly improved due to the special attention of ISAF in building up the main
battle and defense group of Afghanistan.
Moreover, the international community’s insistence on conditional and
performance-based aid facilitated the continuous recruitment of both senior and midlevel bureaucrats by rules and procedures which were previously non-existent. ‘Big
seed’ corruption at the MoD’s administrative branch and the frustration of international
donors led to the creation of the NPA by way of a presidential decree in 2014. The NPA
at the MoD was not only overseen by the SIGAR, but mostly came to be monitored by
the World Bank, UNAMA, and independent appraisers to prevent corrupt backdoor
arrangements. Lastly, the improvements in public accessibility and infrastructure
allowed for the development and expansion of the MoD satellite branches across all 34
provinces as part of the larger goal to maintain a national presence to improve security
outcomes in volatile regions. Thus, the institutional aspect of the MoD has been
described by interviewees as a mixed record of selective departmental progress as well
as setbacks in introducing the core liberal doctrines of accountability, oversight, and
transparency.
Furthermore, the third chapter accentuated the institutional development of the
MoI and the ANP and explored the multitude of factors that shaped its image as the
primary public protection force in Afghanistan. The discussion and analysis of the
administrative branch revealed that the creation of the MoI in 2002 was premised on an
incentive and reward system. Initially designed to integrate pro-US warlords and militia
groups under a national police entity, it oppositely evolved into a corrupt system of
compensation for militia, which assisted the US-led combat forces in ousting the Taliban
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regime in 2001. The far-reaching effects of the informal reward system systematically
deprived the MoI of a capable and functioning administrative branch as envisioned by
NATO in 2003. Without surprise, the MoI found itself at the crossroads of facing
international pressure for increased institutional capacity building on the one hand and
catering to the preferences of the warlords who were keen on maintaining the informal
culture of nepotism and corruption on the other.
The inefficiencies of the incoherent administrative system were further
compounded with the emergence of an acrimonious internal dispute between distinct
divisions of the MoI. The focal point of the dispute centered on an institutional flaw
whereby the allocation of donor aid was unequally and arbitrarily appropriated to
specific branches and divisions leading up to 2011. Also, the constant change in
ministerial positions at the MoI led to a disjointed institutional reform agenda due to the
monumental problems posed by powerful pressure groups led by former warlords in
order to maintain the informal culture of status quo. In turn, continuous changes in
command and the paucity of clear policy directions held the technocrats and rank-andfile officials back from performing their duties to the best of their ability.
Proclamations from participants revealed that another vital factor that further
exacerbated the institutional flaw at the MoI was reported to be the change of
international advisory command from Germany to a mixture of an American-German
assistance initiative. The emergence of CSAC proved to be much more effective in
training the bureaucratic staff by ushering in the military mindset to the MoI, but it also
concomitantly neglected the past advisory direction of Germany in bringing about strict
institutional accountability.
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The research findings about the institutional development at the MoI indicated
that these inherent problems continued to hamper the multiple aspects of administrative
progress leading up to the conclusion of the NATO combat mission in 2014.
Furthermore, the research results indicated that the adoption of a complex
administrative structure by German advisors at the MoI in 2002 also stymied institutional
progress. In general, the adoption of a complex bureaucratic and administrative
structure, which idealistically emulated procedural features highlighting the importance
of accountability and oversight evident in well-developed Western institutions brought
about a period of confusion, inefficiency, and a lack of direction.
Finally, the third chapter’s final area of attention served to provide an appraisal of
the institutional features of the intelligence sector in Afghanistan. It discovered that in
comparison to the MoD and MoI, the NDS was not plagued by similar forms of
institutional malignancies. Participants described that the implementation of a simple
command structure in tandem with the rigorous training provided by the CIA and other
NATO members’ intelligence agencies in early 2003 gave way to the professionalization
of the institutional framework at the NDS. The systemic enterprise to create an internal
watchdog along with an educational and awareness program for the NDS technocrats
on procedural functions of the directorate set in motion the type of institutional
obedience seen in well-developed Western institutions.
Although the NDS fared better in terms of institutional performance and in
maintaining professional responsibility, the directorate found itself caught in the midst of
a rancorous administrative battle between traditional bureaucrats and reformists. The

196

period from 2006 to 2010 was defined by traditionalists lobbying for the weight of their
personal experiences, judgements, and nationalist motivations.
Meanwhile, the reformists were keen to familiarize themselves with modern
forms of analytical and organizational methods in making informed policy and
administrative decisions. Following the assertions of Afghan Official 7, the directorate’s
policy direction leading up to 2014 was derived from a combination of beliefs and dated
forms of analysis but with an outlook of significant potential in incorporating the modern
methods of intelligence analysis and planning.
In short, the interviewees described the institutional professionalism of the NDS’
organizational performance as being in line with the policy-making models apparent in
other developing countries. They elucidated that the orderly transition from humancentric models to the EBPM was an organized process that was dependent on the
development of high levels of personnel expertise and organizational sophistication
analogous to proven scientific methods. In light of the discussed institutional
deficiencies, the NDS was widely considered by interviewees to be the most effective
institution administratively in comparison to the MoD and MoI. Therefore, the existence
of a coherent chain of command staffed by professional bureaucrats embodying a
progressive and partially scientific policy-making model discussed earlier provided the
NDS with considerable potential for further reform.
The institutional issues discussed in the third chapter also concurrently pointed to
the complexities and difficulties in establishing strong institutions in Afghanistan with
little infrastructure and a lack of professional capacity. By analyzing the institution
building and organizational reform through the lens of SSR and liberal institutionalism, it
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becomes clear that a prevailing culture of favouritism rapidly shaped the institutional
features of the MoD, MoI and the NDS. The information provided by research
participants indicated that liberal institutionalist values were either partially or fully
overlooked during the reformative years of institution building in Afghan security
apparatuses.
In the broader context, the state-building endeavour is one which is difficult to
frame within the confines of a procedural and linear process, one which would ultimately
yield the exact same results across time and space. Similarly, the institutional
development of security apparatuses forming the backbone of emerging states in terms
of possessing the coercive capacity to monopolize violence would require an extensive
appraisal of the context in which they seek to be established. It also bears emphasis
that conventional theories in the field of security studies are overwhelmingly becoming
dominated by critical literature questioning the epistemological bases of prescriptive
security policies. That is, there is increasing emphasis on reforming the definition of
security to make it more inclusive by incorporating contemporary dynamics of security
such as environmental, food and human security.
At the same time, this shift in focus towards the multi-faceted forms of security
and securitization studies is detracting attention from the SSR literature which has been
at the frontline of state-building endeavours to reform security institutions. However, the
case of Afghanistan’s SSR journey presented an opportunity for security experts to
assess and study the challenges associated with establishing responsible and
accountable security institutions in post-conflict situations. Without doubt, the liberal
institutionalist model for institutional progress is one, which is confronted by various
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difficulties as documented in this research study. For one, the lawlessness and factional
control over territory in Afghanistan leading up to the US-led invasion and ISAF combat
and training mission had in fact destroyed all remnants of an Afghan state including its
security institutions. The rapid build-up of security institutions with assistance from
NATO member countries in the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban regime should
be understood as a partially successful endeavour in bringing about some degree of
stability and order where none had existed in the decade before.
The institutional challenges described in this chapter pertaining to the
bureaucratic structures of the MoD, MoI and NDS are meant to provide a window of
opportunity for further inquiry to engage the core assumptions of liberal institutionalism
and the lessons which can be incorporated in future SSR initiatives. One crucial lesson
learned from the case of Afghanistan is that the SSR model must maintain a level of
rigidity and a comprehensive plan of action to build democratic and accountable
institutions. A series of rigorous checks and balances led by a ministerial watchdog to
prevent corrupt practices in emerging institutional bureaucracies needs to be
incorporated in SSR models for institutional reform. War-torn countries, such as
Afghanistan, are often governed by a mixture of informal and factional modality of
governance split along ethnic, tribal and ideological fault lines facilitated by the culture
of lawlessness as a result of years or even decades of civil war. In post-conflict
situations where SSR is being presented as an opportunity towards democratic
progress, it requires a degree of rigid operational principles to ensure that the
institutional features of reform are in accordance with the liberal institutionalist model of
good governance.
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This also means that future SSR models must incorporate ongoing training
programs for locals in good governance as a progressive policy to ensure accountability
in security institutions and to act as a safeguard against the infiltration of corruption and
nepotism. In order to achieve the objective of good governance, financial aid to security
institutions in fragile states must be conditional on the progress made towards
professionalization of the bureaucracy. Allocating financial resources to the
development of security institutions without addressing the systemic issues of
corruption, informalism, and nepotism as barriers to democratic bureaucratization is
bound to yield inconsistent results. Therefore, a uniform training model in good
governance for the intelligence, military and police bureaucracies along with a series of
oversight bodies within ministerial settings is a necessary requisite to achieve
democratic progress in state security institutions.

Chapter 4: Overview of Research Findings
The fourth chapter of this dissertation explored the field operations realm of
the ANA and the ANP. Since 2003, ISAF’s SSR mission commanded the largest
training mission for security forces in the alliance’s entire history. This mission was
multifaceted in the sense that it not only involved the training and equipping of multiple
security organs of Afghanistan from their inception, but also encompassed capacitybuilding for the institutions discussed above as well. The research findings discussed in
this chapter were supplemented with interviews conducted with senior NATO and
Afghan officials, which in tandem exhibited the turbulent trajectory of the SSR process
in Afghanistan.

200

Despite the turbulent relationship between the NATO trainers and Afghan
recruits, the establishment of the ANA as Afghanistan’s primary defense entity came to
be known as a model of gradual progress among policymakers. The accelerated
training program based on which 178,000 ANA soldiers were armed, trained, and
deployed across all 34 provinces in Afghanistan was unprecedented, if also fraught with
unprecedented operational difficulties. Interviewees delineated that the operational
ability of the ANA to maintain a nation-wide military presence and maintain control over
large swathes of territory in the face of a complex and asymmetrical insurgency was a
testament to the gradual build-up of morale and professionalism within the ANA ranks.
Another positive development highlighted by both the NATO and Afghan officials
was the unwavering financial and moral support committed to the ANA by the NATO
members. The complex challenges posed by the Taliban against the nascent national
unity of the Afghans facilitated an environment conducive to national reconciliation
where members from every ethnic sect patriotically joined the national defense forces of
Afghanistan.
Research findings demonstrated that the land warfare Corps of the ANA
consistently exhibited its ability to professionalize despite the limited resources allocated
to it while the aerial warfare branch’s progress faced significant developmental hurdles.
The Afghan Air Force only benefited in improving its transport and utility duties, and it
continued to rely on the NATO coalition for strategic and precision airstrikes due to the
lack of a tactical fighter squadron. Interviewees indicated that while the NATO member
countries were satisfied with the professional development of the Afghan pilots in being
able to operate and support the ANA with a limited number of aircraft, NATO policy until
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the end of the combat mission in 2014 was strategically engineered to limit AAF funding
and personnel in favour of building capacity at the ANA. As such, progress in all
divisions of the AAF was not symmetrical and varied across many divisions and
branches due to the specific emphasis on building transport and utility squadrons.
This research study also discussed the findings relevant to aspects of the ANP’s
field operation as the primary public law enforcement agency of Afghanistan.
Predominantly, the topic of paramilitarization dominated accounts and narratives about
the ANP, along with the other parallel distinct training programs. The explanations put
forth by various interviewees regarding the ANP’s disparate field operations
performance in Afghanistan were manifold.
For the most part, the discourse surrounding NATO’s SSR process in
Afghanistan was dominated by the performance, development, and assessment of the
ANP. First, the training programs prescribed to institute police sector reform by the
CSTC-A and later by NTM-A in 2009 were replete with militaristic traits. In sum, it was
postulated that the program was a hybrid product of military and police training, which
heavily emphasized counter-insurgency operations yet faintly covered what should have
been the civilian and community policing duties of the ANP as the primary public law
enforcement institution.
Additionally, the establishment of the ALP in coordination with the NTM-A as an
extension of the MoI’s field operations in rural districts proved to be counter-productive.
The short three-week-long training program provided to the ALP proved to be limited in
improving comprehensive police sector reform in rural districts. Criticisms registered by
the interviewees included gross abuses of power, arbitrary arrests and detentions of
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civilians, high desertion rates, and high levels of illicit drug use, which only worked to
weaken and problematize NATO’s overall SSR efforts in the policing sector.
Thirdly, the impatience of the Pentagon in 2009 resulted in a major reinvigoration
of ANP training with the merger of the CSTC-A and the NTM-A command until 2014.
Personnel in the ANP were encouraged by the US-based military and police trainers to
adopt an aggressive military posture in facing the resilient counterinsurgency led by the
Taliban. These trainers, which included the PMT and the POMLT were primarily military
and Special Forces trainers with a predominant focus on threat neutralization through
the use-of-force tactics. On the other hand, the understaffed EUPOL Mission stressed
the development of civilian policing tactics and adopted a somewhat softer approach in
conveying the fundamental principles and underpinnings of SSR to improve law
enforcement across Afghanistan.
Lastly, the CMR system adopted by CSTC-A and NTM-A found only marginal
progress in different operational aspects of the MoI and the ANP. As detailed by NATO
Official 12, a series of annual reports detailing the complex web of policy appraisal
about the ANP performance leading up to 2014 noted certain key facts. The ANP was
most effective when constantly advised, mentored, and trained by coalition forces in
their realm of operations. Furthermore, providing military training to the ANP recruits
neither improved policing methods nor resulted in the reduction of crime and violent
incidents. Hence, the reliance on measuring police effectiveness with firepower and the
omission of public sector input as part of SSR was attributed to the incompetence,
mistrust, and violent incidents that brought into question the operational ability of the
ANP.
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The fourth chapter of this dissertation highlighted the operational challenges
faced by the military and police apparatuses in Afghanistan and how the constant
change in both strategy and command affected the effectiveness of the police and the
Afghan Armed Forces. The lessons learned from the case of Afghanistan’s police and
military reform are useful in appraising the shortcomings of the SSR agenda and how it
can be better aligned with liberal institutional objectives of democratic reform. One key
lesson learned is that multilateral intervention in war-torn countries opens the floodgates
to corruption, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness in security apparatuses if policy
frameworks are not in place to guide the operational aspect of the military and the
police. That is, there is a genuine need for a separation of duties and responsibilities
within NATO member countries to uphold the integrity of the SSR process. NATO
member countries must clearly adopt a role in SSR and then, stay within the scope of
their roles and responsibilities to ensure uniformity, strategic coordination and continuity
in reforming the military and police sector. As witnessed in the case of ANP, the
constant back and forth in the training command between the US and German trainers
not only affected the civilian community policing initiative but was also a setback in
terms of operational efficiency given the lack of direction for Afghan police recruits.
Secondly, the paramilitarization of the police force must be given considerable
thought within NATO policy circles to assess whether it is conducive to the SSR
process. As discussed in chapter four, a core feature of good governance in the police
sector is the incorporation of civilian community policing in upholding the constitutional
rule of law. The relationship between the locals and the police need not be defined only
from the perspective of coercive capacity of one over another but rather requires a
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civilian approach to foster cooperation and nurture the growth of an emerging police
force in a post-conflict setting. Thus, falsely perceiving paramililtarization of the ANP as
an effective tool against terrorism severely affected the civilian community policing
model that deviated from the core principles of SSR’s police reform agenda.
Finally, the military sector reform in future SSR models must consider the
importance of maintaining a balance between different branches of the military. As
revealed by research participants, disproportionate allocation of resources to certain
ANA Corps in Afghanistan affected the development of the Afghan Air Force. Despite
the shortcomings, the gradual development of the ANA allowed for a certain level of
morale and discipline to prevail in cementing the identity of the modern Afghan state
and the sanctity of its constitution. Given the rapid build-up of the ANA in the aftermath
of the collapse of the Taliban regime, it fared better than its police counterpart largely
due to the singular training model led by the US for Afghan recruits. In other words,
consistency in maintaining constant training models for recruits is paramount for NATO
in ensuring similar levels of combat expertise in field operations. Thus, there is a need
for improvement in devising divergent policy models for police and military sector
training programs to ensure there is no overlap in duties and responsibilities between
the two.

Chapter 5: Overview of Research Findings
The final chapter of this dissertation was exclusively dedicated to the field
operations realm of the NDS. The research findings demonstrated superior capabilities
for all operations forces assigned to the NDS in comparison to the ANA and the ANP.

205

The differentiating factor in field operations superiority for the NDS in comparison to the
ANA and ANP was found to be the extensive overseas training provided by the CIA
instead of the CSTC-A and the NTM-A. As communicated by both NATO and Afghan
officials interviewed as part of this research study, the unwavering commitment, morale,
and resolve of the NDS field operations personnel was admirable.
As previously explained, the NDS Force’s operational domain was marred by
underdevelopment and the incapacities of the ANP and the ANA. The NDS Force
served as the primary rapid reactionary force until it was gradually able to train, equip,
and mentor the ANP’s CRU. Among the NATO policymakers, the comprehensive
training provided by the NDS Force to the CRU was hailed as a success story of an
Afghan-led mentorship program. The CRU training program overseen by the NDS Force
yielded higher than expected results in successfully instituting a capable and
professional high-readiness ANP sub-unit. Later in 2013, the transition of the NDS
Force as trainers for the MIU in the ANA redesigned its mandate as a rapidly deployable
security stabilization training force.
Furthermore, the success of the CTF among all other ANSF subunits was
unsurpassed in Afghanistan. The field operations realm of the CTF was dominated by
intelligence-gathering, seizing and securing operations against insurgents, and
proactively devising counter-terrorism strategies to strengthen the overall offensive and
defensive posture of the NDS. Analogous to the NDS Force, the CTF continuously
pursued a policy of patchwork fulfillment in augmenting the ABP’s performance
deficiencies in volatile border regions. However, despite the CTF’s entanglement in a
multi-dimensional operations arena, it continued as a productive and preventive
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counter-terrorism force by coordinating with the ANA and the command of NATO’s
ISAF. Therefore, the highly trained and readily deployable operatives employed by the
CTF were perceived to be the prominent counter-terrorism operations combat force in
the aftermath of NATO’s combat mission in 2014.
In short, the SOF field operations realm was shaped by performance-based
shortcomings and the endemic corruption documented within the ranks of the ANP. As
a result, the SOF replaced the ANP as the central investigative authority directed at the
prevention of significant crimes, which included extortion, abduction, and infiltration of
Taliban insurgents within the ANA and the ANP ranks. Also, the high level of consistent
security coordination between the CTF and the SOF, as conveyed by interviewees,
facilitated the capture and killing of high-profile Taliban insurgents. Hence, insurgents
captured in the SOF operations across Afghanistan produced valuable intelligence,
which not only assisted in improving security outcomes but simultaneously
demonstrated the SOF’s independence and operational capabilities.

Future Research Agenda
It is hoped the findings in this thesis provide future decision-makers and analysts
with more empirical evidence that further aids their efforts and understanding. One area
of future research could involve a more detailed operational post-2014 appraisal of the
ANA, ANP, and the NDS in order to more deeply assess their capabilities and
development in the aftermath of NATO’s combat and SSR mission. It will be important
to analyse the professional development and evolution of the ANA, ANP, and the NDS
in future years in order to assist in the task of improving these forces’ approach to
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ensuring future peace and security in Afghanistan. As this research study focused
exclusively on the period from 2003 to 2014, and NATO’s combat and SSR process in
Afghanistan during those years, more research on the period 2015-2026 would be
useful. Such a future research agenda could traverse many developmental phases of
the ANA, ANP, and the NDS in order to comprehensively engage with the relevant
literature, reports and interviews and to expand associated parameters of knowledge.

Final Conclusions
This research study did not find all-encompassing faults and failure with the SSR
project in Afghanistan, Instead, it was discovered that the execution of the SSR project
including its various stages of policy development, as described herein, proved often
inconsistent and incoherent. Originally, liberal institutionalism seemed sound and
capable, in terms of providing a framework that could explain how vital institutions could
be established; how transitions of power could be more democratic; and how the
international community and important security institutions, like NATO, could be
engaged. However, It was discovered during the research process and particularly
during the interviews of high-level NATO and Afghan officials, that the tenets underlying
liberal institutionalist principles were often poorly and inadequately understood and
implemented between 2003 and 2014. During the long-term course of SSR
implementation, here was continual conflict in terms of instituting reforms – for example
between traditionalists and modern reformists – and this meant indications of
institutional progress digressed from core liberal institutionalist objectives, particularly
objectives surrounding accountability, responsibility, and transparency.
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To reiterate, the case of Afghanistan has proven to be a challenging case for
SSR, in particular given the parallel mandates that were assigned to the NATO-led ISAF
mission to build both state and security apparatuses in a country divided along ethnic,
ideological, and tribal fault lines. What became clear from the research was that the
NATO-led SSR mission in Afghanistan lacked clear and transparent indicators of
progress and of related deficiencies.
Evidently, Afghanistan is a challenging and an unprecedented case for SSR
implementation, particularly since no formal state institutions existed since the fall of Dr.
Najibullah’s Communist regime in 1992. It needs also to be appreciated that NATO’s
mandate constantly shifted from short-term security stabilization to different mandates
committed to safeguarding the emergence of the fragile democratic order in
Afghanistan, for instance through the establishment of the ANSF. The organizational
commands for field operations within the MoD, MoI, and the NDS, for example, were
direct and indirect attempts to professionalize the ANSF through NATO’s professionalled ISAF. Yet despite such limitations in institutional and human capacity, the NATO-led
initiative to establish the ANSF set in motion the gradual and long-term build-up of vital
security organs.
What has become clear from the research findings in this study is that although
the ANSF has gained some levels of proficiency in field operations and modern counterterrorism tactics, there remains significant room for improvement in order to fully
professionalize the ANSF. The core liberal democratic objectives of SSR –
accountability, responsibility, and transparency –were simply not previously fully
implemented in institutional features and operational aspects of ANSF. The overlooked
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missed challenges may largely be attributed to the challenging case of Afghanistan where the statebuilding enterprise continued to be pursued in tandem with SSR
initiatives. As this dissertation demonstrates, the processes that led from the incipient
stages of state-building to full-fledged democratization and that were supported by high
levels of security were beset with setbacks, trial-and-error policy formation and inherent
tribulations. However, not to have set forth on the road and to have instead expected
failed and failing states to provide sufficient political capital and will to attain fair and
inclusive governance on their own would be misplaced, naïve, and fail to consider the
rights of all stakeholders within and without the state.
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Appendix 1: Research Methodology Revisited

Participants in the study were primarily asked to reflect upon a set of issues,
including but not limited to the following four themes:
Theme 1: the extent of bureaucratic and institutional reform at the Afghan Ministry of
Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS);
Theme 2: the field operations aspect and capabilities of MoD, MoI, and NDS units;
Theme 3: the aspects of NATO’s SSR approach that worked, did not work, and why?
Theme 4: how NATO’s SSR agenda could have been done better in hindsight? And
what could be done better now?
In short, participants were asked what they thought about how NATO’s SSR
agenda provided institutional assistance to the rebuilding of the security sector in
Afghanistan. In order to better understand what is revealed by the research process
itself – as well as the interviews of participants who engaged in SSR – the study makes
use of qualitative interviews. It needs to be emphasized that the interviews focused
mainly on what interviewees – having participated in devising security policy in
Afghanistan – thought about crafting and institutionalizing security policy. Interviewees
for this research were mainly comprised of mid-to-high-level elites and policymakers in
NATO and Afghanistan who were extensively involved in SSR. Approximately the same
set of questions was asked of each person.
This methodological approach was selected from the beginning of the research
study because it was assumed that the interviewer would encounter a varied group of
interviewees, each with their own sets of occupation-and training-related language or
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jargon, understandings, and specializations. In short, many of the questions were
designed to be universally relevant and the final questions at the end of the interview
were designed to be specifically relevant, depending on the interviewee’s position, past
experiences and occupation.
This research made use of non-invasive observation techniques including elite
interviewing (Lancaster, 2016, 7), as well as other techniques such as examining
training and education manuals and relevant pieces of legislation including various and
significant documents and articles related to SSR itself. In total, 30 people were
interviewed by the author, Sakhi Naimpoor, at various institutions including NATO
headquarters in Brussels, Belgium; Hamburg, Germany; Kabul, Afghanistan; and
Ottawa, Canada between February 2017 and October 2018. The interviews were
conducted at different institutions and locations listed in the chart, ‘Interviews
Conducted’ included as an Appendix in this thesis.
The interviews were conducted in public spaces including boardrooms,
cafeterias, hotel lobbies and offices. All interviews were conducted in the English
language as each interviewee chose to speak English (rather than Farsi). Each face-toface interview lasted approximately 30 minutes to one hour. The only identifiable
information that was collected included the interviewee’s full name, work address
including work email address; and information about where the interview will be and
was conducted. The interviewer’s handwritten notes identified the research participant
by a number, not their name, address or any personal information. All this information
was not shared with others and this information was collected in order to contact the
participant by email and to arrange the location and time of one study visit interview.

212

A general outline of relevant questions had been developed and was approved
as part of the September 2017 application to the University of Western Ontario
Research Ethics Board. Some of the approved questions were intentionally devised as
open-ended to allow for a diversity of responses. Approximately the same set of
questions was asked of each person. See the following Non-Medical Research Ethics
Board Approved Interview Questions.
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Non-Medical Research Ethics Board Approved Interview Questions
To mitigate against the possibility of biased evidence selection and researcher
subjectivity as well as to clarify the research agenda, these NMREB-approved research
questions were asked of each interviewee:
1. In your opinion, what were some of the advantages and disadvantages of the
Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda pursued by NATO in Afghanistan?
2. In your opinion, what were some institutional barriers and shortcomings in NATO’s
attempts to institute SSR in the Ministry of Defense (MoD)?
3. In your opinion, what were some institutional barriers in NATO’s attempts to institute
SSR in the Ministry of Interior (MoI)?
4. In your opinion, what were some institutional barriers and shortcomings in NATO’s
attempts to institute SSR in the National Directorate of Security (NDS)?
5. Did the increase in the number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) represent
a core feature of SSR as pursued by NATO?
6.. In your opinion, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the field operations
capabilities of the Afghan National Police (ANP)?
7. In your opinion, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the field operations
capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA)?
8. In your opinion, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the field operations
capabilities of the NDS?
9. In hindsight, do you think that NATO’s SSR process was effective, somewhat
effective, deficient or a failure at instituting Western-style security structures?

214

Addendum: Non-Medical Research Ethics Board Approved Interview Questions
1. The Non-Medical Research Ethics Board Approved Interview Questions are the
questions which the University of Western Ontario’s Ethics Review approved,
before the interviewees were selected, and then contacted by email to request
interviews. (No persons were contacted with an in-person recruitment script).
This form of interview method sought to provide the researcher with reliable,
comparable qualitative data from seasoned mid- to high-level bureaucrats who
subsequently expressed no concerns about feeling pressured to grant interviews.
None of the interviewees declined to participate in the study. None withdrew from
the study, during the single study visit, or afterwards by email or telephone.
2. At the beginning of the research process, the author had published nascent
opinions about the practical considerations for Canadian and Afghan policy of
continuing involvement in Afghanistan (Naimpoor, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a,
Naimpoor and Simpson 2017b, Naimpoor, 2017c). But during the research
process, the collaborator discovered more about theoretical constructs and
institutional approaches that were helpful to mid-and high-level decision-makers.
Those discoveries led to important implications for making further theoretical and
empirical contributions to the international security field that the author published
in 6 opinion pieces or ‘op eds’ and 1 short journal article (Naimpoor, 2017d,
Naimpoor and Simpson, 20118a, Naimpoor, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b, Naimpoor
and Simpson, 2020a, Naimpoor, 2020b). However, none of the interviewees
were identified and none of the exact information they conveyed was used in
these publications. For that reason, the bibliographic references to these
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publications were not emailed to the interviewees. Once this thesis is
successfully defended and published through the School of Graduate Studies, its
URL and bibliographic reference will be emailed to each interviewee. Future
publications will not use the information, published herein, without the
interviewee’s permission, as outlined in the written Information and consent
letter.
3. Each interviewee was selected through a NMREB-approved recruitment process
using email. The email specified the purpose of the study, potential risks (i.e.
none) and benefits (i.e. benefits to society), their right to confidentiality, and their
right to refuse to participate in the study.
4. The interviewees comprised “elites” – policy-makers who have been directly
involved in the process of Security Sector Reform – and by employing a NMREBapproved respondent-driven sampling process, the researcher did not contact
potential participants, identified by another participant in the research study.
5. Some interviewees mentioned this study to others and provided details of the
study and contact information to them so that they could contact the author if
they were interested in taking part in the study. However, the author was the only
person who made initial email contact with potential participants; and the author
had access to contact information due to organizational structures historically
made available on NATO websites and the homepages of the Afghanistan
government.
6. Before the face-to-face interview proceeded, the author asked for the
interviewee’s written consent in an ‘Information and Consent Letter’. The letter
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asked to use their position and title and the information that was being directly or
indirectly collected. Due to the sensitive role of NATO and Afghan officials and
security protocols, each interviewee verbally requested not to be directly quoted
with their names, titles and institutional affiliations associated with their direct
quotations. But each interviewee assented to have their full name; position; title;
location; and date of the interview published in the dissertation. Then each
interviewee consented in the ‘Verbal Assent Script’ - that exactly reflected the
written Information and Consent Letter - that all the information they would impart
could be included in the published thesis so long as they themselves were not
identified by name using direct or indirect quotes. Then they were informed, and
later in writing in a ‘Debriefing Letter’ that the bibliographic reference to the
dissertation would be emailed to them upon publication of the thesis. As outlined
in the letter that was emailed to them a few days after the interview was done,
each interviewee received two emails that detailed the project title: “NATO’s
Security Sector Approach in Afghanistan”; the project’s number, NMREB 107921;
the project’s Principal Investigator (PI), Dr. Erika Simpson; and the project’s
collaborator (the author of this thesis, Sakhi Naimpoor). These emails and all
such written materials also included the project’s sponsor (Social Science
Centre, The University of Western Ontario), and in case of concerns about
conflict of interest, the contact information and mail address of the PI’s office in
the Social Science Centre at the University of Western Ontario.
7. For more detailed information on the recruitment process including the written
and verbal script of the letter of information and consent letter (which included a
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set of boxes with questions that were checked or not checked) as well as the
debriefing letter, please see Project ID NMREB 107921, Project Title “NATO’s
Security Sector Approach in Afghanistan”, created 02/Sep/2017, available upon
request from the Office of Research Ethics and WREM, its online research
protocol submission form, retrieved Jan. 26, 2020 from
https://www.uwo.ca/research/ethics/human/WesternREM.html. If you have
further questions about the Ethics protocol, please contact the Principal
Investigator (PI), Dr. Erika Simpson or if you have any questions about the
conduct of this study, you may contact the Office of Human Research Ethics 1
(519) 661-3036 or 1-844-720-9816 or email: ethics@uwo.ca
8. The interviewees conducted by collaborator, Sakhi Naimpoor, without the PI
present, were conducted without using audio or video recordings, and therefore
without transcribing the interviews. In each case, the 30 interviewees declined
written and verbal offers in the Letter of Information and Consent Letter and
Verbal Script to audio-record the interviews, therefore no transcripts were made.
With the permission of the interviewee, however, the researcher took handwritten
notes during the interviews. These handwritten notes were numbered, without
identifying the interviewee, and are retained in a locked filing cabinet in the
researcher’s office in Ancaster, Ontario. Separately, the master list of
interviewees, with their associated numbers, but without the handwritten notes,
are kept in a locked filing cabinet in the office of the PI (Dr. Erika Simpson’s
Office in Room 4157, Social Science, University of Western Ontario). The
handwritten notes, master list of interviewees, and the list of associated numbers,
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will be destroyed in 7 years, according to the University of Western Ontario’s
protocol. Nobody except the author has access to the handwritten notes and the
master list with associated numbers, and only the PI has access to the list of
associated numbers. As the Consent Letter explained, the information in the
notes will not be used for any future publications, including book chapters, journal
articles or opinion pieces (‘op eds’).
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